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The great Christian doctrine of original sin defendedJonathan Edwards, 1758

Chapter 1

pp. 139–18482 passagespart 1 of 3

Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.

:311p. 139

CHAP. I.

:312p. 139

Observations relating to Things contained in the three first Chapters of Genesis, with Reference to the Doctrine of Original Sin.

:313p. 139

SECT. I.

:314p. 139

Concerning Original Righteousness; and whether our first Parents were created with Righteousness or moral Rectitude of Heart?

:315p. 139

THE Doctrine of Original Righteousness, or the Creation of our first Parents with holy Principles and Dispositions, has a close Connection, in several Respects, with the Doctrine of Original Sin. Dr.T.—was sensible of this; and accordingly he strenuously opposes this Doctrine, in his Book against Original Sin. And therefore in handling the Subject, I would in the first Place remove this Author's main Objection against this Doctrine; and then show how the Doctrine may be inferred from the Account which Moses gives us, in the three first Chapters of Genesis.

THE Doctrine of Original Righteousness, or the Creation of our first Parents with holy Principles and Dispositions, has a close Connection, in several Respects, with the Doctrine of Original Sin. Dr.T.—was sensible of this; and accordingly he strenuously opposes this Doctrine, in his Book against Original Sin. And therefore in handling the Subject, I would in the first Place remove this Author's main Objection against this Doctrine; and then shew how the Doctrine may be infer'd from the Account which Moses gives us, in the three first Chapters of Genesis.

The great Christian doctrine of original sin defendedJonathan Edwards, 1758

Chapter 1

pp. 139–18482 passagespart 1 of 3

Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.

:311p. 139

CHAP. I.

:312p. 139

Observations relating to Things contained in the three first Chapters of Genesis, with Reference to the Doctrine of Original Sin.

:313p. 139

SECT. I.

:314p. 139

Concerning Original Righteousness; and whether our first Parents were created with Righteousness or moral Rectitude of Heart?

:315p. 139

THE Doctrine of Original Righteousness, or the Creation of our first Parents with holy Principles and Dispositions, has a close Connection, in several Respects, with the Doctrine of Original Sin. Dr.T.—was sensible of this; and accordingly he strenuously opposes this Doctrine, in his Book against Original Sin. And therefore in handling the Subject, I would in the first Place remove this Author's main Objection against this Doctrine; and then shew how the Doctrine may be infer'd from the Account which Moses gives us, in the three first Chapters of Genesis.

:318p. 140–141

In the first Place, I think it a Contradiction to the Nature of Things, as judged of by the common Sense of Mankind. It is agreeable to the Sense of the Minds of Men in all Nations and Ages, not only that the Fruit or Effect of a good Choice is virtuous, but the good Choice itself, from whence that Effect proceeds; yea, and not only so, but also the antecedent good Disposition, Temper or Affection of Mind, from whence proceeds that good Choice, is virtuous. This is the general Notion, not that Principles derive their Goodness from Actions, but that Actions derive their Goodness from the Principles whence they proceed; and so that the Act of choosing that which is good, is no further virtuous than it proceeds from a good Principle, or virtuous Disposition of Mind. Which supposes, that a virtuous Disposition of Mind may be before a virtuous ⟨p. 141⟩Act of Choice; and that therefore it is not necessary that there should first be Thought, Reflection and Choice, before there can be any virtuous Disposition. If the Choice be first, before the Existence of a good Disposition of Heart, what signifies that Choice? There can, according to our natural Notions, be no Virtue in a Choice which proceeds from no virtuous Principle, but from mere Self-love, Ambition, or some animal Appetite. And therefore a virtuous Temper of Mind may be before a good Act of Choice, as a Tree may be before the Fruit, and the Fountain before the Stream which proceeds from it.

In the first Place, I think it a Contradiction to the Nature of Things, as judged of by the common Sense of Mankind. It is agreable to the Sense of the Minds of Men in all Nations and Ages, not only that the Fruit or Effect of a good Choice is virtuous, but the good Choice itself, from whence that Effect proceeds; yea, and not only so, but also the antecedent good Disposition, Temper or Affection of Mind, from whence proceeds that good Choice, is virtuous. This is the general Notion, not that Principles derive their Goodness from Actions, but that Actions derive their Goodness from the Principles whence they proceed; and so that the Act of chusing that which is good, is no further virtuous than it proceeds from a good Principle, or virtuous Disposition of Mind. Which supposes, that a virtuous Disposition of Mind may be before a virtu•us ⟨p. 141⟩Act of Choice; and that therefore it is not necessary that there should first be Thought, Reflection and Choice, before there can be any virtuous Disposition. If the Choice be first, before the Existence of a good Disposition of Heart, what signifies that Choice? There can, according to our natural Notions, be no Virtue in a Choice which proceeds from no virtuous Principle, but from me•r Selflove, Ambition, or some animal Appetite. And therefore a virtuous Temper of Mind may be before a good Act of Choice, as a Tree may be before the Fruit, and the Fountain before the Stream which proceeds from it.

:320p. 141–142

If a virtuous Disposition or Affection is before Acts that proceed from it, then they are before those virtuous Acts of Choice which proceed from it. And therefore there is no Necessity that all virtuous Dispositions or Affections should be the Effect of Choice: and so no such supposed Necessity can be a good Objection against such a Disposition's being natural, or from a Kind of Instinct, implanted in the Mind in it's Creation. Agreeable to what Mr. ⟨p. 142⟩Hutcheson says (Ibid. Sect. III. P. 196, 197.) I know not, says he, for what Reason some will not allow that to be Virtue, which flows from Instinct or Passions. But how do they help themselves? They say, Virtue arises from Reason. What is Reason, but the Sagacity we have in prosecuting any End? The ultimate End proposed by common Moralists, is the Happiness of the Agent himself. And this certainly he is determined to pursue from Instinct. Now may not another Instinct towards the Public, or the Good of others, be as proper a Principle of Virtue, as the Instinct towards private Happiness?—If it be said, that Actions from Instinct are not the Effect of Prudence and Choice, this Objection will hold full as strongly against the Actions which flow from Self-love.

If a virtuous Disposition or Affection is before Acts that proceed from it, then they are before those virtuous Acts of Choice which proceed from it. And therefore there is no Necessity that all virtuous Dispositions or Affections should be the Effect of Choice: and so no such supposed Necessity can be a good Objection against such a Disposition's being natural, or from a Kind of Instinct, implanted in the Mind in it's Creation. Agreable to what Mr. ⟨p. 142⟩Hutcheson says (Ibid. Sect. III. P. 196, 197.) I know not, says he, for what Reason some will not allow that to be Virtue, which flows from Instinct or Passions. But how do they help themselves? They say, Virtue arises from Reason. What is Reason, but the Sagacity we have in prosecuting any End? The ultimate End proposed by common Moralists, is the Happiness of the Agent himself. And this certainly he is determined to pursue from Instinct. Now may not another Instinct towards the Publick, or the Good of others, be as proper a Principle of Virtue, as the Instinct towards private Happiness?—If it be said, that Actions from Instinct are not the Effect of Prudence and Choice, this Objection will hold full as strongly against the Actions which flow from Self-love.

:321p. 142–143

And if we consider what Dr. T. declares as his own Notion of the Essence of Virtue, we shall find, what he so confidently and often affirms, of it's being essential to all Virtue that it should follow Choice and proceed from it, is no less repugnant to that, than it is to the Nature of Things, and the general Notions of Mankind. For 'tis his Notion, as well as Mr. Hutcheson's, that the Essence of Virtue lies in good Affection, and particularly in Benevolence or Love: as he very fully declares in these Words in his Key, ^*That the Word that signifies Goodness and Mercy, should also signify moral Rectitude in general, will not seem strange, if we consider that Love is the fulfilling of the Law. Goodness according to the Sense of Scripture, and the Nature of Things, includes all moral Rectitude; which, I reckon, may every Part of it, where it is true and genuine, be resolved into this single Principle. If it be so indeed, then certainly no Act whatsoever can have moral Rectitude, but what proceeds from this Principle. And consequently no Act of Volition or Choice can have any moral Rectitude, that takes Place before this Principles exists. And yet he most ⟨p. 143⟩confidently affirms, that Thought, Reflection and Choice must go before Virtue, and that all Virtue or Righteousness must be the Fruit of preceding Choice. This brings his Scheme to an evident Contradiction. For no Act of Choice can be virtuous but what proceeds from a Principle of Benevolence or Love; for he insists that all genuine moral Rectitude, in every Part of it, is resolved into this single Principle: And yet the Principle of Benevolence is self, can't be virtuous, unless it proceeds from Choice; for he affirms that Nothing can have the Nature of Virtue but what comes from Choice. So that virtuous Love, as the Principle of all Virtue, must go before virtuous Choice, and be the Principle or Spring of it; and yet virtuous Choice must go before virtuous Benevolence, and be the Spring of that. If a virtuous Act of Choice goes before a Principle of Benevolence, and produces it, then this virtuous Act is something distinct from that Principle which follows it, and is it's Effect. So that here is at least one Part of Virtue, yea the Spring and Source of all Virtue, viz. a virtuous Choice, that cannot be resolved into that single Principle of Love.

