A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…

I. If that be made an Objection against the foregoing Reasoning, that it is metaphysical, or may properly be reduced to the Science of Metaphysics, it is a very impertinent Objection; whether it be so or no, is not worthy of any Dispute or Controversy. If the Reasoning be good, 'tis as frivolous to enquire what Science it is properly reduced to, as what Language it is delivered in: And for a Man to go about to confute the Arguments of his Opponent, by telling him, his Arguments are Metaphysical, would be as weak as to tell him, his Arguments could not be substantial, because they were written in French or Latin. The Question is not, Whether what is said be Metaphysics, Physics, Logic, or Mathematics, Latin, French, English, or Mohawk? But, Whether the Reasoning be good, and the Arguments truly conclusive? The foregoing Arguments are no more metaphysical, than those which we use against the Papists, to disprove their Doctrine of Transubstantiation; alleging, it is inconsistent with the Notion of corporeal Identity, that it should be in ten Thousand Places at the same Time. 'Tis by metaphysical Arguments only we are able to prove, that the rational Soul is not corporeal; that Lead or Sand can't think; that Thoughts are not square or round, or don't weigh a Pound. The Arguments by which we prove ⟨p. 279⟩the Being of God, if handled closely and distinctly, so as to show their clear and demonstrative Evidence, must be metaphysically treated. 'Tis by Metaphysics only, that we can demonstrate, that God is not limited to a Place, or is not mutable; that he is not ignorant, or forgetful; that it is impossible for him to lie, or be unjust; and that there is one God only, and not Hundreds or Thousands. And indeed we have no strict Demonstration of any Thing, excepting mathematical Truths, but by Metaphysics. We can have no Proof, that is properly demonstrative, of any one Proposition, relating to the Being and Nature of God, his Creation of the World, the Dependence of all Things on him, the Nature of Bodies or Spirits, the Nature of our own Souls, or any of the great Truths of Morality and natural Religion, but what is metaphysical. I am willing, my Arguments should be brought to the Test of the strictest and justest Reason, and that a clear, distinct and determinate Meaning of the Terms I use, should be insisted on;

I. If that be made an Objection against the foregoing Reasoning, that it is metaphysical, or may properly be reduced to the Science of Metaphysicks, it is a very impertinent Objection; whether it be so or no, is not worthy of any Dispute or Controversy. If the Reasoning be good, 'tis as frivolous to enquire what Science it is properly reduc'd to, as what Language it is delivered in: And for a Man to go about to confute the Arguments of his Opponent, by telling him, his Arguments are Metaphysical, would be as weak as to tell him, his Arguments could not be substantial, because they were written in French or Latin. The Question is not, Whether what is said be Metaphysicks, Physicks, Logick, or Mathematicks, Latin, French, English, or Mohawk? But, Whether the Reasoning be good, and the Arguments truly conclusive? The foregoing Arguments are no more metaphysical, than those which we use against the Papists, to disprove their Doctrine of Transubstantiation; alledging, it is inconsistent with the Notion of corporeal Identity, that it should be in ten Thousand Places at the same Time. 'Tis by metaphysical Arguments only we are able to prove, that the rational Soul is not corporeal; that Lead or Sand can't think; that Thoughts are not square or round, or don't weigh a Pound. The Arguments by which we prove