N05663:493
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, virtue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, vertue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]
printed by S. Kneeland, 1754
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
2. If it were so, that all Virtue and Vice, in every Case, consisted only in the Act of the Will, whereby it determines whether to consider or no, it would not alter the Case in the least, as to the present Argument. For still in this Act of the Will on this Determination, it is induced by some Motive, and necessarily follows the strongest Motive; and so is necessary, even in that Act wherein alone it is either virtuous or vicious.
2. If it were so, that all Vertue and Vice, in every Case, consisted only in the Act of the Will, whereby it determines whether to consider or no, it would not alter the Case in the least, as to the present Argument. For still in this Act of the Will on this Determination, it is induced by some Motive, and necessarily follows the strongest Motive; and so is necessary, even in that Act wherein alone it is either vertuous or vicious.
One Thing more I would observe, concerning the Inconsistence of Arminian Notions of moral Agency with the Influence of Motives.— I suppose none will deny, that 'tis possible for Motives to be set before the Mind so powerful, and exhibited in so strong a Light, and under so advantageous Circumstances, as to be invincible; and such as the Mind cannot but yield to. In this Case, Arminians will doubtless say, Liberty is destroyed. And if so, then if Motives are exhibited with half so much Power, they hinder Liberty in Proportion to their Strength, and go half-way towards destroying it. If a Thousand Degrees of Motive abolish all Liberty, then five ⟨p. 188⟩Hundred take it half away. If one Degree of the Influence of Motive don't at all infringe or diminish Liberty, then no more do two Degrees; for Nothing doubled, is still Nothing. And if two Degrees don't diminish the Will's Liberty, no more do four, eight, sixteen, or six Thousand. For Nothing multiplied never so much, comes to but Nothing. If there be nothing in the Nature of Motive or moral Suasion, that is at all opposite to Liberty, then the greatest Degree of it can't hurt Liberty. But if there be any Thing in the Nature of the Thing, that is against Liberty, then the least Degree of it hurts it in some Degree; and consequently hurts and diminishes Virtue. If invincible Motives to that Action which is good, take away all the Freedom of the Act, and so all the Virtue of it; then the more forcible the Motives are, so much the worse, so much the less Virtue; and the weaker the Motives are, the better for the Cause of Virtue; and none is best of all.