And if we consider what Dr. T. declares as his own Notion of the Essence of Virtue, we shall find, what he so confidently and often affirms, of it's being essential to all Virtue that it should follow Choice and proceed from it, is no less repugnant to that, than it is to the Nature of Things, and the general Notions of Mankind. For 'tis his Notion, as well as Mr. Hutcheson's, that the Essence of Virtue lies in good Affection, and particularly in Benevol•nce or Love: as he very fully declares in these Words in his Key, ^*That the Word that signifies Goodness and Mercy, should also signify moral Rectitude in general, will not seem strange, if we consider that Love is the fulfilling of the Law. Goodness according to the Sense of Scripture, and the Nature of Things, includes all moral Rectitude; which, I reckon, may every Part of it, where it is true and genuine, be resolved into this single Principle. If it be so indeed, then certainly no Act whatsoever can have moral Rectitude, but what proceeds from this Principle. And consequently no Act of Volition or Choice can have any moral Rectitude, that takes Place before this Principles exists. And yet he most ⟨p. 143⟩confidently affirms, that Thought, Reflection and Choice must go before Virtue, and that all Virtue or Right•ousness must be the Fruit of preceeding Choice. This brings his Scheme to an evident Contradiction. For no Act of Choice can be virtuous but what proceeds from a Principle of Benevolence or Love; for he insists that all genuine moral Rectitude, in every Part of it, is resolved into this single Principle: And yet the Principle of Benevolence is self, can't be virtuous, unless it proceeds from Choice; for he affirms that Nothing can have the Nature of Virtue but what comes from Choice. So that virtuous Love, as the Principle of all Virtue, must go before virtuous Choice, and be the Principle or Spring of it; and yet virtuous Choice must go before virtuous Benevolence, and be the Spring of that. If a virtuous Act of Choice goes before a Principle of Benevolence, and produces it, then this virtuous Act is something distinct from that Principle which follows it, and is it's Effect. So that here is at least one Part of Virtue, yea the Spring and Source of all Virtue, viz. a virtuous Choice, that cannot be resolved into that single Principle of Love.

*Marginal Note annexed to §. 326.

:322p. 143–144

Here also it is worthy to be observed, that Dr. T. P. 128. says, The Cause of every Effect, alone, is chargeable with the Effect it produceth, or which proceedeth from it: And so he argues that if the Effect be bad, the Cause alone is sinful. According to which Reasoning, when the Effect is good, the Cause alone is righteous or virtuous; to the Cause is to be ascribed all the Praise of the good Effect it produceth. And by the same Reasoning it will follow, that if, as Dr. T. says, Adam must choose to be righteous, before he was righteous, and if it be essential to the Nature of Righteousness or moral Rectitude, that it be the Effect of Choice, and hence a Principle of Benevolence can't have moral Rectitude, unless it proceeds from Choice; then not to the Principle of Benevolence, which is the Effect, but to the foregoing Choice alone, is to be ascribed all the Virtue or Righteousness that is in the Case. And so in Stead of all moral Rectitude, in every Part of it, being ⟨p. 144⟩resolved into that single Principle of Benevolence, no moral Rectitude, in any Part of it, is to be resolved into that Principle: But all is to be resolved into the foregoing Choice, which is the Cause.

Here also it is worthy to be observed, that Dr. T. P. 128. says, The Cause of every Effect, alone, is chargeable with the Effect it produceth, or which proceedeth from it: And so he argues that if the Effect be bad, the Cause alone is sinful. According to which Reasoning, when the Effect is good, the Cause alone is righteous or virtuous; to the Cause is to be ascribed all the Praise of the good Effect it produceth. And by the same Reasoning it will follow, that if, as Dr. T. says, Adam must chuse to be righteous, before he was righteous, and if it be essential to the Nature of Righteousness or moral Rectitude, that it be the Effect of Choice, and hence a Principle of Benevolence can't have moral Rectitude, unless it proceeds from Choice; then not to the Principle of Benevolence, which is the Effect, but to the foregoing Choice alone, is to be ascribed all the Virtue or Righteousness that is in the Case. And so in Stead of all moral Rectitude, in every Part of it, being ⟨p. 144⟩resolved into that single Principle of Benevolence, no moral Rectitude, in any Part of it, is to be resolved into that Principle: But all is to be resolved into the foregoing Choice, which is the Cause.

:324p. 144–153

And with respect to Adam, let us consider how upon Dr. T—r's Principles, it was possible he ever should have any such Thing as Righteousness, by any Means at all. In the State wherein God created him, he could have no such thing as Love to God, or any Love or Benevolence in his Heart. For if so, there would have been Original Righteousness; there would have been genuine moral Rectitude; Nothing would be wanting: For our Author says, True genuine moral Rectitude, in every Part of it, is to be resolved into this single Principle. But if he were wholly without any such thing as Love to God, or any virtuous Love, how should he come by Virtue? The Answer doubtless will be, By Act of Choice: he must first choose to be virtuous. But what if he did choose to be virtuous? It could not be from Love to God, or any ⟨p. 153⟩virtuous Principle, that he chose it; for, by the Supposition, he has no such Principle in his Heart: And if he chooses it without such a Principle, still, according to this Author, there is no Virtue in his Choice; for all Virtue, he says, is to be resolved into that single Principle of Love. Or will he say, there may be produced in the Heart a virtuous Benevolence by an Act or Acts of Choice, that are not virtuous? But this don't consist with what he implicitly asserts. That to the Cause alone is to be ascribed what is in the Effect. So that there is no Way can possibly be devised, in Consistence with Dr. T—r's Scheme, in which Adam ever could have any Righteousness, or could ever either obtain any Principle of Virtue, or perform any one virtuous Act.

And with respect to Adam, let us consider how upon Dr. T—r's Principles, it was possible he ever should have any such Thing as Righteousness, by any Means at all. In the State wherein God created him, he could have no such thing as Love to God, or any Love or Benevolence in his Heart. For if so, there would have been Original Righteousness; there would have been genuine moral Rectitude; Nothing would be wanting: For our Author says, True genuine moral Rectitude, in every Part of it, is to be resolved into this single Principle. But if he were wholly without any such thing as Love to God, or any virtuous Love, how should he come by Virtue? The Answer doubtless will be, By Act of Choice: he must first chuse to be virtuous. But what if he did chuse to be virtuous? It could not be from Love to God, or any ⟨p. 153⟩virtuous Principle, that he chose it; for, by the Supposition, he has no such Principle in his Heart: And if he chuses it without such a Principle, still, according to this Author, there is no Virtue in his Choice; for all Virtue, he says, is to be resolved into that single Principle of Love. Or will he say, there may be produced in the Heart a virtuous Benevolence by an Act or Acts of Choice, that are not virtuous? But this don't consist with what he implicitly asserts. That to the Cause alone is to be ascribed what is in the Effect. So that there is no Way can possibly be devised, in Consistence with Dr. T—r's Scheme, in which Adam ever could have any Righteousness, or could ever either obtain any Principle of Virtue, or perform any one virtuous Act.

:327p. 153–154¶1

1. This History leads us to suppose, Adam's Sin, with Relation to the forbidden Fruit, was the first Sin he committed. Which could not have been, had he not always, till then, been perfectly righteous, righteous from the first ⟨p. 154⟩Moment of his Existence; and consequently, created or brought into Existence righteous. In a moral Agent, subject to moral Obligations, it is the same thing, to be perfectly innocent, as to be perfectly righteous. It must be the same, because there can no more be any Medium between Sin and Righteousness, or between being right and being wrong, in a moral Sense, than there can be a Medium between straight and crooked, in a natural Sense. Adam was brought into Existence capable of acting immediately, as a moral Agent: and therefore he was immediately under a Rule of right Action: he was obliged as soon as he existed, to act right. And if he was obliged to act right as soon as he existed, He was obliged even then to be inclined to act right. Dr. T. says, P. 442. "Adam could not sin without a sinful Inclination": ^*And, just for the same Reason, he could not do right, without an Inclination to right Action. And as he was obliged to act right from the first Moment of his Existence, and did do so, 'till he sinned in the Affair of the forbidden Fruit, he must have an Inclination or Disposition of Heart to do right the first Moment of his Existence; and that is the same as to be created, or brought into Existence, with an Inclination to right Action, or, which is the same Thing, a virtuous and holy Disposition of Heart.

