THE SECOND PART OF THIS APPENDIX; BEING Some ANIMADVERSIONS On the foresaid Treatise De Veritate, Resolving several Questions there included or implied.THE SECOND PART OF THIS APPENDIX; BEING Some ANIMADVERSIONS On the foresaid Treatise De Veritate, Resolving several Questions there included or implyed.
pp. 79–169114 passagespart 3 of 3
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Thirdly, Every thing that is, when it is, (if corporeal) is naturally Evident to those that have their faculties in those conditions that are necessary, and have the object in its necessary magnitude, cognation, detection, site, distance, medium and abode.
Fourthly, The judgement that is made upon sense it self faileth (as this noble Author hath well opened) when either the Object, the Evidence the Sense or the Intellect want their necessary conditions or qualifications; else not.
Fifthly, The Fountain of all Freedom and Morality is the Will of ⟨p. 142⟩God: And yet the moral Evidence of truth which is in Gods word, when known to be his word, is as sure as any natural Evidence of the thing: There being the surest natural evidence ab effect is at least that there is a God most perfect, that cannot lie.
Fifthly, The Fountain of all Freedome and Morality is the Will of ⟨p. 142⟩God: And yet the moral Evidence of truth which is in Gods word, when known to be his word, is as sure as any natural Evidence of the thing: There being the surest natural evidence ab effect is at least that there is a God most perfect, that cannot lie.
Sixthly, The Essences of all things are but imperfectly evident to us; The existences of corporeal things that are present and duly qualified, are fully evident. The existence of things absent beyond the reach of sense, is evident only to the discursive intellect; not by the immediate natural evidence of the things themselves, but by a borrowed evidence from Causes or Signs; Discourse improving the Fundamental common truths, for the knowing of the rest, by proving a certain connection between them. The Praterition of things, and the Futurition, are both like the distant existence, unknown to sense, and the immediate apprehension of the intellect; And therefore must both be known also by collection as conclusions in discourse, or not at all.