N05663:480
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, virtue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, vertue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]
printed by S. Kneeland, 1754
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
'Tis evident, that no habitual Disposition of Heart, whether it be to a greater or lesser Degree, can be in any Degree virtuous or vicious; or the Actions which proceed from them at all Praise or Blame-worthy. Because, tho' we should suppose the Habit not to be of such Strength as wholly to take away all moral Ability and self-determining Power; or hinder but that, altho' the Act be partly from Bias, yet it may be in Part from Self-determination; yet in this Case, all that is from antecedent Bias must be set aside, as of no Consideration; and in estimating the Degree of Virtue or Vice, no more must be considered than what arises from self-determining Power, without any Influence of that Bias, because Liberty is exercised in no more: So that all that is the Exercise of habitual Inclination, is thrown away, as not belonging to the Morality of the Action. By which it appears▪ that no Exercise of these Habits, let 'em be stronger or weak•• can ever have any Thing of the Nature of either Virtue or Vice.
'Tis evident, that no habitual Disposition of Heart, whether it be to a greater or lesser Degree, can be in any Degree vertuous or vicious; or the Actions which proceed from them at all Praise or Blame-worthy. Because, tho' we should suppose the Habit not to be of such Strength as wholly to take away all moral Ability and self-determining Power; or hinder but that, altho' the Act be partly from Bias, yet it may be in Part from Self-determination; yet in this Case, all that is from antecedent Bias must be set aside, as of no Consideration; and in estimating the Degree of Vertue or Vice, no more must be considered than what arises from self-determining Power, without any Influence of that Bias, because Liberty is exercised in no more: So that all that is the Exercise of habitual Inclination, is thrown away, as not belonging to the Morality of the Action. By which it appears▪ that no Exercise of these Habits, let 'em be stronger or weak•• can ever have any Thing of the Nature of either Vertue or Vice.