N05663:213
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, virtue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, vertue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]
printed by S. Kneeland, 1754
Part 2 › Section 8: Concerning the supposed Liberty of the Will, as opposite to all Necessity.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
I. I would consider whether Volition is a Thing that ever does, or can come to pass, in this Manner, contingently.
And here it must be remembered, that it has been already shown, that Nothing can ever come to pass without a Cause, or Reason why it exists in this Manner rather than another; and the Evidence of this has been particularly applied to the Acts of the Will. Now if this be so, it will demonstrably follow, that the Acts of the Will are never contingent, or without Necessity, in the Sense spoken of; in as much as those Things which have a Cause, or Reason of their Existence, must be connected with their Cause. This appears by the following Considerations.
And here it must be remembred, that it has been already shewn, that Nothing can ever come to pass without a Cause, or Reason why it exists in this Manner rather than another; and the Evidence of this has been pa•ticularly applied to the Acts of the Will. Now if this be so, it will demonstrably follow, that the Acts of the Will are never contingent, or without Necessity, in the Sense spoken of; in as much as those Things which have a Cause, or Reason of their Existence, must be connected with their Cause. This appears by the following Considerations.
1. For an Event to have a Cause and Ground of it's Existence, and yet not to be connected with it's Cause, is an Inconsistence. For if the Event be not connected with the Cause, it is not dependent on the Cause; it's Existence is as it were loose from it's Influence, and may attend it, or may not; it being a mere Contingence, whether it follows or attends the Influence of the Cause, or not: And that is the same Thing as not to be dependent ⟨p. 74⟩