Concerning the supposed Liberty of the Will, as opposite to all Necessity.
pp. 73–7611 passages
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
SECTION VIII. Concerning the supposed Liberty of the Will, as opposite to all Necessity.
'TIS a Thing chiefly insisted on by Arminians, in this Controversy, as a Thing most important and essential in human Liberty, that Volitions, or the Acts of the Will, are contingent Events; understanding Contingence as opposite, not only to Constraint, but to all Necessity. Therefore I would particularly consider this Matter. And
1. I would enquire, whether there is, or can be any such Thing, as a Volition which is contingent in such a Sense, as not only to come to pass without any Necessity of Constraint or Co-action, but also without a Necessity of Consequence, or an infallible Connection with any Thing foregoing.
2. Whether, if it were so, this would at all help the Cause of Liberty.
I. I would consider whether Volition is a Thing that ever does, or can come to pass, in this Manner, contingently.
And here it must be remembered, that it has been already shown, that Nothing can ever come to pass without a Cause, or Reason why it exists in this Manner rather than another; and the Evidence of this has been particularly applied to the Acts of the Will. Now if this be so, it will demonstrably follow, that the Acts of the Will are never contingent, or without Necessity, in the Sense spoken of; in as much as those Things which have a Cause, or Reason of their Existence, must be connected with their Cause. This appears by the following Considerations.