A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…

2. If there are some Events which are not necessarily connected with their Causes, then it will follow, that there are some Things which come to pass without any Cause, contrary to the Supposition. For if there be any Event which was not necessarily connected with the Influence of the Cause under such Circumstances, then it was contingent whether it would attend or follow the Influence of the Cause, or no; It might have followed, and it might not, when the Cause was the same, it's Influence the same, and under the same Circumstances. And if so, why did it follow, rather than not follow? There is no Cause or Reason of this. Therefore here is something without any Cause or Reason why it is, viz. the following of the Effect on the Influence of the Cause, with which it was not necessarily connected. If there be a necessary Connection of the Effect on any Thing antecedent, then we may suppose that sometimes the Event will follow the Cause, and sometimes not, when the Cause is the same, and in every Respect in the same State & Circumstances. And what can be the Cause and Reason of this strange Phenomenon, even this Diversity, that in one Instance, the Effect should follow, in another not? 'Tis evident by the Supposition, that this is wholly without any Cause or Ground. Here is something in the present Manner of the Ex•••ence of Things, and State of the World, that is absolutely without a Cause. Which is contrary to the Supposition, and contrary to what has been before demonstrated.

3. To suppose there are some Events which have a Cause and Ground of their Existence, that yet are not necessarily connected with their Cause, is to suppose that they have a Cause which is not their Cause. Thus […] the Effect be not necessarily connected with the Cause, with it's Influence, and influential Circumstances; then, as I observed before, 'tis a Thing possible and supposable, that the Cause may sometimes exert the same Influence, under the same Circumstances, and yet the Effect not follow. And if this actually happens in any Instance, this Instance is a Proof, in Fact, that the Influence of the Cause is not sufficient to produce the Effect. For if it had been sufficient, it would have done it. And yet, by the Supposition, in another Instance, the same Cause, with perfectly the same Influence, and when all Circumstances which have any Influence, are the same, it as followed with the Effect. By which it is manifest, that the Effect in this last Instance was not owing to the Influence of the Cause, but must come to pass some other Way. For it was proved before, that the Influence of the Cause was not sufficient to produce the Effect. And if it was not sufficient to produce it, then the Production of it could not be owing to that Influence, but must be owing to something else, or owing to Nothing. And if the Effect be not owing to the Influence of the Cause, then it is not the Cause. Which brings us to the Contradiction, of a Cause, and no Cause, that which is the Ground and Reason of the Existence of a Thing, and at the same Time is not the Ground and Reason of it's Existence, nor is sufficient to be so.