N05663:93
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, virtue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, vertue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]
printed by S. Kneeland, 1754
Part 1 › Section 4: Of the Distinction of natural and moral Necessity, and Inability.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
2. When I use this Distinction of moral and natural Necessity, I would not be understood to suppose, that if any Thing comes to pass by the former Kind of Necessity, the Nature of Things is not concerned in it, as well as in the latter. I don't mean to determine, that when a moral Habit or Motive is so strong, that the Act of the Will infallibly follows, this is not owing to the Nature of Things. But these are the Names that these two Kinds of Necessity have usually been called by; and they must be distinguished by some Names or other; for there is a Distinction or Difference between them, that is very important in its Consequences. Which Difference does not lie so much in the Nature of the Connection, as in the two Terms connected. The Cause with which the Effect is connected, is of a particular Kind; viz. that which is of a moral Nature; either some previous habitual Disposition, or some Motive exhibited to the Understanding. And the Effect is also of a particular Kind; being likewise of a moral Nature; consisting in some Inclination or Volition of the Soul, or voluntary Action.
2. When I use this Distinction of moral and natural Necessity, I would not be understood to suppose, that if any Thing comes to pass by the former Kind of Necessity, the Nature of Things is not concerned in it, as well as in the latter. I don't mean to determine, that when a moral Habit or Motive is so strong, that the Act of the Will in•allibly follows, this is not owing to the Nature of Things. But these are the Names that these two Kinds of Necessity have usually been called by; and they must be distinguished by some Names or other; for there is a Distinction or Difference between them, that is very important in its Consequences. Which Difference does not lie so much in the Nature of the Connection, as in the two Terms connected. The Cause with which the Effect is connected, is of a particular Kind; viz. that which is of a moral Nature; either some previous habitual Disposition, or some Motive exhibited to the Understanding. And the Effect is also of a particular Kind; being likewise of a moral Nature; consisting in some Inclination or Volition of the Soul, or voluntary Action.