Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The…

THAT which is called virtue, is a certain kind of beautiful nature, form or quality that is observed in things. That form or quality is called beautiful to any one beholding it to whom it is beautiful, which appears in itself agreeable or comely to him, or the view or idea of which is immediately pleasant to the mind. I say, agreeable in itself and immediately pleasant, to distinguish it from things which in themselves are not agreeable nor pleasant, but either indifferent or disagreeable, which yet appear eligible and agreeable indirectly for something else that is the consequence of them, or with which they are connected. Such a kind of indirect agreeableness or eligibleness in things, not for themselves, but ⟨p. 185⟩for some thing else, is not what is called beauty. But when a form or quality appears lovely, pleasing and delightful in itself, then it is called beautiful; and this agreeableness or gratefulness of the idea is what is called beauty. It is evident therefore by this, that the way we come by the idea or sensation or beauty, is by immediate sensation of the gratefulness of the idea called beautiful; and not by finding out by argumentation any consequences, or other things that it stands connected with; any more than tasting the sweetness of honey, or perceiving the harmony of a tune, is by argumentation on connections and consequences. And this manner of being affected with the immediate presence of the beautiful idea depends not, therefore, on any reasonings about the idea, after we have it, before we can find out whether it be beautiful, or not; but on the frame of our minds, whereby they are so made that such an idea, as soon as we have it, is grateful, or appears beautiful.

THAT which is called virtue, is a certain kind of beautiful nature, form or quality that is observed in things. That form or quality is called beautiful to any one beholding it to whom it is beautiful, which appears in itself agreable or comely to him, or the view or idea of which is immediately pleasant to the mind. I say, agreable in itself and immediately pleasant, to distinguish it from things which in themselves are not agreable nor pleasant, but either indifferent or disagreable, which yet appear eligible and agreable indirectly for something else that is the consequence of them, or with which they are connected. Such a kind of indirect agreableness or eligibleness in things, not for themselves, but ⟨p. 185⟩