A Discourse of Witchcraft.
pp. 1–256410 passagespart 4 of 11
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Ans▪ It cannot be denied that they are causes of some things, but I demand, what causes? not particular of particular events• but general and common, that work alike upon all things: and no man can divine of a particular event, by a general cause, unless he also know the particular causes subordinate to the general, and the particular dispositions ⟨p. 77⟩and operations of them. For example, let twenty or thirty eggs of sundry kinds of birds be taken, and set under one and the same hen to be hatched; it is not possible for any man, only upon the bare consideration of the heat of the hen, which is the general cause of hatching the eggs, to set down certainly what kind of bird each egg will bring forth, unless he know what the eggs were particularly. For a general and common cause, doth not immediately produce a particular effect, but only moveth and helpeth the particular, immediate, and subordinate causes. Therefore the heat of the hen doth not make one egg to send forth a hen-chicken, another egg a duck, a third a swan, &c. but only helpeth it forward by sitting and crouching upon them. In like manner the stars are general causes of natural things, as the heat of the hen is of the hatching of the eggs, and by them no man can rightly define of particular events, and therefore Divination by the stars, whereby are fore-told particular contingent events, ⟨p. 78⟩in kingdoms, families, or particular persons, is but a forged skill, that hath no ground in nature from the virtue of the stars, for any such purpose.
Ans▪ It cannot be denied that they are causes of some things, but I demand, what causes? not particular of particular euents• but generall and common, that worke alike vpon all things: and no man can diuine of a particular euent, by a generall cause, vnlesse he also know the particular causes subordinate to the generall, and the particular dispositions ⟨p. 77⟩and operations of them. For example, let twentie or thirtie egges of sundrie kinds of birds be taken, and set vnder one and the same henne to be hatched; it is not possible for any man, onely vpon the bare consideration of the heate of the hen, which is the generall cause of hatching the egges, to set downe certainely what kind of bird each egge will bring forth, vnlesse he know what the egges were particularly. For a generall and common cause, doth not immediately produce a particular effect, but onely mooueth and helpeth the particular, immediate, and subordinate causes. Therefore the heat of the henne doth not make one egge to send forth a henne-chicken, another egge a ducke, a third a swanne, &c. but onely helpeth it forward by sitting and crouching vpon them. In like manner the starres are generall causes of naturall things, as the heat of the hen is of the hatching of the egges, and by them no man can rightly define of particular euents, and therefore Diuination by the slarres, whereby are fore-told particular contingent euents,