Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The…

Ans. 1. SUCH an objection must arise from a very ignorant or inconsiderate notion of the vice of selfishness, and the virtue of generosity. It by selfishness be meant, a disposition in any being to regard himself; this is no otherwise vicious or unbecoming, than as one is less than a multitude; and so the public weal is of greater value than his particular interest. Among created beings one single person must be looked upon as inconsiderable in comparison of the generality; and so his interest as of little importance compared with the interest of the whole system: Therefore in them, a disposition to prefer self, as if it were more than all is exceeding vicious. But it is vicious on no other account, than as it is a disposition that don't agree with the nature of things; and that which is indeed the greatest good. And a disposition in any one to forego his own interest for the sake of others, is no further excellent, no further worthy the name of generosity than it is a treating things according to their true value; a prosecuting something most worthy to be prosecuted; an expression of a disposition to prefer something to self-interest, that is indeed preferable in it self.—But if God be indeed so great, and so excellent, that all other beings are as nothing to him, and all other excellency be as nothing and less than nothing, and vanity in comparison of his; and God be omniscient and infallible and perfectly knows that he is infinitely the most valuable being; then it is fit that his heart should be agreeable to this, which is indeed the true nature and proportion of things and agreeable to this infallible and all-comprehending understanding which he has of them, and that perfectly clear light in which he views them: and so 'tis fit and suitable that he should value himself infinitely more than his creatures.

Ans. 1. SUCH an objection must arise from a very ignorant or inconsiderate notion of the vice of selfishness, and the virtue of generosity. It by selfishness be meant, a disposition in any being to regard himself; this is no otherwise vicious or unbecoming, than as one is less than a multitude; and so the public weal is of greater value than his particular interest. Among created beings one single person must be looked upon as inconsiderable in comparison of the generality; and so his interest as of little importance compared with the interest of the whole system: Therefore in them, a disposition to prefer self, as if it were more than all is exceeding vicious. But it is vicious on no other account, than as it is a disposition that don't agree with the nature of things; and that which is indeed the greatest good. And a disposition in any one to forego his own interest for the sake of others, is no further excellent, no further worthy the name of generosity than it is a treating things according to their true value; a prosecuting something most worthy to be prosecuted; an expression of a disposition to prefer something to self-interest, that is indeed preferable in it self.—But if God be indeed so great, and so excellent, that all other beings are as nothing to him, and all other excellency be as nothing and less than nothing, and vanity in comparison of his; and God be omniscient and infallible and perfectly knows that he is infinitely the most valuable being; then it is fit that his heart should be agreable to this, which is indeed the true nature and proportion of things and agreable to this infallible and all-comprehending understanding which he has of them, and that perfectly clear light in which he views them: and so 'tis fit and suitable that he should value himself infinitely more than his creatures.