Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The…

2. THESE principles have a like effect with true virtue in this respect, that they tend several ways to restrain vice, and prevent many acts of wickedness.—So, natural affection, love to our party, or to particular friends, tends to keep us from acts of injustice towards these persons; which would be real wickedness—Pity preserves from cruelty, which would be real and great moral evil.—Natural conscience tends to restrain sin in general, in the present state of the world.—But neither can this prove these principles themselves to be of the nature of true virtue. For so is this present state of mankind ordered by a merciful ⟨p. 183⟩God, that men's self-love does in innumerable respects restrain from acts of true wickedness; and not only so, but puts men upon seeking true virtue: yet is not itself true virtue, but is the source of all the wickedness that is in the world.

ANOTHER reason why these inferior affections especially some of them, are accounted virtuous, is, that there are affections of the same denomination, which are truly virtuous. Thus, for instance, there is a truly virtuous pity, or a compassion to others under affliction or misery from general benevolence. Pure benevolence would be sufficient to excite pity to another in calamity, if there were no particular instinct, or any other principle determining the mind thereto. It is easy to see how benevolence, which seeks another's good should cause us to desire his deliverance from evil. And this is a source of pity far more extensive than the other. It excites compassion in cases that are overlooked by natural instinct. And even in those cases to which instinct extends, it mixes its influence with the natural principle, and guides and regulates its operations. And when this is the case, the pity which is exercised, may be called a virtuous compassion.—So there is a virtuous gratitude, or a gratitude that arises not only from self-love, but from a superior principle of disinterested general benevolence. As 'tis manifest, that when we receive kindness from such as we love already, we are more disposed to gratitude, and disposed to greater degrees of it, than when the mind is destitute of any such friendly prepossession. Therefore, when the superior principle of virtuous love has a governing hand, and regulates the affair, it may be called a virtuous gratitude.—So there is a virtuous love of justice, arising from pure benevolence to Being in general, as that naturally and necessarily inclines the heart, that every particular Being should have such a share of benevolence as is proportioned to its dignity, consisting in the degree of its Being, and the degree of its virtue. Which is entirely diverse from an apprehension of justice, from a sense of the beauty of uniformity in variety: as has been particularly shown already. And so it is easy to see how there may be a virtuous sense of desert different from what is natural and common.