N05663:256
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, virtue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, vertue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]
printed by S. Kneeland, 1754
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
And lastly, it may be observed, that however Mr. Chubb does much insist that no Volition can take Place without ⟨p. 93⟩some Motive to induce it, which previously disposes the M•nd to it; yet, as he also insists that the Mind without Reference to any previous superior Strength of Motives, picks and chooses for it's Motive to follow; He himself herein plainly supposes, that with Regard to the Mind's Preference of one Motive before another, it is not the Motive that disposes the Will, but the Will disposes it self to follow the Motive.
And lastly, it may be observed, that however Mr. Chubb does much insist that no Volition can take Place without ⟨p. 93⟩some Motive to induce it, which previously disposes the M•nd to it; yet, as he also insists that the Mind without Reference to any previous superiour Strength of Motives, picks and chuses for it's Motive to follow; He himself herein plainly supposes, that with Regard to the Mind's Preference of one Motive before another, it is not the Motive that disposes the Will, but the Will disposes it self to follow the Motive.
IV. Mr. Chubb supposes Necessity to be utterly inconsistent with Agency; and that to suppose a Being to be an Agent in that which is necessary, is a plain Contradiction. P. 311. And throughout his Discourses on the Subject of Liberty, he supposes, that Necessity cannot consist with Agency or Freedom; and that to suppose otherwise, is to make Liberty and Necessity, Action and Passion, the same Thing. And so he seems to suppose, that there is no Action strictly speaking, but Volition; and that as to the Effects of Volition in Body or Mind, in themselves considered, being necessary, they are said to be free, only as they are the Effects of an Act that is not necessary.