Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The…

SECT. IV.

Some objections considered which may be made against the reasonableness of what has been said of God's making himself his last end.

Object. 1. Some may object against what has been said, as inconsistent with God's absolute independence and immutability: particularly the representation that has been made, as tho' God were inclined to a communication of his fullness and emanations of his own glory, as being his own most glorious and complete state. It may be thought that this don't well consist with God's being self-existent from all eternity; absolutely perfect in himself, in the possession of infinite and independent good. And that in general, to suppose that God makes himself his end, in the creation of the world, seems to suppose that he aims at some interest or happiness of his own, not easily reconcilable with his being happy, perfectly & infinitely happy in himself. If it could be supposed that God needed any thing; or that the goodness of his creatures could extend to him; or that they could be profitable to him; it might be fit, that God should make himself, and his own interest, his highest and last end in creating the world: and there would be some reason and ground for the preceding discourse. But seeing that God is above all need and all capacity of being added to and advanced, made better or happier in any respect; to what purpose should God make himself his end; or seek to advance himself in any respect by any of his works? How absurd is it to suppose that God should do such great things with a view to obtain, what he is already most perfectly possessed of, and was so from all eternity; and therefore can't now possibly need, nor with any colour of reason be supposed to seek?

Object. 1. Some may object against what has been said, as inconsistent with God's absolute independence and immutability: particularly the representation that has been made, as tho' God were inclined to a communication of his fulness and emanations of his own glory, as being his own most glorious and compleat state. It may be tho't that this don't well consist with God's being self-existent from all eternity; absolutely perfect in himself, in the possession of infinite and independent good. And that in general, to suppose that God makes himself his end, in the creation of the world, seems to suppose that he aims at some interest or happiness of his own, not easily reconcileable with his being happy, perfectly & infinitely happy in himself. If it could be supposed that God needed any thing; or that the goodness of his creatures could extend to him; or that they could be profitable to him; it might be fit, that God should make himself, and his own interest, his highest and last end in creating the world: and there would be some reason and ground for the preceeding discourse. But seeing that God is above all need and all capacity of being added to and advanced, made better or happier in any respect; to what purpose should God make himself his end; or seek to advance himself in any respect by any of his works? How absurd is it to suppose that God should do such great things with a view to obtain, what he is already most perfectly possessed of, and was so from all eternity; and therefore can't now possibly need, nor with any colour of reason be suppos'd to seek?