A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…

So that if we carefully distinguish the proper Objects of the several Acts of the Will, it will not appear by this, and such-like Instances, that there is any Difference between Volition and Preference; or that a Man's choosing, liking best, or being best pleased with a Thing, are not the same with his willing that Thing; as they seem to be according to those general and more natural Notions of Men, according to which Language is formed. Thus an Act of the Will is commonly expressed by it's pleasing a Man to do thus or thus; and a Man's doing as he wills, and doing as he pleases, are the same Thing in common Speech.

So that if we carefully distinguish the proper Objects of the several Acts of the Will, it will not appear by this, and such-like Instances, that there is any Difference between Volition and Preference; or that a Man's chusing, liking best, or being best pleased with a Thing, are not the same with his willing that Thing; as they seem to be according to those general and more natural Notions of Men, according to which Language is formed. Thus an Act of the Will is commonly express'd by it's pleasing a Man to do thus or thus; and a Man's doing as he wills, and doing as he pleases, are the same Thing in common Speech.

Mr. Locke says, ^†The Will is perfectly distinguished from Desire; which in the very same Action may have a quite contrary Tendency from that which our Wills set us upon. A Man (says he) whom I cannot deny, may oblige me to use Persuasions to another, which, at the same Time I am speaking, I may wish may not prevail on him. In this Case 'tis plain the Will and Desire run counter. I don't suppose, that Will and Desire are Words of precisely the same Signification: Will seems to be a Word of a more general Signification, extending to Things present and absent. Desire respects something absent. I may prefer my present Situation and Posture, suppose sitting still, or having my Eyes open, and so may will it. But yet I can't think they are so entirely distinct, that they can ever be properly said to run counter. A Man never, in any Instance, wills any Thing contrary to his Desires, or desires any Thing contrary to his Will. The forementioned Instance, which Mr. Locke produces, don't prove that he ever does. He may, on some Consideration or other, will to utter Speeches which have a Tendency