N05663:51
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, virtue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, vertue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]
printed by S. Kneeland, 1754
Part 1 › Section 2: Concerning the Determination of the Will.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
1. With respect to the Degree of Judgment, or Firmness of Assent, with which the Mind judges the Pleasure to be future. Because it is more agreeable to have a certain Happiness, than an uncertain one; and a Pleasure viewed as more probable, all other Things being equal, is more agreeable to the Mind, than that which is viewed as less probable.
1. With respect to the Degree of Iudgment, or Firmness of Assent, with which the Mind judges the Pleasure to be future. Because it is more agreable to have a certain Happiness, than an uncertain one; and a Pleasure view'd as more probable, all other Things being equal, is more agreable to the Mind, than that which is view'd as less probable.
2. With respect to the Degree of the Idea of the future Pleasure. With Regard to Things which are the Subject of our Thoughts, either past, present or future, we have much more of an Idea or Apprehension of some Things than others; that is, our Idea is much more clear, lively and strong. Thus, the Ideas we have of sensible Things by immediate Sensation, are usually much more lively than those we have by mere Imagination, or by Contemplation of them when absent. ⟨p. 10⟩My Idea of the Sun, when I look upon it, is more vivid, than when I only think of it. Our Idea of the sweet Relish of a delicious Fruit is usually stronger when we taste it, than when we only imagine it. And sometimes, the Ideas we have of Things by Contemplation, are much stronger & clearer, than at other Times. Thus, a Man at one Time has a much stronger Idea of the Pleasure which is to be enjoyed in eating some Sort of Food that he loves, than at another. Now the Degree, or Strength of the Idea or Sense that Men have of future Good or Evil, is one Thing that has great Influence on their Minds to excite Choice or Volition. When of two Kinds of future Pleasure, which the Mind considers of, and are presented for Choice, both are supposed exactly equal by the Judgment, and both equally certain, and all other Things are equal, but only one of them is what the Mind has a far more lively Sense of, than of the other; this has the greatest Advantage by far to affect and attract the Mind, and move the Will. 'Tis now more agreeable to the Mind, to take the Pleasure it has a strong and lively Sense of, than that which it has only a faint Idea of. The View of the former is attended with the strongest Appetite, and the greatest Uneasiness attends the Want of it; and 'tis agreeable to the Mind, to have Uneasiness removed, and it's Appetite gratified. And if several future Enjoyments are presented together, as Competitors for the Choice of the Mind, some of them judged to be greater, and others less; the Mind also having a greater Sense and more lively Idea of the Good of some of them, and of others a less; and some are viewed as of greater Certainty or Probability than others; and those Enjoyments that appear most agreeable in one of these Respects, appears least so in others: