Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The…

THEREFORE here may arise a question, which may deserve to be considered, viz Seeing it is thus, that sentiment among mankind is the rule of language, as to what is called by the name of good and evil, worthy and unworthy; and 'tis apparent, that sentiment, at least as to many particulars, by some means or other is different in different persons, in different nations; that being thought to deserve praise by one, which by others is thought to be worthy of blame; how therefore can virtue and vice be any other than arbitrary, not at all determined by the nature of things, but by the sentiments of men with relation to the nature of things?

IN order to the answering this question with clearness, it may be divided into two: viz. Whether men's sentiments ⟨p. 190⟩of moral good and evil are not arbitrary, or rather casual and accidental? And, whether the way of their using words in what they call good and evil, is not arbitrary, without respect to any common sentiment in all, conformed to the nature of things?

As TO the first, I would observe, that the general disposition or sense of mind exercised in a sense of desert of esteem or resentment, may be the same in all: though as to particular objects and occasions with regard to which it is exercised, it may be very various in different men or bodies of men, through the partiality or error that may attend the view or attention of the mind. In all, a notion of desert of love, or resentment, may consist in the same thing, in general, viz. a suitableness, or natural uniformity and agreement between the affections and acts of the agent, and the affections and treatment of others some way concerned; or the natural agreement between love (or something that some way implies love, or proceeds from it, or tends to it) and love; a natural agreement between treating well, and being well treated; the natural agreement between hating (or something that some way partakes of the nature of hatred) and being hated, &c. I say, this general notion of desert may be the same: and yet occasions and objects through variety of apprehensions about these occasions and objects, and the various manner in which they are viewed, by reason of the partial attention of the mind, may be extremely various; and example, custom, education, and association may have a hand in this, in ways innumerable. But 'tis needless to dwell long on this, since things which have been said by others (Mr. Hutcheson, in particular) may abundantly show, that the differences which are to be found among different persons and nations, concerning moral good and evil, are not inconsistent with a general moral sense, common to all mankind.