1. This History leads us to suppose, Adam's Sin, with Relation to the forbidden Fruit, was the first Sin he committed. Which could not have been, had he not always, till then, been perfectly righteous, righteous from the first ⟨p. 154⟩Moment of his Existence; and consequently, created or brought into Existence righteous. In a moral Agent, subject to moral Obligations, it is the same thing, to be perfectly innocent, as to be perfectly righteous. It must be the same, because there can no more be any Medium between Sin and Righteousness, or between being right and being wrong, in a moral Sense, than there can be a Medium between streight and crooked, in a natural Sense. Adam was brought into Existence capable of acting immediately, as a moral Agent: and therefore he was immediately under a Rule of right Action: he was obliged as soon as he existed, to act right. And if he was obliged to act right as soon as he existed, He was obliged even then to be inclined to act right. Dr. T. says, P. 442. "Adam could not sin without a sinful Inclination": ^*And, just for the same Reason, he could not do right, without an Inclination to right Action. And as he was obliged to act right from the first Moment of his Existence, and did do so, 'till he sinned in the Affair of the forbidden Fruit, he must have an Inclination or Disposition of Heart to do right the first Moment of his Existence; and that is the same as to be created, or brought into Existence, with an Inclination to right Action, or, which is the same Thing, a virtuous and holy Disposition of Heart.

*This is doubtless true: for altho' there was no natural sinful Inclination in Adam, yet an Inclination to that Sin of eating the forbidden Fruit, was begotten in him by the Delusion and Error he was led into; and this Inclination to eat the forbidden Fruit, must proceed his actual Eating.This is doubtless true: for altho' there was no natural sinful Inclination in Adam, yet an Inclination to that Sin of eating the forbidden Fruit, was begotten in him by the Delusion and Error he was led into; and this Inclination to eat the forbidden Fruit, must preceed his actual Eating.

:328p. 154–155

Here it will be in vain to say, 'Tis true, that it was Adam's Duty to have a good Disposition or Inclination as soon as it was possible to be obtained, in the Nature of Things: but as it could not be without Time to establish such an Habit, which requires antecedent Thought, Reflection, and repeated right Action; therefore all that Adam could be obliged to in the first Place, was to reflect and consider Things in a right Manner, and apply himself to ⟨p. 155⟩right Action, in order to obtain a right Disposition. For, this supposes, that even this Reflection and Consideration, which he was obliged to, was right Action. Surely he was obliged to it no otherwise than as a thing that was right: And therefore he must have an Inclination to this right Action immediately, before he could perform those first right Actions. And as the Inclination to them should be right, the Principle or Disposition from which he performed even these Actions, must be good. Otherwise, the Actions would not be right in the Sight of Him who looks at the Heart; nor would they answer the Man's Obligations, or be a doing his Duty, if he had done them for some sinister End, and not from a Regard to God and his Duty. Therefore there must be a Regard to God and his Duty implanted in him at his first Existence: Otherwise, 'tis certain, he would have done Nothing from a Regard to God and his Duty; no, not so much as to reflect and consider, and try to obtain such a Disposition. The very Supposition of a Disposition to right Action being first obtained by repeated right Action, is grossly inconsistent with it self: for it supposes a Course of right Action, before there is a Disposition to perform any right Action.

Here it will be in vain to say, 'Tis true, that it was Adam's Duty to have a good Disposition or Inclination as soon as it was possible to be obtained, in the Nature of Things: but as it could not be without Time to establish such an Habit, which requires antecedent Thought, Reflexion, and repeated right Action; therefore all that Adam could be obliged to in the first Place, was to reflect and consider Things in a right Manner, and apply himself to ⟨p. 155⟩right Action, in order to obtain a right Disposition. For, this supposes, that even this Reflexion and Consideration, which he was obliged to, was right Action. Surely he was obliged to it no otherwise than as a thing that was right: And therefore he must have an Inclination to this right Action immediately, before he could perform those first right Actions. And as the Inclination to them should be right, the Principle or Disposition from which he performed even these Actions, must be good. Otherwise, the Actions would not be right in the Sight of Him who looks at the Heart; nor would they answer the Man's Obligations, or be a doing his Duty, if he had done them for some sinister End, and not from a Regard to God and his Duty. Therefore there must be a Regard to God and his Duty implanted in him at his first Existence: Otherwise, 'tis certain, he would have done Nothing from a Regard to God and his Duty; no, not so much as to reflect and consider, and try to obtain such a Disposition. The very Supposition of a Disposition to right Action being first obtain'd by repeated right Action, is grosly inconsistent with it self: for it supposes a Course of right Action, before there is a Disposition to perform any right Action.

:329p. 155–156

These are no invented Quibbles, or Sophisms. If God expected of Adam any Obedience or Duty to him at all, when he first made him, whether it was in reflecting, considering, or any way exerting the Faculties he had given him, then God expected he should immediately exercise Love and Regard to Him. For how could it be expected, that Adam should have a strict and perfect Regard to God's Commands and Authority, and his Duty to Him, when he had no Love nor Regard to Him in his Heart, nor could it be expected he should have any? If Adam from the Beginning did his Duty to God, and had more Respect to the Will of his Creator, than to other Things, and as much Respect to him as he ought to have; then from the Beginning he had a supreme and perfect Respect and Love to God: And if so, he was created with such a Principle. There is no avoiding the Consequence. Not only external ⟨p. 156⟩Duties, but internal Duties, such as summarily consist in Love, must be immediately required of Adam, as soon as he existed, if any Duty at all was required. For 'tis most apparently absurd, to talk of a spiritual Being, with the Faculties of Understanding and Will, being required to perexternal Duties, without internal. Dr.T. himself, observes, that Love is the fulfilling of the Law, and that all moral Rectitude, even every Part of it, must be resolved into that single Principle. Therefore, if any morally right Act at all, Reflection, Consideration, or any thing else, was required of Adam immediately, on his first Existence, and was performed as required; then he must, the first Moment of his Existence, have his Heart possessed of that Principle of divine Love; which implies the whole of moral Rectitude in every Part of it, according to our Author's own Doctrine; and so the whole of moral Rectitude or Righteousness must begin with his Existence: which is the Thing taught in the Doctrine of original Righteousness.

These are no invented Quibbles, or Sophisms. If God expected of Adam any Obedience or Duty to him at all, when he first made him, whether it was in reflecting, considering, or any way exerting the Faculties he had given him, then God expected he should immediately exercise Love and Regard to Him. For how could it be expected, that Adam should have a strict and perfect Regard to God's Commands and Authority, and his Duty to Him, when he had no Love nor Regard to Him in his Heart, nor could it be expected he should have any? If Adam from the Beginning did his Duty to God, and had more Respect to the Will of his Creator, than to other Things, and as much Respect to him as he ought to have; then from the Beginning he had a supreme and perfect Respect and Love to God: And if so, he was created with such a Principle. There is no avoiding the Consequence. Not only external ⟨p. 156⟩Duties, but internal Duties, such as summarily consist in Love, must be immediately required of Adam, as soon as he existed, if any Duty at all was required. For 'tis most apparently absurd, to talk of a spiritual Being, with the Faculties of Understanding and Will, being required to perexternal Duties, without internal. Dr.T. himself, observes, that Love is the fulfilling of the Law, and that all moral Rectitude, even every Part of it, must be resolved into that single Principle. Therefore, if any morally right Act at all, Reflexion, Consideration, or any thing else, was required of Adam immediately, on his first Existence, and was performed as required; then he must, the first Moment of his Existence, have his Heart possessed of that Principle of divine Love; which implies the whole of moral Rectitude in every Part of it, according to our Author's own Doctrine; and so the whole of moral Rectitude or Righteousness must begin with his Existence: which is the Thing taught in the Doctrine of original Righteousness.

:330p. 156–157

And let us consider how it could be otherwise, than that Adam was always, in every Moment of his Existence, obliged to exercise such Regard or Respect of Heart towards every Object or Thing, as was agreeable to the apparent Merit of that Object. For Instance, would it not at any Time have been a becoming Thing in Adam, on the Exhibition to his Mind of God's infinite Goodness to him, for him to have exercised answerable Gratitude; and the contrary have been unbecoming and odious? And if something had been presented to Adam's View, transcendently amiable in it self, as for Instance, the glorious Perfection of the divine Nature, would it not have become him to love, relish and delight in it? Would not such an Object have merited this? And if the View of an Object so amiable in it self did not affect his Mind with Complacence, would it not, according to the plain Dictates of our Understanding, have shown an unbecoming Temper of Mind? To say, that he had not had Time, by Culture, to form and establish a good Disposition or Relish, is not what would have taken off the Disagreeableness & Odiousness of ⟨p. 157⟩the Temper. And if there had been never so much Time, I don't see, how it could be expected he should improve it aright, in order to obtain a good Disposition, if he had not already some good Disposition to engage him to it.

