A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…

IV. Mr. Chubb supposes Necessity to be utterly inconsistent with Agency; and that to suppose a Being to be an Agent in that which is necessary, is a plain Contradiction. P. 311. And throughout his Discourses on the Subject of Liberty, he supposes, that Necessity cannot consist with Agency or Freedom; and that to suppose otherwise, is to make Liberty and Necessity, Action and Passion, the same Thing. And so he seems to suppose, that there is no Action strictly speaking, but Volition; and that as to the Effects of Volition in Body or Mind, in themselves considered, being necessary, they are said to be free, only as they are the Effects of an Act that is not necessary.

And yet, according to him, Volition it self is the Effect of Volition; yea, every Act of free Volition: and therefore every Act of free Volition must, by what has now been observed from Him, be necessary. That every Act of free Volition is it self the Effect of Volition, is abundantly supposed by H•m. In P. 341, he says, If a Man is such a Creature as I have above proved him to be, that is, if he has in him a Power or Liberty of doing either Good or Evil, and either of these is the Subject of his own free Choice, so that he might, IF HE HAD PLEASED, have CHOSEN and done the contrary. —Here He supposes, all that is Good or Evil in Man is the Effect of his Choice; and so that his good or evil Choice it self is the Effect of his Pleasure or Choice, in these Words, He might if he had PLEASED, have CHOSEN the contrary. So in P. 356. Tho' it be highly reasonable, that a Man should always choose the greater Good, — yet he may, if he PLEASE, CHOOSE otherwise. Which is the same Thing as if he had said, He may, if he chooses, choose otherwise. And then he goes on, — that is, he may, if he pleases, choose what is good for himself &c. And again in the same Page, The Will is not confined by the Understanding to any particular Sort of Good, whether greater or less; but is at ⟨p. 94⟩Liberty to choose what Kind of Good it pleases. —If there be any Meaning in these last Words, the Meaning must be this, that the Will is at Liberty to choose what Kind of Good it chooses to choose; supposing the Act of Choice it self determined by an antecedent Choice. The Liberty Mr. Chubb speaks of, is not only a Man's having Power to move his Body agreeably to an antecedent Act of Choice, but to use or exert the Faculties of his Soul. Thus, in P. 379. speaking of the Faculties of his Mind, he says, Man has Power, and is at Liberty to neglect these Faculties, to use them aright, or to abuse them, as he pleases. And that he supposes an Act of Choice, or Exercise of Pleasure, properly distinct from, and antecedent to those Acts thus chosen, directing, commanding and producing the chosen Acts, and even the Acts of Choice themselves, is very plain in P. 283. He can command his Actions; and herein consists his Liberty; He can give or deny himself that Pleasure a he pleases. And P. 377.