Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The…

2. ANOTHER thing, in doing good to others from self-love, that derogates from the freeness of the goodness; is doing good to others from dependence on them for the good we need, or desire: which dependence obliges. So that in our beneficence we are not self-moved, but as it were, constrained by something without ourselves. But it has been particularly shown already, that God's making himself his end, in the manner that has been spoken of, argues no dependence; but is consistent with absolute independence and self-sufficiency.

2. ANOTHER thing, in doing good to others from self-love, that derogates from the freeness of the goodness; is doing good to others from dependence on them for the good we need, or desire: which dependence obliges. So that in our beneficence we are not self-moved, but as it were, constrained by something without ourselves. But it has been particularly shewn already, that God's making himself his end, in the manner that has been spoken of, argues no dependence; but is consistent with absolute independence and self-sufficience.

AND I would here observe, that there is something in that disposition in God to communicate goodness, which shows him to be independent and self-moved in it, in a manner that is peculiar, and above what is in the beneficence of creatures. Creatures, even the most gracious of them, are not so independent and self-moved in their goodness; but that in all the exercises of it, they are excited by some object that they find: something appearing good, or in some respect worthy of regard, presents itself, and moves their kindness. But God being all and alone is absolutely self-moved. The exercises of his communicative disposition are absolutely from within himself, not finding any thing, or any object to excite them or draw them forth: but all that is good and worthy in the object, and the very being of the object, proceeding from the over flowing of his fullness.

AND I would here observe, that there is something in that disposition in God to communicate goodness, which shews him to be independent and self-moved in it, in a manner that is peculiar, and above what is in the beneficence of creatures. Creatures, even the most gracious of them, are not so independent and self-moved in their goodness; but that in all the exercises of it, they are excited by some object that they find: something appearing good, or in some respect worthy of regard, presents itself, and moves their kindness. But God being all and alone is absolutely self-moved. The exercises of his communicative disposition are absolutely from within himself, not finding any thing, or any object to excite them or draw them forth: but all that is good and worthy in the object, and the very being of the object, proceeding from the over flowing of his fulness.