Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The…

Fourthly, I OBSERVE, there is no other temper but this, that a man can have, and agree with himself, or be without self-inconsistence, i. e. without having some inclinations and relishes repugnant to others. And that for these reasons. Every Being that has understanding and will, necessarily loves happiness. For, to suppose any Being not to love happiness, would be to suppose he did not love what was agreeable to him; which is a contradiction: or at least would imply, that nothing was agreeable or eligible to him, which is the same as to say, that he has no such thing as choice, or any faculty of will. So that every Being who has a faculty of will, must of necessity have an inclination to happiness. And therefore, if he be consistent with himself, and has not some inclinations repugnant to others, he must approve of those inclinations whereby Beings desire the happiness of Being in general, and must be against a disposition to the misery of Being in general: because otherwise he would approve of opposition to his own happiness. For, if a temper inclined to the misery of Being in general prevailed universally, 'tis apparent, it would tend to universal misery. But he that loves a tendency to universal misery, in effect loves a tendency to his own misery: and as he necessarily hates his own misery, he has then one inclination repugnant to another.—And besides, it necessarily follows from self-love, that men love to be loved by others; because in this others love agrees with their own love. But if men loved hatred to Being in general, they would in effect love the hatred of themselves: and so would be inconsistent with themselves, having one natural inclination contrary to another.

Fourthly, I OBSERVE, there is no other temper but this, that a man can have, and agree with himself, or be without self-inconsistence, i. e. without having some inclinations and relishes repugnant to others. And that for these reasons. Every Being that has understanding and will, necessarily loves happiness. For, to suppose any Being not to love happiness, would be to suppose he did not love what was agreable to him; which is a contradiction: or at least would imply, that nothing was agreable or eligible to him, which is the same as to say, that he has no such thing as choice, or any faculty of will. So that every Being who has a faculty of will, must of necessity have an inclination to happiness. And therefore, if he be consistent with himself, and has not some inclinations repugnant to others, he must approve of those inclinations whereby Beings desire the happiness of Being in general, and must be against a disposition to the misery of Being in general: because otherwise he would approve of opposition to his own happiness. For, if a temper inclined to the misery of Being in general prevailed universally, 'tis apparent, it would tend to universal misery. But he that loves a tendency to universal misery, in effect loves a tendency to his own misery: and as he necessarily hates his own misery, he has then one inclination repugnant to another.—And besides, it necessarily follows from self-love, that men love to be loved by others; because in this others love agrees with their own love. But if men loved hatred to Being in general, they would in effect love the hatred of themselves: and so would be inconsistent with themselves, having one natural inclination contrary to another.