And let us consider how it could be otherwise, than that Adam was always, in every Moment of his Existence, obliged to exercise such Regard or Respect of Heart towards every Object or Thing, as was agreable to the apparent Merit of that Object. For Instance, would it not at any Time have been a becoming Thing in Adam, on the Exhibition to his Mind of God's infinite Goodness to him, for him to have exercised answerable Gratitude; and the contrary have been unbecoming and odious? And if something had been presented to Adam's View, transcendently amiable in it self, as for Instance, the glorious Perfection of the divine Nature, would it not have become him to love, relish and delight in it? Would not such an Object have merited this? And if the View of an Object so amiable in it self did not affect his Mind with Complacence, would it not, according to the plain Dictates of our Understanding, have shown an unbecoming Temper of Mind? To say, that he had not had Time, by Culture, to form and establish a good Disposition or Relish, is not what would have taken off the Disagreableness & Odiousness of ⟨p. 157⟩the Temper. And if there had been never so much Time, I don't see, how it could be expected he should improve it aright, in order to obtain a good Disposition, if he had not already some good Disposition to engage him to it.

:332p. 157

Human Nature must be created with some Dispositions; a Disposition to relish some Things as good and amiable, and to be averse to other Things as odious & disagreeable. Otherwise, it must be without any such Thing as Inclination or Will: It must be perfectly indifferent, without Preference, without Choice or Aversion towards any Thing, as agreeable or disagreeable. But if it had any concreated Dispositions at all, they must be either right or wrong, either agreeable or disagreeable to the Nature of Things. If Man had at first the highest Relish of those Things that were most excellent and beautiful, a Disposition to have the quickest and highest Delight in those Things that were most worthy of it, then his Dispositions were morally right and amiable, and never can be decent and excellent in a higher Sense. But if he had a Disposition to love most those things that were inferior and less worthy, then his Dispositions were vicious. And 'tis evident there can be no Medium between these.

Human Nature must be created with some Dispositions; a Disposition to relish some Things as good and amiable, and to be averse to other Things as odious & disagreable. Otherwise, it must be without any such Thing as Inclination or Will: It must be perfectly indifferent, without Preference, without Choice or Aversion towards any Thing, as agreable or disagreable. But if it had any concreated Dispositions at all, they must be either right or wrong, either agreable or disagreable to the Nature of Things. If Man had at first the highest Relish of those Things that were most excellent and beautiful, a Disposition to have the quickest and highest Delight in those Things that were most worthy of it, then his Dispositions were morally right and amiable, and never can be decent and excellent in a higher Sense. But if he had a Disposition to love most those things that were inferiour and less worthy, then his Dispositions were vicious. And 'tis evident there can be no Medium between these.

:333p. 157–158¶2

II. This Notion of Adam's being created without a Principle of Holiness in his Heart, taken with the rest of Dr. T—r's Scheme, is inconsistent with what the History in the Beginning of Genesis leads us to suppose of the great Favours and Smiles of Heaven, which Adam enjoyed, while he remained in Innocency. The Mosaic Account suggests to us, that till Adam sinned, he was in happy Circumstances, surrounded with Testimonies and Fruits of God's Favour. This is implicitly owned by Dr. T. when ⟨p. 158⟩he says, P. 252. That in the Dispensation our first Parents were under, before the Fall, they were placed in a Condition proper to engage their Gratitude, Love and Obedience. But it will follow on our Author's Principles, that Adam while in Innocency, was placed in far worse Circumstances, than he was in after his Disobedience, and infinitely worse than his Posterity are in; under unspeakably greater Disadvantages for the avoiding Sin, and the Performance of Duty. For by his Doctrine Adam's Posterity come into the World with their Hearts as free from any Propensity to Sin as he, and he was made as destitute of any Propensity to Righteousness as they: and yet God, in Favour to them, does great Things to restrain them from Sin, & excite them to Virtue, which he never did for Adam in Innocency, but laid him, in the highest Degree, under contrary Disadvantages. God, as an Instance of his great Favour, and fatherly Love to Man, since the Fall, has denied him the Ease and Pleasures of Paradise, which gratified and allured his Senses, and bodily Appetites; that he might diminish his Temptations to Sin: And as a still greater Means to restrain from Sin, and promote Virtue, has subjected him to Labour, Toil & Sorrow in the World: And not only so, but as a Means to promote his spiritual and eternal Good far beyond this, has doomed him to Death: And when all this was found insufficient, he, in further Prosecution of the Designs of his Love, shortened Men's Lives exceedingly, made them twelve or thirteen times shorter than in the first Ages.

II. This Notion of Adam's being created without a Principle of Holiness in his Heart, taken with the rest of Dr. T—r's Scheme, is inconsistent with what the History in the Beginning of Genesis leads us to suppose of the great Favours and Smiles of Heaven, which Adam enjoyed, while he remained in Innocency. The Mosaic Account suggests to us, that till Adam sin'd, he was in happy Circumstances, surrounded with Testimonies and Fruits of God's Favour. This is implicitly own'd by Dr. T. when ⟨p. 158⟩he says, P. 252. That in the Dispensation our first Parents were under, before the Fall, they were placed in a Condition proper to engage their Gratitude, Love and Obedience. But it will follow on our Author's Principles, that Adam while in Innocency, was placed in far worse Circumstances, than he was in after his Disobedience, and infinitely worse than his Posterity are in; under unspeakably greater Disadvantages for the avoiding Sin, and the Performance of Duty. For by his Doctrine Adam's Posterity come into the World with their Hearts as free from any Propensity to Sin as he, and he was made as destitute of any Propensity to Righteousness as they: and yet God, in Favour to them, does great Things to restrain them from Sin, & excit• them to Virtue, which he never did for Adam in Innocency, but laid him, in the highest Degree, under contrary Disadvantages. God, as an Instance of his great Favour, and fatherly Love to Man, since the Fall, has denied him the Ease and Pleasures of Paradise, which gratified and allured his Senses, and bodily Appetites; that he might diminish his Temptations to Sin: And as a still greater Means to restrain from Sin, and promote Virtue, has subjected him to Labour, Toil & Sorrow in the World: And not only so, but as a Means to promote his spiritual and eternal Good far beyond this, has doom'd him to Death: And when all this was found insufficient, he, in further Prosecution of the Designs of his Love, shortned Men's Lives exceedingly, made them twelve or thirteen times shorter than in the first Ages.

:335p. 159–160

These Things are not agreeable to Moses's Account; which represents an happy State of peculiar Favours and Blessings before the Fall, and the Curse coming afterwards: but according to this Scheme, the Curse was before the Fall, and the great Favours and Testimonies of Love followed the Apostasy. And the Curse before the Fall must be a Curse with a Witness, being to so high a Degree the Reverse of such Means, Means so necessary for such a Creature as innocent Man, and in all their Multitude and Fullness proving too little. Paradise therefore must be a mere Delusion! There was indeed a great Show of Favour, in placing Man in the midst of such Delights. But this delightful Garden, it seems, with all it's Beauty and Sweetness, was in it's real Tendency worse than the Apples ⟨p. 160⟩of Sodom: It was but a mere Bait (God forbid the Blasphemy) the more effectually enticing by it's Beauty and Deliciousness, to Adam's eternal Ruin: which might be the more expected to be fatal to him, seeing that he was the first Man that ever existed, having no Superiority of Capacity to his Posterity, and wholly without the Advantage of the Observations, Experiences and Improvements of preceding Generations; which his Posterity have.

These Things are not agreeable to Moses's Account; which represents an happy State of peculiar Favours and Blessings before the Fall, and the Curse coming afterwards: but according to this Scheme, the Curse was before the Fall, and the great Favours and Testimonies of Love followed the Apostacy. And the Curse before the Fall must be a Curse with a Witness, being to so high a Degree the Reverse of such Means, Means so necessary for such a Creature as innocent Man, and in all their Multitude and Fulness proving too little. Paradise therefore must be a meer Delusion! There was indeed a great Shew of Favour, in placing Man in the midst of such Delights. But this delightful Garden, it seems, with all it's Beauty and Sweetness, was in it's real Tendency worse than the Apples ⟨p. 160⟩of Sodom: It was but a meer Bait (God forbid the Blasphemy) the more effectually enticing by it's Beauty and Deliciousness, to Adam's eternal Ruin: which might be the more expected to be fatal to him, seeing that he was the first Man that ever existed, having no Superiority of Capacity to his Posterity, and wholly without the Advantage of the Observations, Experiences and Improvements of preceding Generations; which his Posterity have.

