A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…

Whatever is a Motive, in this Sense, must be something that is extant in the View or Apprehension of the Understanding, or perceiving Faculty. Nothing can induce or invite the Mind to will or act any Thing, any further than it is perceived, or is some Way or other in the Mind's view; for what is wholly unperceived, and perfectly out of the Mind's view, can't affect the Mind at all. 'Tis most evident, that nothing is in the Mind, or reaches it, or takes any Hold of it, any otherwise than as it is perceived or thought of.

Whatever is a Motive, in this Sense, must be something that is extant in the View or Apprehension of the Understanding, or perceiving Faculty. Nothing can induce or invite the Mind to will or act any Thing, any further than it is perceived, or is some Way or other in the Mind's view; for what is wholly unperceived, and perfectly out of the Mind's view, can't affect the Mind at all. 'Tis most evident, that nothing is in the Mind, or reaches it, or takes any Hold of it, any otherwise than as it is perceiv'd or tho't of.

And I think it must also be allowed by all, that every Thing that is properly called a Motive, Excitement or Inducement to a perceiving willing Agent, has some Sort and Degree of Tendency, or Advantage to move or excite the Will, previous to the Effect, or to the Act of the Will excited. This previous Tendency of the Motive is what I call the Strength of the Motive. That Motive which has a less Degree of previous Advantage or Tendency to move the Will, or that appears less inviting, as it stands in the View of the Mind, is what I call a weaker Motive. On the contrary, that which appears most inviting, and has, by what appears concerning it to the Understanding or Apprehension, the greatest Degree of previous Tendency to excite and induce the Choice, is what I call the strongest Motive. And in this Sense, I suppose the Will is always determined by the strongest Motive.