N06399:323
The great Christian doctrine of original sin defended
The great Christian doctrine of original sin defended; evidences of it's [sic] truth produced, and arguments to the contrary answered. Containing, in particular, a reply to the objections and arguings of Dr. John Taylor, in his book, entitled, "The Scripture-doctrine of original sin proposed to free and candid examination, &c. / By the late Reverend and learned Jonathan Edwards, president of the College of New-Jersey. ; [Thirteen lines of quotations]The great Christian doctrine of original sin defended; evidences of it's [sic] truth produced, and arguments to the contrary answered. Containing, in particular, a reply to the objections and arguings of Dr. John Taylor, in his book, intitled, "The Scripture-doctrine of original sin proposed to free and candid examination, &c. / By the late Reverend and learned Jonathan Edwards, president of the College of New-Jersey. ; [Thirteen lines of quotations]
printed by S. Kneeland, 1758
The great Christian Doctrine of ORIGINAL SIN defended. › Part 2 › Chapter 1 › Section 1
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
If a virtuous Disposition or Affection is before Acts that proceed from it, then they are before those virtuous Acts of Choice which proceed from it. And therefore there is no Necessity that all virtuous Dispositions or Affections should be the Effect of Choice: and so no such supposed Necessity can be a good Objection against such a Disposition's being natural, or from a Kind of Instinct, implanted in the Mind in it's Creation. Agreeable to what Mr. ⟨p. 142⟩Hutcheson says (Ibid. Sect. III. P. 196, 197.) I know not, says he, for what Reason some will not allow that to be Virtue, which flows from Instinct or Passions. But how do they help themselves? They say, Virtue arises from Reason. What is Reason, but the Sagacity we have in prosecuting any End? The ultimate End proposed by common Moralists, is the Happiness of the Agent himself. And this certainly he is determined to pursue from Instinct. Now may not another Instinct towards the Public, or the Good of others, be as proper a Principle of Virtue, as the Instinct towards private Happiness?—If it be said, that Actions from Instinct are not the Effect of Prudence and Choice, this Objection will hold full as strongly against the Actions which flow from Self-love.
If a virtuous Disposition or Affection is before Acts that proceed from it, then they are before those virtuous Acts of Choice which proceed from it. And therefore there is no Necessity that all virtuous Dispositions or Affections should be the Effect of Choice: and so no such supposed Necessity can be a good Objection against such a Disposition's being natural, or from a Kind of Instinct, implanted in the Mind in it's Creation. Agreable to what Mr. ⟨p. 142⟩Hutcheson says (Ibid. Sect. III. P. 196, 197.) I know not, says he, for what Reason some will not allow that to be Virtue, which flows from Instinct or Passions. But how do they help themselves? They say, Virtue arises from Reason. What is Reason, but the Sagacity we have in prosecuting any End? The ultimate End proposed by common Moralists, is the Happiness of the Agent himself. And this certainly he is determined to pursue from Instinct. Now may not another Instinct towards the Publick, or the Good of others, be as proper a Principle of Virtue, as the Instinct towards private Happiness?—If it be said, that Actions from Instinct are not the Effect of Prudence and Choice, this Objection will hold full as strongly against the Actions which flow from Self-love.