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Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The…
Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The nature of true virtue. / by the late Reverend, learned and pious Jonathan Edwards, A.M. president of the College in New-Jersey.
Boston: printed by S. Kneeland, 1765
Concerning the END for which GOD created the WORLD. › Chapter 1 › Sect 4
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
I WOULD here observe by the way, that if any insist that it becomes God to love and take delight in the virtue of his creatures for its own sake, in such a manner as not to love it from regard to himself; and that it supposeth too much selfishness to suppose that all God's delight in virtue is to be resolved into delight in himself: This will contradict a former objection against God's taking pleasure in communications of himself; viz. that inasmuch as God is perfectly independent and self-sufficient therefore all his happiness and pleasure consists in the enjoyment of himself. For in the present objection it is insisted that it becomes God to have some pleasure, love or delight in virtue distinct from his delight in himself. So that if the same persons make both objections they must be inconsistent with themselves.
I WOULD here observe by the way, that if any insist that it becomes God to love and take delight in the virtue of his creatures for its own sake, in such a manner as not to love it from regard to himself; and that it supposeth too much selfishn•ss to suppose that all God's delight in virtue is to be resolv'd into delight in himself: This will contradict a former objection against God's taking pleasure in communications of himself; viz. that inasmuch as God is perfectly independent and self-sufficient therefore all his happiness and pleasure consists in the injoyment of himself. For in the present objection it is insisted that it becomes God to have some pleasure, love or delight in virtue distinct from his delight in himself. So that if the same persons make both objections they must be inconsistent with themselves.
2. IN answer to the objection we are upon; as to God's creatures whose esteem and love he seeks, being infinitely inferior to God as nothing and vanity.—I would observe that it is not unworthy of God to take pleasure in that which in itself is fit and amiable, even in those that are infinitely below him. If there be infinite grace and condescension in it, yet these are not unworthy of God; but infinitely to his honour and glory.