N05663:243
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, virtue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, vertue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]
printed by S. Kneeland, 1754
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Now, how can these Things hang together? How can the Mind first act, and by it's Act of Volition and Choice determine what Motives shall be the Ground and Reason of it's Volition and Choice? For this supposes, the Choice is already made, before the Motive has it's •ffect; and that the Volition is already exerted, before the Motive prevails, so as actually to be the Ground of the Volition; and makes the prevailing of the Motive, the Consequence of the Volition, which yet it is the Ground of. If the Mind has already chosen to comply with a Motive, and to yield to it's Excitement, it don't need to yield to it after this: for the Thing is effected already, that the Motive would excite to, and the Will is before-hand with the Excitement; and the Excitement comes in too late, and is needless and in vain afterwards. If the Mind has already chosen to yield to a Motive which invites to a Thing, that implies and in Fact is a choosing the Thing invited to; and the very Act of Choice is before the Influence of the Motive which induces, and is the Ground of the Choice; the Son is before-hand with the Father that begets him: The Choice is supposed to be the Ground of that Influence of the Motive, which very Influence is supposed to be the Ground of the Choice. And so Vice versa, The Choice is supposed to be the Consequence of the Influence of the Motive, which Influence of the Motive is the Consequence of that very Choice.
Now, how can these Things hang together? How can the Mind first act, and by it's Act of Volition and Choice determine what Motives shall be the Ground and Reason of it's Volition and Choice? For this supposes, the Choice is already made, before the Motive has it's •ffect; and that the Volition is already exerted, before the Motive prevails, so as actually to be the Ground of the Volition; and makes the prevailing of the Motive, the Consequence of the Volition, which yet it is the Ground of. If the Mind has already chosen to comply with a Motive, and to yield to it's Excitement, it don't need to yield to it after this: for the Thing is effected already, that the Motive would excite to, and the Will is before-hand with the Excitement; and the Excitement comes in too late, and is needless and in vain afterwards. If the Mind has already chosen to yield to a Motive which invites to a Thing, that implies and in Fact is a chusing the Thing invited to; and the very Act of Choice is before the Influence of the Motive which induces, and is the Ground of the Choice; the Son is before-hand with the Father that begets him: The Choice is supposed to be the Ground of that Influence of the Motive, which very Influence is supposed to be the Ground of the Choice. And so Vice versa, The Choice is supposed to be the Consequence of the Influence of the Motive, which Influence of the Motive is the Consequence of that very Choice.