A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…

And here it must be remembered, that it has been already shown, that Nothing can ever come to pass without a Cause, or Reason why it exists in this Manner rather than another; and the Evidence of this has been particularly applied to the Acts of the Will. Now if this be so, it will demonstrably follow, that the Acts of the Will are never contingent, or without Necessity, in the Sense spoken of; in as much as those Things which have a Cause, or Reason of their Existence, must be connected with their Cause. This appears by the following Considerations.

And here it must be remembred, that it has been already shewn, that Nothing can ever come to pass without a Cause, or Reason why it exists in this Manner rather than another; and the Evidence of this has been pa•ticularly applied to the Acts of the Will. Now if this be so, it will demonstrably follow, that the Acts of the Will are never contingent, or without Necessity, in the Sense spoken of; in as much as those Things which have a Cause, or Reason of their Existence, must be connected with their Cause. This appears by the following Considerations.

1. For an Event to have a Cause and Ground of it's Existence, and yet not to be connected with it's Cause, is an Inconsistence. For if the Event be not connected with the Cause, it is not dependent on the Cause; it's Existence is as it were loose from it's Influence, and may attend it, or may not; it being a mere Contingence, whether it follows or attends the Influence of the Cause, or not: And that is the same Thing as not to be dependent ⟨p. 74⟩on it. And to say, the Event is not dependent on it's Cause, is absurd: 'Tis the same Thing as to say, it is not it's Cause, nor the Event the Effect of it: For Dependence on the Influence of a Cause, is the very Notion of an Effect. If there be no such Relation between one Thing and another, consisting in the Connection and Dependence of one Thing on the Influence of another, then it is certain there is no such Relation between them as is signified by the Terms Cause and Effect. So far as an Event is dependent on a Cause, and connected with it, so much Causality s there in the Case, and no more. The Cause does, or brings to pass no more in any Event, than is dependent on it. If we say, the Connection and Dependence is not total, but partial, and that the Effect, tho' it has some Connection and Dependence, yet is not entirely dependent on it; That is the same Thing as to say, that not all that is in the Event is an Effect of that Cause, but that only Part of it arises from thence, and Part some other Way.