:337p. 160–153

It is an Observation of no Weight, which Dr. T. makes on this Text, that the Word Man is commonly used to signify Mankind in general, or Mankind collectively taken. It is true, it often signifies the Species of Mankind: but then it is used to signify the Species with regard to it's Duration and Succession from it's Beginning, as well as with regard to it's Extent. The English Word Mankind is used to signify the Species: but what if it be so? Would it be an improper or unintelligible way of Speaking, to say, that when God first made Mankind, he placed them in a pleasant Paradise (meaning in […] first Parents) but now they live in the midst of Briars […] Thorns? And 'tis certain, that to speak of God's […] Mankind in such a Meaning, viz. his giving the Species an Existence in their first Parents, at the Creation of the World, is agreeable to the Scripture-Use of such an Expression. As in Deut. iv. 32. Since the Day that God CREATED MAN upon the Earth. Job xx. 4. Knowest thou not this of old, since MAN was placed upon the Earth. Isai. X•v. 12. I have made the Earth, and CREATED MAN upon it: I, even my Hands, have stretched out the Heavens. Jer. xxvii. 5. I HAVE MADE the Earth, the MAN and the Beast that are upon the Ground, by my great Power. All these Texts speak of ⟨p. 153⟩God's making Man, by the Word, Man, signifying the Species of Mankind; and yet they all plainly have Respect to God's making Man at first, when God made the Earth, and stretched out the Heavens, and created the first Parents of Mankind. In all these Places the same Word Adam is used, as here in Ecclesiastes; and in the last of them, used with HE emphaticum, as it is here; tho' Dr.T. omits it, when he tells us, he gives us a Catalogue of all the Places of Scripture, where the Word is used. And it argues Nothing to the Doctor's Purpose, that the Pronoun, They, is used. THEY have sought out many Inventions. Which is properly applied to the Species, which God made at first upright: God having begun the Species with more than one, and it being continued in a Multitude. As Christ speaks of the two Sexes, in the Relation of Man & Wife, as continued in successive Generations. Matth. xix. 4. He that MADE THEM at the Beginning, made them Male and Female; having Reference to Adam & Eve.

It is an Observation of no Weight, which Dr. T. makes on this Text, that the Word Man is commonly used to signify Mankind in general, or Mankind collectively taken. It is true, it often signifies the Species of Mankind: but then it is used to signify the Species with regard to it's Duration and Succession from it's Beginning, as well as with regard to it's Extent. The English Word Mankind is used to signify the Species: but what if it be so? Would it be an improper or unintelligible way of Speaking, to say, that when God first made Mankind, he placed them in a pleasant Paradise (meaning in 〈…〉 first Parents) but now they live in the midst of Briars 〈…〉 Thorns? And 'tis certain, that to speak of God's 〈…〉 Mankind in such a Meaning, viz. his giving the Species an Existence in their first Parents, at the Creation of the World, is agreable to the Scripture-Use of such an Expression. As in Deut. iv. 32. Since the Day that God CREATED MAN upon the Earth. Job xx. 4. Knowest thou not this of old, since MAN was placed upon the Earth. Isai. X•v. 12. I have made the Earth, and CREATED MAN upon it: I, even my Hands, have stretched out the Heavens. Jer. xxvii. 5. I HAVE MADE the Earth, the MAN and the Beast that are upon the Ground, by my great Power. All these Texts speak of ⟨p. 153⟩God's making Man, by the Word, Man, signifying the Species of Mankind; and yet they all plainly have Respect to God's making Man at first, when God made the Earth, and stretched out the Heavens, and created the first Parents of Mankind. In all these Places the same Word Adam is used, as here in Ecclesiastes; and in the last of them, used with HE emphaticum, as it is here; tho' Dr.T. omits it, when he tells us, he gives us a Catalogue of all the Places of Scripture, where the Word is used. And it argues Nothing to the Doctor's Purpose, that the Pronoun, They, is used. THEY have sought out many Inventions. Which is properly applied to the Species, which God made at first upright: God having begun the Species with more than one, and it being continued in a Multitude. As Christ speaks of the two Sexes, in the Relation of Man & Wife, as continued in successive Generations. Matth. xix. 4. He that MADE THEM at the Beginning, made them Male and Female; having Reference to Adam & Eve.

:338p. 153–154

No less impertinent, and also very unfair is his Criticism on the Word Jashar, translated Upright. Because the Word sometimes signifies Right, he would from thence infer, that it don't properly signify a moral Rectitude, even when used to express the Character of moral Agents. He might as well insist, that the English Word Upright, sometimes, and in it's most original Meaning, signifying right up, or in an erect Posture, therefore it don't properly signify any moral Character, when applied to moral Agents: And indeed less unreasonably; for 'tis known, that in the Hebrew Language, in a peculiar Manner, most Words used to signify moral and spiritual Things, are taken from Things external and natural. The Word Jashar is used, as applied to moral Agents, or to the Words and Actions of such (if I have not mis-reckoned^*) about 110 Times in Scripture; and about an 100 of them, without all Dispute, ⟨p. 154⟩to signify Virtue, or moral Rectitude (tho' Dr.T. is pleased to say, the Word don't generally signify a moral Character;) and for the most Part it signifies true Virtue, or Virtue in such a Sense, as distinguishes it from all false Appearances of Virtue, or what is only Virtue in some Respects, but not truly so in the Sight of God. It is used at least 80 Times in this Sense. And scarce any Word can be found in the Hebrew Language more significant of this. It is thus used constantly in Solomon's Writings (where 'tis often found) when used to express a Character or Property of moral Agents. And it is beyond all Controversy that he uses it in this Place in the viith of Eccles. to signify a moral Rectitude, or Character of real Virtue and Integrity. For the wise Man, in this Context, is speaking of Men with respect to their moral Character, enquiring into the Corruption and Depravity of Mankind (as is confessed P. 184.) and he here declares, he had not found more than one among a Thousand, of the right Stamp, truly and thoroughly virtuous and upright: which appeared a strange thing! But in this Text, he clears God, and lays the Blame to Man: Man was not made thus at first. He was made of the right Stamp, altogether good in his Kind (as all other things were) truly and thoroughly virtuous, as he ought to be; But they have sought out many Inventions. Which last Expression signifies things sinful, or morally evil; as is confessed, P. 185.

No less impertinent, and also very unfair is his Criticism on the Word Jashar, translated Upright. Because the Word sometimes signifies Right, he would from thence infer, that it don't properly signify a moral Rectitude, even when used to express the Character of moral Agents. He might as well insist, that the English Word Upright, sometimes, and in it's most original Meaning, signifying right up, or in an erect Posture, therefore it don't properly signify any moral Character, when applied to moral Agents: And indeed less unreasonably; for 'tis known, that in the Hebrew Language, in a peculiar Manner, most Words used to signify moral and spiritual Things, are taken from Things external and natural. The Word Jashar is used, as applied to moral Agents, or to the Words and Actions of such (if I have not mis-reckon'd^*) about 110 Times in Scripture; and about an 100 of them, without all Dispute, ⟨p. 154⟩to signify Virtue, or moral Rectitude (tho' Dr.T. is pleased to say, the Word don't generally signify a moral Character;) and for the most Part it signifies true Virtue, or Virtue in such a Sense, as distinguishes it from all false Appearances of Virtue, or what is only Virtue in some Respects, but not truly so in the Sight of God. It is used at least 80 Times in this Sense. And scarce any Word can be found in the Hebrew Language more significant of this. It is thus used constantly in Solomon's Writings (where 'tis often found) when used to express a Character or Property of moral Agents. And it is beyond all Controversy that he uses it in this Place in the viith of Eccles. to signify a moral Rectitude, or Character of real Virtue and Integrity. For the wise Man, in this Context, is speaking of Men with respect to their moral Character, enquiring into the Corruption and Depravity of Mankind (as is confess'd P. 184.) and he here declares, he had not found more than one among a Thousand, of the right Stamp, truly and thoroughly virtuous and upright: which appear'd a strange thing! But in this Text, he clears God, and lays the Blame to Man: Man was not made thus at first. He was made of the right Stamp, altogether good in his Kind (as all other things were) truly and thoroughly virtuous, as he ought to be; But they have sought out many Inventions. Which last Expression signifies things sinful, or morally evil; as is confess'd, P. 185.

*Making Use of Buxtor•'s Concordance, which according to the Author's profess'd Design, directs to all the Places where the Word is used.

:339p. 154–155

And this Expression, used to signify those moral Evils he found in Man, which he sets in Opposition to the Uprightness Man was made in, shows, that by Uprightness he means the most true and sincere Goodness. The Word rendered Inventions, most naturally & aptly signifies the subtle Devices, and crooked deceitful Ways of Hypocrites, wherein they are of a Character contrary to Men of Simplicity and godly Sincerity; who, tho' wise in that which is good, are simple concerning Evil. Thus the same wise Man in Prov. xii. 2. sets a truly good Man in Opposition to a Man of wicked Devices, whom God will condemn. Solomon had Occasion to observe many who put on an artful Disguise and fair Sh•w ⟨p. 155⟩of Goodness; But on searching thoroughly, he found very few truly upright. As he says, Prov. xx. 6. Most Men will proclaim every one his own Goodness: but a faithful Man who can find? So that it is exceeding plain, that by Uprightness, in this Place in Ecclesiastes, Solomon means true moral Goodness.

