A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…

And besides, if the Will acts first towards the Motive before it falls under it's Influence, and the prevailing of the Motive upon it to induce it to act and choose, be the Fruit and Consequence of it's Act and Choice, then how is the Motive a PREVIOUS Ground and Reason of the Act and Choice, so that in the Nature of the Things, Volition cannot take Place without some PREVIOUS Reason and Motive to induce it; and that this Act is consequent upon, and follows the Motive? Which Things Mr. Chubb often asserts, as of certain and undoubted Truth. ⟨p. 87⟩So that the very same Motive is both previous and consequent, both before and after, both the Ground and Fruit of the very same Thing!

And besides, if the Will acts first towards the Motive before it falls under it's Influence, and the prevailing of the Motive upon it to induce it to act and chuse, be the Fruit and Consequence of it's Act and Choice, then how is the Motive a PREVIOUS Ground and Reason of the Act and Choice, so that in the Nature of the Things, Volition cannot take Place without some PREVIOUS Reason and Motive to induce it; and that this Act is consequent upon, and follows the Motive? Which Things Mr. Chubb oft•n asserts, as of certain and undoubted Truth. ⟨p. 87⟩So that the very same Motive is both previous and consequent, both before and after, both the Ground and Fruit of the very same Thing!

II. Agreeable to the fore-mentioned inconsistent Notion of the Will's first acting towards the Motive, choosing whether it will comply with it, in order to it's becoming a Ground of the Will's acting, before any Act of Volition can take Place, Mr. Chubb frequently calls Motives and Excitements to the Action of the Will, the passive Ground or Reason of that Action. Which is a remarkable Phrase; than which I presume there is none more unintelligible, and void of distinct and consistent Meaning, in all the Writings of Duns, Scotus, or Thomas Aquinas. When he represents the Motive to Action or Volition as passive, he must mean—passive in that Affair, or passive with Respect to that Action which he speaks of; otherwise it is Nothing to his Purpose, or relating to the Design of his Argument: He must mean (if that can be called a Meaning) that the Motive to Volition is first acted upon or towards by the Volition, choosing to yield to it, making it a Ground of Action, or determining to fetch it's Influence from thence; and so to make it a previous Ground of it's own Excitation and Existence. Which is the same Absurdity, as if one should say, that the Soul of Man, or any other Thing should, previous to it's existing, choose what Cause it would come into Existence by, and should act upon it's Cause, to fetch Influence from thence, to bring it into Being; and so it's Cause should be a passive Ground of it's Existence!