THAT kind affection which is exercised towards those who are near one to another in natural relation, particularly the love of parents to their children, called natural affection, is by many referred to instinct. I have already considered this sort of love as an affection that arises from self-love; and in that view, and in that supposition have shown, it cannot be of the nature of true virtue. But if any think, that natural affection is more properly to be referred to a particular instinct of nature, than to self-love, as its cause, I shall not think it a point worthy of any controversy or dispute. In my opinion, both are true; viz. that natural affection is owing to natural instinct, and also that it arises from self-love. It may be said to arise from instinct, as it depends on a law of nature. But yet it may be truly reckoned as an affection arising from self-love; because, tho' it arises from a law of nature, yet that is such a law as ⟨p. 170⟩according to the order and harmony every where observed among the laws of nature, is connected with, and follows from self-love: as was shown before. However, it is not necessary to my present purpose, to insist on this. For if it be so, that natural affection to a man's children or family, or near relations, is not properly to be ascribed to self-love, as its cause, in any respect, but is to be esteemed an affection arising from a particular independent instinct of nature, which the creator in his wisdom has implanted in men for the preservation and well-being of the world of mankind, yet it cannot be of the nature of true virtue. For it has been observed, and I humbly conceive, proved before (chap. II.) that if any Being or Beings have by natural instinct, or any other means, a determination of mind to benevolence, extending only to some particular persons or private system, however large that system may be, or however great a number of individuals it may contain, so long as it contains but an infinitely small part of universal existence, and so bears no proportion to this great and universal system,—such limited private benevolence, not arising from, nor being subordinate to benevolence to Being in general, cannot have the nature of true virtue.
THAT kind affection which is exercised towards those who are near one to another in natural relation, particularly the love of parents to their children, called natural affection, is by many refer'd to instinct. I have already considered this sort of love as an affection that arises from self-love; and in that view, and in that supposition have shewn, it cannot be of the nature of true virtue. But if any think, that natural affection is more properly to be refer'd to a particular instinct of nature, than to self-love, as its cause, I shall not think it a point worthy of any controversy or dispute. In my opinion, both are true; viz. that natural affection is owing to natural instinct, and also that it arises from self-love. It may be said to arise from instinct, as it depends on a law of nature. But yet it may be truly reckoned as an affection arising from self-love; because, tho' it arises from a law of nature, yet that is such a law as ⟨p. 170⟩according to the order and harmony every where observed among the laws of nature, is connected with, and follows from self-love: as was shewn before. However, it is not necessary to my present purpose, to insist on this. For if it be so, that natural affection to a man's children or family, or near relations, is not properly to be ascribed to self-love, as its cause, in any respect, but is to be esteemed an affection arising from a particular independent instinct of nature, which the creator in his wisdom has implanted in men for the preservation and well-being of the world of mankind, yet it cannot be of the nature of true virtue. For it has been observed, and I humbly conceive, proved before (chap. II.) that if any Being or Beings have by natural instinct, or any other means, a determination of mind to benevolence, extending only to some particular persons or private system, however large that system may be, or however great a number of individuals it may contain, so long as it contains but an infinitely small part of universal existence, and so bears no proportion to this great and universal system,—such limited private benevolence, not arising from, nor being subordinate to benevolence to Being in general, cannot have the nature of true virtue.
