Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The…

IF what is called natural affection, arises from a particular natural instinct, so, much more indisputably, does that mutual affection which naturally arises between the sexes. I agree with Hutcheson and Hume in this, that there is a foundation laid in nature for kind affections between the sexes, that are truly diverse from all inclinations to sensitive pleasure, and don't properly arise from any such inclination. There is doubtless a disposition both to a mutual benevolence and mutual complacence, that are not naturally and necessarily connected with any sensitive desires. But yet 'tis manifest such affections as are limited to opposite sexes, are from a particular instinct, thus directing & limiting them; and not arising from a principle of general benevolence; for this has no tendency to any such limitation. And tho' these affections don't properly arise from the sensitive desires ⟨p. 172⟩which are between the sexes, yet they are implanted by the author of nature chiefly for the same purpose, viz. the preservation or continuation of the world of mankind, to make persons willing to forsake father and mother, and all their natural relations in the families where they were born and brought up, for the sake of a stated union with a companion of the other sex, and to dispose to that union in bearing and going through with that series of labours, anxieties, and pains requisite to the Being, support and education of a family of children. Tho' not only for these ends, but partly also for the comfort of mankind as united in a marriage-relation.—But I suppose, few (if any) will deny, that the peculiar natural dispositions there are to mutual affection between the sexes, arise from an instinct or particular law of nature. And therefore it is manifest from what has been said already, that those natural dispositions cannot be of the nature of true virtue.

ANOTHER affection which is owing to a particular instinct, implanted in men for like purposes with other instincts, is that pity which is natural to mankind, when they see others in great distress.—'Tis acknowledged, that such an affection is natural to mankind. But I think it evident, that the pity which is general and natural, is owing to a particular instinct, and is not of the nature of true virtue. I am far from saying, that there is no such thing as a truly virtuous pity among mankind. For I am far from thinking, that all the pity or mercy which is any where to be found among them, arises merely from natural instinct, or, that none is to be found, which arises from that truly virtuous divine principle of general benevolence to sensitive Beings. Yet at the same time I think, this is not the case with all pity, or with that disposition to pity which is natural to mankind in common. I think I may be bold to say, this does not arise from general benevolence, nor is truly of the nature of benevolence, or properly called by that name.