A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…

But I would here observe, that however the Defenders of that Notion of Liberty of Will, which I have opposed, exclaim against the Doctrine of Calvinists, as tending to bring Men into Doubts, concerning the moral Perfections of God; it is their Scheme, and not the Scheme of Calvinists, that indeed is justly chargeable with this. For 'tis one of the most fundamental Points of their Scheme of Things, that a Freedom of Will, consisting in self-determination, without all Necessity, is essential to Moral Agency. This is the same Thing as to say, that such a Determination of the Will without all Necessity, must be in all intelligent Beings, in those Things, wherein they are moral Agents, or in their moral Acts: And from this it will follow, that God's Will is not necessarily determined, in any Thing he does, as a moral Agent, or in any of his Acts that are of a moral Nature. So that in all Things, wherein he acts holily, justly and truly, he don't act necessarily; or his Will is not necessarily determined to act holily and justly; because if it were necessarily determined, he would not be a moral Agent in thus acting: His Will would be attended with Necessity: which they say is inconsistent with moral Agency: He can act ⟨p. 273⟩no otherwise; He is at no Liberty in the Affair; He is determined by unavoidable invincible Necessity: Therefore such Agency is no moral Agency; ye•, no Agency at all, properly speaking: A necessary Agent is no Agent: He being passive, and subject to Necessity, what He does is no Act of his, but an Effect of a Necessity prior to any Act of his. This is agreeable to their Manner of arguing. Now then what is become of all our Proof of the moral Perfections of God? How can we prove, that God certainly will in any one Instance do that which is just and holy; seeing his Will is determined in the Matter by no Necessity? We have no other Way of proving that any Thing certainly will be, but only by the Necessity of the Event. Where we can see no Necessity, but that the Thing may be, or may not be, there we are unavoidably left at a Loss. We have no other Way properly and truly to demonstrate the moral Perfections of God, but the Way that Mr. Chubb proves them, in P. 252, 261, 262, 263. of his Tracts; viz. That God must necessarily perfectly know what is most worthy and valuable in it self, which in the Nature of Things is best and fittest to be done.

But I would here observe, that however the Defenders of that Notion of Liberty of Will, which I have opposed, exclaim against the Doctrine of Calvinists, as tending to bring Men into Doubts, concerning the moral Perfections of God; it is their Scheme, and not the Scheme of Calvinists, that indeed is justly chargeable with this. For 'tis one of the most fundamental Points of their Scheme of Things, that a Freedom of Will, consisting in self-determination, without all Necessity, is essential to Moral Agency. This is the same Thing as to say, that such a Determination of the Will without all Necessity, must be in all intelligent Beings, in those Things, wherein they are moral Agents, or in their moral Acts: And from this it will follow, that God's Will is not necessarily determined, in any Thing he does, as a moral Agent, or in any of his Acts that are of a moral Nature. So that in all Things, wherein he acts holily, justly and truly, he don't act necessarily; or his Will is not necessarily determined to act holily and justly; because if it were necessarily determined, he would not be a moral Agent in thus acting: His Will would be attended with Necessity: which they say is inconsistent with moral Agency: He can act