And this Expression, used to signify those moral Evils he found in Man, which he sets in Opposition to the Uprightness Man was made in, shews, that by Uprightness he means the most true and sincere Goodness. The Word rendered Inventions, most naturally & aptly signifies the subtil Devices, and crooked deceitful Ways of Hypocrites, wherein they are of a Character contrary to Men of Simplicity and godly Sincerity; who, tho' wise in that which is good, are simple concerning Evil. Thus the same wise Man in Prov. xii. 2. sets a truly good Man in Opposition to a Man of wicked Devices, whom God will condemn. Solomon had Occasion to observe many who put on an artful Disguise and fair Sh•w ⟨p. 155⟩of Goodness; But on searching thoroughly, he found very few truly upright. As he says, Prov. xx. 6. Most Men will proclaim every one his own Goodness: but a faithful Man who can find? So that it is exceeding plain, that by Uprightness, in this Place in Ecclesiastes, Solomon means true moral Goodness.

:344p. 155–156

To this I would say; 'Tis true, Death is opposed to Life, and must be understood according to the Nature of that Life, to which it is opposed: but does it therefore follow, that Nothing can be meant by it but the Loss of ⟨p. 156⟩Life? Misery is opposed to Happiness, and Sorrow is in Scripture often opposed to Joy: but can we conclude from thence, that Nothing is meant in Scripture by Sorrow, but the Loss of Joy? Or that there is no more in Misery, than the Loss or Absence of Happiness? And if it be so, that the Death threatened to Adam can, with Certainty, be opposed only to the Life given to Adam, when God created him; I think, a State of perfect, perpetual and hopeless Misery is properly opposed to that State Adam was in, when God created him. For I suppose, it won't be denied, that the Life Adam had, was truly a happy Life; happy in-perfect Innocency, in the Favour of his Maker, surrounded with the happy Fruits and Testimonies of his Love: and I think it has been proved, that he also was happy in a State of perfect Righteousness. And Nothing is more manifest, than that it is agreeable to a very common Acceptation of the Word, Life, in Scripture, that it be understood as signifying a State of excellent and happy Existence. Now that which is most opposite to that Life and State Adam was created in, is a State of total confirmed Wickedness, and perfect hopeless Misery, under the divine Displeasure and Curse; not excluding temporal Death or the Destruction of the Body, as an Introduction to it.

To this I would say; 'Tis true, Death is opposed to Life, and must be understood according to the Nature of that Life, to which it is opposed: but does it therefore follow, that Nothing can be meant by it but the Loss of ⟨p. 156⟩Life? Misery is opposed to Happiness, and Sorrow is in Scripture often opposed to Joy: but can we conclude from thence, that Nothing is meant in Scripture by Sorrow, but the Loss of Joy? Or that there is no more in Misery, than the Loss or Absence of Happiness? And if it be so, that the Death threatned to Adam can, with Certainty, be opposed only to the Life given to Adam, when God created him; I think, a State of perfect, perpetual and hopeless Misery is properly opposed to that State Adam was in, when God created him. For I suppose, it won't be deny'd, that the Life Adam had, was truly a happy Life; happy in-perfect Innocency, in the Favour of his Maker, surrounded with the happy Fruits and Testimonies of his Love: and I think it has been proved, that he also was happy in a State of perfect Righteousness. And Nothing is more manifest, than that it is agreable to a very common Acceptation of the Word, Life, in Scripture, that it be understood as signifying a State of excellent and happy Existence. Now that which is most opposite to that Life and State Adam was created in, is a State of total confirmed Wickedness, and perfect hopeless Misery, under the divine Displeasure and Curse; not excluding temporal Death or the Destruction of the Body, as an Introduction to it.

:345p. 156–157

And besides, that which is much more evident, than any Thing Dr. T. says on this Head, is this, viz. That the Death, which was to come on Adam as the Punishment of his Disobedience, was opposed to that Life which he would have had as the Reward of his Obedience, in Case he had not sinned. Obedience and Disobedience are Contraries: And the Threatenings and Promises, that are Sanctions of a Law, are set in direct Opposition: and the promised Rewards, and threatened Punishments, are what are most properly taken as each others Opposites. But none will deny, that the Life which would have been Adam's Reward, if he had persisted in Obedience, was eternal Life. And therefore we argue justly, that the Death which stands opposed to that Life (Dr. T. himself being Judge, P. 396.) is manifestly eternal Death, a Death widely different ⟨p. 157⟩from the Death we now die.—to use his own Words. If Adam, for his persevering Obedience, was to have had everlasting Life and Happiness, in perfect Holiness, Union with his Maker, and Enjoyment of his Favour, and this was the Life which was to be confirmed by the Tree of Life; then doubtless the Death threatened in Case of Disobedience, which stands in direct Opposition to this, was a being given over to everlasting Wickedness & Misery, in Separation from God and in enduring his Wrath.

And besides, that which is much more evident, than any Thing Dr. T. says on this Head, is this, viz. That the Death, which was to come on Adam as the Punishment of his Disobedience, was opposed to that Life which he would have had as the Reward of his Obedience, in Case he had not sin'd. Obedience and Disobedience are Contraries: And the Threatnings and Promises, that are Sanctions of a Law, are set in direct Opposition: and the promised Rewards, and threatned Punishments, are what are most properly taken as each others Opposites. But none will deny, that the Life which would have been Adam's Reward, if he had persisted in Obedience, was eternal Life. And therefore we argue justly, that the Death which stands opposed to that Life (Dr. T. himself being Judge, P. 396.) is manifestly eternal Death, a Death widely different ⟨p. 157⟩from the Death we now die.—to use his own Words. If Adam, for his persevering Obedience, was to have had everlasting Life and Happiness, in perfect Holiness, Union with his Maker, and Enjoyment of his Favour, and this was the Life which was to be confirmed by the Tree of Life; then doubtless the Death threatned in Case of Disobedience, which stands in direct Opposition to this, was a being given over to everlasting Wickedness & Misery, in Separation from God and in enduring his Wrath.

:346p. 157

And it may with the greatest Reason be supposed, that when God first made Mankind, and made known to them the Methods of his moral Government towards them, in the Revelation he made of Himself to the natural Head of the whole Species; and let him know, that Obedience to Him was expected as his Duty; and enforced this Duty with the Sanction of a threatened Punishment, called by the Name of Death; I say, we may with the greatest Reason suppose in such a Case, that by Death was meant that same Death which God esteemed to be the most proper Punishment of the Sin of Mankind, and which he speaks of under that Name, throughout the Scripture, as the proper Wages of the Sin of Man, & was always from the Beginning understood to be so in the Church of God. It would be strange indeed, if it should be otherwise. It would have been strange, if when the Law of God was first given, & enforced by the Threatening of a Punishment, Nothing at all had been mentioned of that great Punishment, ever spoken of under the Name of Death (in the Revelations which he has given to Mankind from Age to Age) as the proper Punishment of the Sin of Mankind, And it would be no less strange, if when the Punishment which was mentioned and threatened on that Occasion, was called by the same Name, even Death, yet we must not understand it to mean the same Thing, but something infinitely diverse, and infinitely more inconsiderable.

And it may with the greatest Reason be supposed, that when God first made Mankind, and made known to them the Methods of his moral Government towards them, in the Revelation he made of Himself to the natural Head of the whole Species; and let him know, that Obedience to Him was expected as his Duty; and inforced this Duty with the Sanction of a threaten'd Punishment, called by the Name of Death; I say, we may with the greatest Reason suppose in such a Case, that by Death was meant that same Death which God esteemed to be the most proper Punishment of the Sin of Mankind, and which he speaks of under that Name, throughout the Scripture, as the proper Wages of the Sin of Man, & was always from the Beginning understood to be so in the Church of God. It would be strange indeed, if it should be otherwise. It would have been strange, if when the Law of God was first given, & inforced by the Threatning of a Punishment, Nothing at all had been mention'd of that great Punishment, ever spoken of under the Name of Death (in the Revelations which he has given to Mankind from Age to Age) as the proper Punishment of the Sin of Mankind, And it would be no less strange, if when the Punishment which was mentioned and threatned on that Occasion, was called by the same Name, even Death, yet we must not understand it to mean the same Thing, but something infinitely diverse, and infinitely more inconsiderable.

