Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The…

HOWEVER, it may not be amiss more particularly to consider the reasons why private affections, or good-will limited to a particular circle of Beings, •alling infinitely short of the whole existence, and not dependent upon it, nor subordinate to general benevolence, cannot be of the nature of true virtue.

1. SUCH, a private affection, detached from general benevolence and independent on i•, as the case may be, will be against general benevolence, or o• a contrary tendency; and will set a person against general existence, and make him an enemy to it—As it is with selfishness, or when a man is governed by a regard to his own private interest, independent of regard to the public good, such a temper exposes a man to act the part of an enemy to the public. As, in every case wherein his private interest seems to ••ash with the public; or in all those cases wherein such things are presented to his view, that suit his personal appetites or private inclinations, but are inconsistent with the good of the public. On which account a selfish, contracted, narrow spirit is generally abhorred, and is esteemed base and sordid.—But if a man's affection takes in half a dozen more and his regards extend so far beyond his own single person as to take in his children and family; or if it reaches further still, to a larger circle, but falls infinitely short of the universal system, and is exclusive of Being in general; his ⟨p. 130⟩private affection exposes him to the same thing, viz. to pursue the interest of its particular object in opposition to general existence: which is certainly contrary to the tendency of true virtue; yea, directly contrary to the main and most essential thing in its nature, the thing on account of which chiefly its nature and tendency is good. For the chief and most essential good that is in virtue, is its favouring Being in general. Now certainly, if private affection to a limited system had in itself the essential nature of virtue, it would be impossible, that it should in any circumstance whatsoever have a tendency and inclination directly contrary to that wherein the essence of virtue chiefly consists.