THERE seems to be an inconsistence in some writers on morality, in this respect, that they don't wholly exclude a regard to the Deity out of there schemes of morality, but yet mention it so slightly, that they leave me room and reason to suspect they esteem it a less important and a subordinate part of true morality; and insist on benevolence to the created system in such a manner, as would naturally lead one to suppose, they look upon that as by far the most important and essential thing in their scheme. But why should this be? If true virtue consists partly in a respect to God, then doubtless it consists chiefly in it. If true morality requires that we should have some regard, some benevolent affection to our creator, as well as to his creatures, then doubtless it requires the first regard to be paid to him; and that he be every way the supreme object of our benevolence▪ I• his being above our reach, and beyond all capacity of being profited by us, don't hinder but ⟨p. 128⟩that nevertheless he is the proper object of our love, then it don't hinder that he should be loved according to his dignity, or according to the degree in which he has those things wherein worthiness of regard consists, so far as we are capable of it. But this worthiness none will deny, consists in these two things, greatness and moral goodness. And those that own a God, don't deny that he infinitely exceeds all other Beings in these. If the Deity is to be looked upon as within that system of Beings which properly terminates our benevolence, or belonging to that whole, certainly he is to be regarded as the head of the system, and the chief part of it; if it be proper to call him a part, who is infinitely more than all the rest, and in comparison of whom and without whom all the rest are nothing, either as to beauty or existence. And therefore certainly, unless we will be atheists, we must allow that true virtue does primarily and most essentially consist in a supreme love to God; and that where this is wanting, there can be no true virtue.
THERE seems to be an inconsistence in some writers on morality, in this respect, that they don't wholly exclude a regard to the Deity out of there schemes of morality, but yet mention it so slightly, that they leave me room and reason to suspect they esteem it a less important and a subordinate part of true morality; and insist on benevolence to the created system in such a manner, as would naturally lead one to suppose, they look upon that as by far the most important and essential thing in their scheme. But why should this be? If true virtue consists partly in a respect to God, then doubtless it consists chiefly in it. If true morality requires that we should have some regard, some benevolent affection to our creator, as well as to his creatures, then doubtless it requires the first regard to be paid to him; and that he be every way the supream object of our benevolence▪ I• his being above our reach, and beyond all capacity of being profited by us, don't hinder but ⟨p. 128⟩that nevertheless he is the proper object of our love, then it don't hinder that he should be loved according to his dignity, or according to the degree in which he has those things wherein worthiness of regard consists, so far as we are capable of it. But this worthiness none will deny, consists in these two things, greatness and moral goodness. And those that own a God, don't deny that he infinitely exceeds all other Beings in these. If the Deity is to be look'd upon as within that system of Beings which properly terminates our benevolence, or belonging to that whole, certainly he is to be regarded as the head of the system, and the chief part of it; if it be proper to call him a part, who is infinitely more than all the rest, and in comparison of whom and without whom all the rest are nothing, either as to beauty or existence. And therefore certainly, unless we will be atheists, we must allow that true virtue does primarily and most essentially consist in a supream love to God; and that where this is wanting, there can be no true virtue.