:347p. 157–159

But now, let us consider what that Death is, which the Scripture ever speaks of as the proper Wages of the Sin of Mankind, and is spoken of as such by God's Saints in ⟨p. 158⟩all Ages of the Church, from the first Beginning of a written Revelation, to the Conclusion of it. I'll begin with the New-Testament. When the Apostle Paul says, Rom. vi. 23. The Wages of Sin is Death, Dr. T. tells us, P. 396. that this means eternal Death, the second Death, a Death widely different from the Death we now die. The same Apostle speaks of Death as the proper Punishment due for Sin, in Rom. vii. 5. and Chap. viii. 13, 2 Cor. iii. 7. 1 Cor. xv. 56. In all which Places, Dr. T. himself supposes the Apostle to intend eternal Death. ^*And when the Apostle James speaks of Death, as the proper Reward, Fruit and End of Sin, Jam. i. 15. Sin, when it is finished, bringeth forth Death: 'tis manifest, that our Author supposes eternal Destruction to be meant.^‖ And the Apostle John, agreeable to Dr. T—r's Sense, speaks of the second Death, as that which Sin unrepented of will bring all Men to at last. Rev. xx. 6, 14. and xxi. 8. and Chap. ii. 11. In the same Sense the Apostle John uses the Word in his 1st Epistle, Chap. iii. 14. We know, that we have passed from Death to Life, because we love the Brethren: He that •ateth his Brother, abideth in Death. In the same Manner Christ used the Word from Time to Time, when he was on Earth, and spake concerning the Punishment and Issue of Sin. Joh. v. 24. He that heareth my Word, and believeth, &c. hath everlasting Life; and shall not come into Condemnation; but is passed from Death to Life. Where, according to Dr.T—r's own Way of arguing, it can't be the Death which we now die, that Christ speaks of, but eternal Death, because it is set in Opposition to everlasting Life. Joh. vi. 50. This is the Bread which cometh down from Heaven, that a Man may eat thereof, and not die. Chap. viii. 51. Verily, verily, I say unto you, If a Man ⟨p. 159⟩keep my Saying, he shall never see Death. Chap. xi. 26. And whosoever liveth and believeth in me, shall never die. In which Places, 'tis plain, Christ don't mean that Believers shall never see temporal Death. See also Matth. x. 29. and Luke x. 28. In like Manner, the Word was commonly used by the Prophets of old, when they spake of Death as the proper End & Recompense of Sin. So, abundantly by the Prophet Ezekiel. Ezek. iii. 18.

But now, let us consider what that Death is, which the Scripture ever speaks of as the proper Wages of the Sin of Mankind, and is spoken of as such by God's Saints in ⟨p. 158⟩all Ages of the Church, from the first Beginning of a written Revelation, to the Conclusion of it. I'll begin with the New-Testament. When the Apostle Paul says, Rom. vi. 23. The Wages of Sin is Death, Dr. T. tells us, P. 396. that this means eternal Death, the second Death, a Death widely different from the Death we now die. The same Apostle speaks of Death as the proper Punishment due for Sin, in Rom. vii. 5. and Chap. viii. 13, 2 Cor. iii. 7. 1 Cor. xv. 56. In all which Places, Dr. T. himself supposes the Apostle to intend eternal Death. ^*And when the Apostle James speaks of Death, as the proper Reward, Fruit and End of Sin, Jam. i. 15. Sin, when it is finished, bringeth forth Death: 'tis manifest, that our Author supposes eternal Destruction to be meant.^‖ And the Apostle John, agreable to Dr. T—r's Sense, speaks of the second Death, as that which Sin unrepented of will bring all Men to at last. Rev. xx. 6, 14. and xxi. 8. and Chap. ii. 11. In the same Sense the Apostle John uses the Word in his 1st Epistle, Chap. iii. 14. We know, that we have passed from Death to Life, because we love the Brethren: He that •ateth his Brother, abideth in Death. In the same Manner Christ used the Word from Time to Time, when he was on Earth, and spake concerning the Punishment and Issue of Sin. Joh. v. 24. He that heareth my Word, and believeth, &c. hath everlasting Life; and shall not come into Condemnation; but is passed from Death to Life. Where, according to Dr.T—r's own Way of arguing, it can't be the Death which we now die, that Christ speaks of, but eternal Death, because it is set in Opposition to everlasting Life.

*See P. 78. Note on Rom vii. 5. and Note on ver. 6. Note on Rom. v. 20. Note on Rom. vii. 8.
‖By comparing what he says P. 126. with what he often says of that Death and Destruction which is the Demerit & End of personal Sin, which he says is the second Death, or eternal Destruction.

:348p. 159–160

When I say unto the wicked Man, Thou shalt surely die. In the Original, Dying thou shalt die.—The same Form of Expression, which God used in the Threatening to Adam. We have the same Words again, Chap. xxxiii. 18.—In Chap. xviii. 4. it is said, The Soul that sinneth, it shall die. To the like Purpose are Chap. iii. 19, 20. & xviii. 4, 5, 10, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 26, 28. Chap. xxxiii. 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 19, 20. And that temporal Death is not meant in these Places, is plain, because it is promised most absolutely that the Righteous shall not die the Death spoken of. Chap▪xvii.21. He shall surely live, he shall not die. So v. 9, 17, 19 & 22. and Chap. iii. 21. And 'tis evident, the Prophet Jeremiah uses the Word in the same Sense; Jer. xxxi. 30. Every one shall die for his own Iniquity. And the same Death is spoken of by the Prophet Isaiah. Isai. xi. 4. With the Breath of his Lips shall be slay the Wicked. See also Chap. lxi. 16. with v. 24.—Solomon, who we must suppose was thoroughly acquainted with the Sense in which the Word was used by the Wise, and by the Ancients, continually speaks of Death as the proper Fruit, Issue and Recompense of Sin, using the Word only in this Sense. Chap. xi. 19. As Righteousness tendeth to Life, so he that pursueth Evil, pursueth it to his own Death. So Chap. xviii. 32. x. 21. xiv. 12. xix. 16. i. 18, 32. i. 18. v. 5, 6, 23. vii. 22, 26, 27. ix. 18. xi. 19. xv. 10. xviii. 21. xxi. 16. & xxiii. 13, 14. In these Places, he cannot mean temporal Death; for he often speaks of it as a Punishment of the Wicked, wherein the Righteous shall certainly be distinguished from 'em: as in Prov. xii. 2•. In the Way of Righteousness is Life, and in the Pathway ⟨p. 160⟩thereof is no Death. So in Chap. x.2.—xi.4.—xiii. 14.—xiv. 27. and many other Places. But we find, this same Wise man observes, that as to temporal Death, and temporal Events in general, there is no Distinction, but that they happen alike to good and bad. Eccl. ii. 14, 15, 16.—viii. 14. & ix. 2,3. His Words are remarkable in Eccl. vii. 15. There is a just Man that perisheth in his Righteousness; and there is a wicked Man that prolongeth his Life in his Wickedness.—So we find, David in the Book of Psalms uses the Word Death in the same Sense, when he speaks of it as the proper Wages and Issue of Sin. Psal. xxxiv. 21.Evil shall slay the Wicked. He speaks of it as a certain Thing, Psal.

When I say unto the wicked Man, Thou shalt surely die. In the Original, Dying thou shalt die.—The same Form of Expression, which God used in the Threatning to Adam. We have the same Words again, Chap. xxxiii. 18.—In Chap. xviii. 4. it is said, The Soul that sinneth, it shall die. To the like Purpose are Chap. iii. 19, 20. & xviii. 4, 5, 10, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 26, 28. Chap. xxxiii. 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 19, 20. And that temporal Death is not meant in these Places, is plain, because it is promised most absolutely that the Righteous shall not die the Death spoken of. Chap▪xvii.21. He shall surely live, he shall not die. So v. 9, 17, 19 & 22. and Chap. iii. 21. And 'tis evident, the Prophet Jeremiah uses the Word in the same Sense; Jer. xxxi. 30. Every one shall die for his own Iniquity. And the same Death is spoken of by the Prophet Isaiah. Isai. xi. 4. With the Breath of his Lips shall be slay the Wicked. See also Chap. lxi. 16. with v. 24.—Solomon, who we must suppose was thoroughly acquainted with the Sense in which the Word was used by the Wise, and by the Ancients, continually speaks of Death as the proper Fruit, Issue and R•compence of Sin, using the Word only in this Sense. Chap. xi. 19. As Righteousness tendeth to Life, so he that pursueth Evil, pursueth it to his own Death. So Chap. xviii. 32. x. 21. xiv. 12. xix. 16. i. 18, 32. i. 18. v. 5, 6, 23. vii. 22, 26, 27. ix. 18. xi. 19. xv. 10. xviii. 21. xxi. 16. & xxiii. 13, 14. In these Places, he cannot mean temporal Death; for he often speaks of it as a Punishment of the Wicked, wherein the Righteous shall certainly be distinguished from 'em: as in Prov. xii. 2•. In the Way of Righteousness is Life, and in the Pathway ⟨p. 160⟩thereof is no Death. So in Chap. x.2.—xi.4.—xiii. 14.—xiv. 27. and many other Places. But we find, this same Wise man observes, that as to temporal Death, and temporal Events in general, there is no Distinction, but that they happen alike to good and bad. Eccl. ii. 14, 15, 16.—viii. 14. & ix. 2,3. His Words are remarkable in Eccl. vii. 15. There is a just Man that perisheth in his Righteousness; and there is a wicked Man that prolongeth his Life in his Wickedness.—So we find, David in the Book of Psalms uses the Word Death in the same Sense, when he speaks of it as the proper Wages and Issue of Sin.

