Here it may be of Use to observe this Distinction of moral Inability, viz. of that which is general and habitual, and that which is particular and occasional. By a general and habitual moral Inability, I mean an Inability in the Heart to all Exercises or Acts of Will of that Nature or Kind, through a fixed and habitual Inclination, or an habitual and stated Defect, or Want of a certain Kind of Inclination. Thus a very ill-natured Man may be unable to exert such Acts of Benevolence, as another, who is full of good Nature, co• monly exerts; and a Man, whose Heart is habitually void o• Gratitude, may be unable to exert such and such grateful Acts, through that stated Defect of a grateful Inclination. By particular and occasional moral Inability, I mean an Inability of the Will or Heart to a particular Act, thro' the Strength or Defect of present Motives, or of Inducements presented to the View of the Understanding, on this Occasion.— If it be so, that the Will is always determined by the strongest Motive, then it must always have an Inability, in this latter Sense, to act otherwise than it does; it not being possible, in any Case, that the Will, should, at present, go against the Motive which has now, all Things considered, the greatest Strength & Advantage to excite and induce it.—The former of these Kinds of moral Inability, consisting in that which is stated habitual and general, is most commonly called by the Name of Inability; because the Word Inability, in its most proper and original Signification, has Respect to some stated Defect. And this especially obtains the Name of Inability also upon another Account: — I before observed, that the Word Inability in its original and most common Use, is a relative Term; and has Respect to Will and Endeavour, as supposable in the Case, and as insufficient to bring to pass the Thing desired and endeavoured. Now there may be more of an Appearance & Shadow of this, with Respect to the Acts which arise from a fixed and strong Habit, than others that arise only from transient Occasions and Causes. Indeed Will and Endeavour against, or diverse from present Acts of the Will, are in no Case supposable, whether those Acts be occasional or habitual; for that would be to suppose the Will, at present, to be otherwise than, at present▪ ⟨p. 26⟩it is.
Here it may be of Use to observe this Distinction of moral Inability, viz. of that which is general and habitual, and that which is particular and occasional. By a general and habitual moral Inability, I mean an Inability in the Heart to all Exercises or Acts of Will of that Nature or Kind, through a fix'd and habitual Inclination, or an habitual and stated Defect, or Want of a certain Kind of Inclination. Thus a very ill-natur'd Man may be unable to exert such Acts of Benevolence, as another, who is full of good Nature, co• monly exerts; and a Man, whose Heart is habitually void o• Gratitude, may be unable to exert such and such grateful Acts, through that stated Defect of a grateful Inclination. By particular and occasional moral Inability, I mean an Inability of the Will or Heart to a particular Act, thro' the Strength or Defect of present Motives, or of Inducements presented to the View of the Understanding, on this Occasion.— If it be so, that the Will is always determined by the strongest Motive, then it must always have an Inability, in this latter Sense, to act otherwise than it does; it not being possible, in any Case, that the Will, should, at present, go against the Motive which has now, all Things considered, the greatest Strength & Advantage to excite and induce it.—The former of these Kinds of moral Inability, consisting in that which is stated habitual and general, is most commonly called by the Name of Inability; because the Word Inability, in its most proper and original Signification, has Respect to some stated Defect. And this especially obtains the Name of Inability also upon another Account: — I before observed, that the Word Inability in its original and most common Use, is a relative Term; and has Respect to Will and Endeavour, as supposable in the Case, and as insufficient to bring to pass the Thing desired and endeavoured. Now there may be more of an Appearance & Shadow of this, with Respect to the Acts which arise from a fix'd and strong Habit, than others that arise only from transient Occasions and Causes. Indeed Will and Endeavour against, or diverse from present Acts of the Will, are in no Case supposable, whether those Acts be occasional or habitual; for that would be to suppose the Will, at present, to be otherwise than, at present▪ ⟨p. 26⟩it is.