But let us consider your reason why the distinction foresaid can have no place, if the pure mass be the object of predestination. For (say you) the entity or personal being of man is so indivisible, that an universal negation, and a particular affirmation of the same thing (to wit salvation) falling upon man as man, or upon the personal being of man, draws to the strictest kind of contradiction. All this is but one proposition, but it contains more then one fault. For first you make the affirmation and negation of salvation upon the same men, to follow upon voluntas signi touching their salvation, and voluntas beneplaciti touching their non salvation. Whereas no such thing will follow. For although from voluntas beneplaciti, whereby God doth will the salvation of one man, it followeth, such a one shall be saved; yet upon the voluntas signi, whereby God doth will their salvation, it shall not follow that such shall be saved: like as from voluntas signi, whereby God did will Abraham to sacrifice his son, it did not follow that Isaac should be sacrificed: yet you swallow this consequence without any chawing; but an Ostrich will sooner digest a ten-penny nail, then any sober and intelligent Scholar will digest this consequence. If you would deal directly, you should profess, that to will and not to will the salvation of the same man is contradiction; but that is untrue as well as the former. For unto contradiction ⟨p. 547⟩is required that it must be, ad idem, secundum idem, eodem modo, & eodem tempore. Now these conditions are not found in this that we speak of. For we do not say, that God doth will and not will the salvation of the same man, voluntate eodem modo accepta; for that he wills the salvation of this man, is only voluntate signi; that he doth not will it, is voluntate beneplaciti; and this will which is called the will of good pleasure, is only the will of God in proper speech, and that S. Paul speaks of when he saith, Who hath resisted his will? 1the other, to wit, voluntas signi, is improperly (though usually) called the will of God. It being indeed nothing else but Gods commandment; in which sense he willed Abraham to sacrifice his son; yet who doubts but that it was Gods will in proper speech, that Isaac should not be sacrificed.
But let us consider your reason why the distinction foresaid can have no place, if the pure masse be the object of predestination. For (say you) the entity or personall being of man is so indivisible, that an universall negation, and a particular affirmation of the same thing (to wit salvation) falling upon man as man, or upon the personall being of man, drawes to the strictest kinde of contradiction. All this is but one proposition, but it containes more then one fault. For first you make the affirmation and negation of salvation upon the same men, to follow upon voluntas signi touching their salvation, and voluntas beneplaciti touching their non salvation. Whereas no such thing will follow. For although from voluntas beneplaciti, whereby God doth will the salvation of one man, it followeth, such a one shall be saved; yet upon the voluntas signi, whereby God doth will their salvation, it shall not follow that such shall be saved: like as from voluntas signi, whereby God did will Abraham to sacrifice his sonne, it did not follow that Isaak should bee sacrified: yet you swallow this consequence without any chawing; but an Estrich will sooner digest a tenne-peny naile, then any sober and intelligent Scholar wil digest this consequence. If you would deale directly, you should professe, that to will and not to will the salvation of the same man is contradiction; but that is untrue as well as the former. For unto contradiction ⟨p. 547⟩is required that it must be, ad idem, secundum idem, eodem modo, & eodem tempore. Now these conditions are not found in this that we speake of. For we doe not say, that God doth will and not will the salvation of the same man, voluntate eodem modo accepta; for that hee wils the salvation of this man, is onely voluntate signi; that he doth not will it, is voluntate beneplaciti; and this will which is called the will of good pleasure, is onely the will of God in proper speech, and that S. Paul speakes of when he saith, Who hath resisted his will? 1the other, to wit, voluntas signi, is improperly (though usually) called the will of God. It being indeed nothing else but Gods commandement; in which sense he willed Abraham to sacrifice his sonne; yet who doubts but that it was Gods will in proper speech, that Isaak should not be sacrificed.
- 1Rom. 9. 1•