:349p. 160–161

cxxxix. 19. Surely Thou wilt slay the Wicked, O God. And he speaks of it as a Thing wherein the Wicked are distinguished from the Righteous, Psal. lxix. 28. Let them be blotted out of the Book of the Living, and not be written with the Righteous.—And thus we find the Word Death used in the Pentateuch, or Books of Moses: in which Part of the Scripture it is, that we have the Account of the Threatening of Death to Adam. When Death, in these Books, is spoken of as the proper Fruit & appointed Reward of Sin, it is to be understood of eternal Death. So Deut. xxx. 15. See, I have set before thee this Day, Life and Good, and Death and Evil. Ver. 19. I call Heaven and Earth to Record this Day against you, that I have set before you Life and Death, Blessing & Cursing. The Life that is spoken of here, is doubtless the same that is spoken of in Lev. xviii. 5.Ye shall therefore keep my Statutes and my Judgments, which if a Man do, he shall live in them. This the Apostle understands of eternal Life; as is plain by Rom. x. 5. and Gal. iii. 12.—But that the Death threatened for Sin in the Law of Moses meant eternal Death, is what Dr.T abundantly declares. So in his Note on Rom. v. 20. Such a Constitution the Law of Moses was, subjecting those who were under it to Death for every Transgression; meaning by Death ETERNAL DEATH. These are his Words. The like he asserts ⟨p. 161⟩in many other Places. When it is said, in the Place now mentioned, I have set before thee Life & Death, Blessing and Cursing, without doubt, the same Blessing and Cursing is meant which God had already set before them with such Solemnity, in the 27th and 28th Chapters; where we have the Sum of the Curses in those last Words of the 27th Chapter, Cursed is every one, which confirmeth not all the Words of this Law to do them. Which the Apostle speaks of as a Threatening of eternal Death; and with him Dr. T. himself.^* In this Sense also Job and his Friends, spake of Death, as the Wages and End of Sin, who lived before any written Revelation, and had their Religion and their Phraseology about the Things of Religion from the Ancients.

cxxxix. 19. Surely Thou wilt slay the Wicked, O God. And he speaks of it as a Thing wherein the Wicked are distinguished from the Righteous, Psal. lxix. 28. Let them be blotted out of the Book of the Living, and not be written with the Righteous.—And thus we find the Word Death used in the Pentateuch, or Books of Moses: in which Part of the Scripture it is, that we have the Account of the Threatning of Death to Adam. When Death, in these Books, is spoken of as the proper Fruit & appointed Reward of Sin, it is to be understood of eternal Death. So Deut. xxx. 15. See, I have set before thee this Day, Life and Good, and Death and Evil. Ver. 19. I call Heaven and Earth to Record this Day against you, that I have set before you Life and Death, Blessing & Cursing. The Life that is spoken of here, is doubtless the same that is spoken of in Lev. xviii. 5.Ye shall therefore keep my Statutes and my Judgments, which if a Man do, he shall live in them. This the Apostle understands of eternal Life; as is plain by Rom. x. 5. and Gal. iii. 12.—But that the Death threatned for Sin in the Law of Moses meant eternal Death, is what Dr.T abundantly declares. So in his Note on Rom. v. 20. Such a Constitution the Law of Moses was, subjecting those who were under it to Death for every Transgression; meaning by Death ETERNAL DEATH. These are his Words. The like he asserts ⟨p. 161⟩in many other Places. When it is said, in the Place now mentioned, I have set before thee Life & Death, Blessing and Cursing, without doubt, the same Blessing and Cursing is meant which God had already set before them with such Solemnity, in the 27th and 28th Chapters; where we have the Sum of the Curses in those last Words of the 27th Chapter, Cursed is every one, which confirmeth not all the Words of this Law to do them. Which the Apostle speaks of as a Threatning of eternal Death; and with him Dr. T. himself.^* In this Sense also Job and his Friends, spake of Death, as the Wages and End of Sin, who lived before any written Revelation, and had their Religion and their Phraseology about the Things of Religion from the Antients.

*Note on Rom. v. 20. In his Exp. on Rom. P. 371, 373, 374, 376. There in P. 371, he says expressly, "The Law of Moses subjected those who were under it to Death, meaning by Death, […] Death."Note on Rom. v. 20. In his Exp. on Rom. P. 371, 373, 374, 376. There in P. 371, he says expresly, "The Law of Moses subjected those who were under it to Death, meaning by Death, 〈…〉 Death."

:350p. 161–162

If any should insist upon it as an Objection against supposing that Death was intended to signify eternal Death in the Threatening to Adam, that this Use of the Word is figurative: tho' this should be allowed, yet it is by no Means so figurative as many other Phrases used in the History contained in these three Chapters: As when it is said, God said, Let there be Light; God said, Let there be a Firmament, &c as tho' God spake such Words with a Voice. So when it is said, God called the Light, Day: God called the Firmament, Heaven, &c. God rested on the seventh Day; as tho' he had been weary, and then rested. And when it is said, They heard the Voice of God walking; as tho' the Deity had two Feet, and took Steps on the Ground. Dr. T. supposes, that when it is said of Adam and Eve, Their Eyes were opened, and they saw that they were naked; by the Word naked, is meant a State of Guilt. (P. 12.) Which Sense of the Word, naked, is much further from the common Use of the Word, than the supposed Sense of the Word Death. So this Author supposes the Promise concerning the Seed ⟨p. 162⟩of the Woman's bruising the Serpent's Head, while the Serpent should bruise his Heel, is to be understood of the Messiah's destroying the Power and Sovereignty of the Devil, & receiving some slight Hurt from him. (P. 15, 16.) Which makes the Sentence full of Figures, vastly more beside the common Use of Words. And why might not God deliver Threatenings to our first Parents in figurative Expressions, as well as Promises?—Many other strong Figures are used in these Chapters.

If any should insist upon it as an Objection against supposing that Death was intended to signify eternal Death in the Threatning to Adam, that this Use of the Word is figurative: tho' this should be allowed, yet it is by no Means so figurative as many other Phrases used in the History contained in these three Chapters: As when it is said, God said, Let there be Light; God said, Let there be a Firmament, &c as tho' God spake such Words with a Voice. So when it is said, God called the Light, Day: God called the Firmament, Heaven, &c. God rested on the seventh Day; as tho' he had been weary, and then rested. And when it is said, They heard the Voice of God walking; as tho' the Deity had two Feet, and took Steps on the Ground. Dr. T. supposes, that when it is said of Adam and Eve, Their Eyes were opened, and they saw that they were naked; by the Word naked, is meant a State of Guilt. (P. 12.) Which Sense of the Word, naked, is much further from the common Use of the Word, than the supposed Sense of the Word Death. So this Author supposes the Promise concerning the Seed ⟨p. 162⟩of the Woman's bruising the Serpent's Head, while the Serpent should bruise his Heel, is to be understood of the Messiah's destroying the Power and Sovereignty of the Devil, & receiving some slight Hurt from him. (P. 15, 16.) Which makes the Sentence full of Figures, vastly more beside the common Use of Words. And why might not God deliver Threatnings to our first Parents in figurative Expressions, as well as Promises?—Many other strong Figures are used in these Chapters.

Chapter 1

CHAP. I.

Observations relating to Things contained in the three first Chapters of Genesis, with Reference to the Doctrine of Original Sin.

SECT. I.

Concerning Original Righteousness; and whether our first Parents were created with Righteousness or moral Rectitude of Heart?

Chapter 1

CHAP. I.

Observations relating to Things contained in the three first Chapters of Genesis, with Reference to the Doctrine of Original Sin.

SECT. I.

Concerning Original Righteousness; and whether our first Parents were created with Righteousness or moral Rectitude of Heart?

SECT. II.

Concerning the Kind of Death, threatened to our first Parents, if they should eat of the forbidden Fruit.

Concerning the Kind of Death, threatned to our first Parents, if they should eat of the forbidden Fruit.

CHAP. I.

Observations relating to Things contained in the three first Chapters of Genesis, with Reference to the Doctrine of Original Sin.

SECT. I.

Concerning Original Righteousness; and whether our first Parents were created with Righteousness or moral Rectitude of Heart?

Reformers309

Puritans1,782

Westminster Assembly24

Evangelicals36

CHAP. I.

Observations relating to Things contained in the three first Chapters of Genesis, with Reference to the Doctrine of Original Sin.

SECT. I.

Concerning Original Righteousness; and whether our first Parents were created with Righteousness or moral Rectitude of Heart?

SECT. II.

Concerning the Kind of Death, threatened to our first Parents, if they should eat of the forbidden Fruit.

Concerning the Kind of Death, threatned to our first Parents, if they should eat of the forbidden Fruit.