N05663:96
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, virtue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, vertue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]
printed by S. Kneeland, 1754
Part 1 › Section 4: Of the Distinction of natural and moral Necessity, and Inability.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
What has been said of natural and moral Necessity, may serve to explain what is intended by natural and moral Inability. We are said to be naturally unable to do a Thing, when we can't do it if we will, because what is most commonly called Nature don't allow of it, or because of some impeding Defect or Obstacle that is extrinsic to the Will; either in the Faculty of Understanding, Constitution of Body, or external Objects. Moral Inability consists not in any of these Things; but either in the Want of Inclination; or the Strength of a contrary Inclination; or the want of sufficient Motives in View, to induce and excite the Act of the Will, or the Strength of apparent Motives to the contrary. Or both these may be resolved into one; and it may be said in one Word, that moral Inability consists in the Opposition or Want of Inclination. For when a Person is unable to will or choose such a Thing, through a Defect of Motives, or Prevalence of contrary Motives, 'tis the same Thing as his being unable through the Want of an Inclination, or the Prevalence of a contrary Inclination, in such Circumstances, and under the Influence of such Views.
What has been said of natural and moral Necessity, may serve to explain what is intended by natural and moral Inability. We are said to be naturally unable to do a Thing, when we can't do it if we will, because what is most commonly called Nature don't allow of it, or because of some impeding Defect or Obstacle that is extrinsic to the Will; either in the Faculty of Understanding, Constitution of Body, or external Objects. Moral Inability consists not in any of these Things; but either in the Want of Inclination; or the Strength of a contrary Inclination; or the want of sufficient Motives in View, to induce and excite the Act of the Will, or the Strength of apparent Motives to the contrary. Or both these may be resolved into one; and it may be said in one Word, that moral Inability consists in the Opposition or Want of Inclination. For when a Person is unable to will or chuse such a Thing, through a Defect of Motives, or Prevalence of contrary Motives, 'tis the same Thing as his being unable through the Want of an Inclination, or the Prevalence of a contrary Inclination, in such Circumstances, and under the Influence of such Views.