Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The…

Secondly, THESE private affections, if they do not arise from general benevolence, & they are not connected with it in their first existence, have no tendency to produce it. This appears ⟨p. 171⟩from what has been observed: for being not dependent on it, their detached and unsubordinate operation rather tends to, and implies opposition to Being in general, than general benevolence; as every one sees and owns with respect to self-love. And there are the very same reasons why any other private affection, confined to limits infinitely short of universal existence, should have that influence, as well as love that is confined to a single person.—Now upon the whole, nothing can be plainer than that affections which don't arise from a virtuous principle, and have no tendency to true virtue, as their effect, cannot be of the nature of true virtue.

Secondly, THESE private affections, if they do not arise from general benevolence, & they are not connected with it in their first existence, have no tendency to produce it. This appears ⟨p. 171⟩from what has been observed: for being not dependent on it, their detach'd and unsubordinate operation rather tends to, and implies opposition to Being in general, than general benevolence; as every one sees and owns with respect to self-love. And there are the very same reasons why any other private affection, confined to limits infinitely short of universal existence, should have that influence, as well as love that is confined to a single person.—Now upon the whole, nothing can be plainer than that affections which don't arise from a virtuous principle, and have no tendency to true virtue, as their effect, cannot be of the nature of true virtue.

FOR the reasons which have been given, it is undeniably true, that if persons by any means come to have a benevolent affection limited to a party that is very large, or to the country or nation in general, of which they are a part, or the public community they belong to, tho' it be as large as the Roman empire was of old, yea, if there could be an instinct or other cause determining a person to benevolence towards the whole world of mankind, or even all created sensible natures throughout the universe, exclusive of union of heart to general existence and of love to God, nor derived from that temper of mind which disposes to a supreme regard to him, nor subordinate to such divine love, it cannot be of the nature of true virtue.