Concerning Repentance.
pp. 248–26061 passagespart 2 of 2
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
9. If Faith be the proper condition, Then Repentance cannot be so; because Faith is not ⟨p. 256⟩a condition of the Covenant merely as it is a Grace, but as it is peculiarly qualified in its manner of acting. Now, Repentance not being qualified with that manner of acting, cannot be a part of the proper condition, 1. Because if so, then were graces of different actings admitted to concur in the same capacity and manner of acting, contrary to their natures. 2. If so, then not only Repentance but every Grace, and all good Works, might be accounted parts of the proper condition of the Covenant, as well as Repentance and Faith, if there were no peculiarnesse in Faiths acting respected in this. And though this may be counted no absurdity by some; yet to such as plead only to join Repentance with Faith, it may have weight: And to others we propose these considerations, First, That the evidence of light doth constrain the acknowledging of Faith to be eminently the condition beyond all; yea, that it may be called the only condition of the new Covenant, 1. Because it is the principal condition, and the other but less principal. 2. Because all the rest are reducible to it, as necessary antecedents or means, &c. (so Mr. Baxter, Apho. Those. 62.) and the formal and essential acts of this Faith are acknowledged to be subjection, acceptation, consent, cordial Covenanting, and self resigning. Now, if Faith be the principal condition, and that as acting so, in which respects no other Grace can act, Then certainly Faith hath a peculiar property here, and that not as a Grace simply, but in respect of the formality of its acting: which doth confirm all that is said. And thus, Faith is not the principal condition, as being only so in degree (like a chief City amongst many Cities) but in respect of a different manner of acting, and an excellency (to say so) that is in it in that respect, Such acts being peculiar and proper to it, which are the proper characters of a proper condition: and if so, seeing all other things mentioned are acknowledged as necessary antecedents or means, or implied duties, &c. why should there be a contending about words, and a new controversy stated for the nature of a condition when the Church is almost suffocated with controversies already?
9. If Faith be the proper condition, Then Repentance cannot be so; because Faith is not ⟨p. 256⟩a condition of the Covenant meerly as it is a Grace, but as it is peculiarly qualified in its manner of acting. Now, Repentance not being qualified with that manner of acting, cannot be a part of the proper condition, 1. Because if so, then were graces of different actings admitted to concur in the same capacity and manner of acting, contrary to their natures. 2. If so, then not only Repentance but every Grace, and all good Works, might be accounted parts of the proper condition of the Covenant, as well as Repentance and Faith, if there were no peculiarnesse in Faiths acting respected in this. And though this may be counted no absurdity by some; yet to such as plead only to joyn Repentance with Faith, it may have weight: And to others we propose these considerations, First, That the evidence of light doth constrain the acknowledging of Faith to be eminently the condition beyond all; yea, that it may be called the only condition of the new Covenant, 1. Because it is the principall condition, and the other but lesse principall. 2. Because all the rest are reducible to it, as necessary antecedents or means, &c. (so Mr. Baxter, Apho. Thos. 62.) and the formall and essentiall acts of this Faith are acknowledged to be subjection, acceptation, consent, cordiall Covenanting, and self resigning. Now, if Faith be the principall condition, and that as acting so, in which respects no other Grace can act, Then certainly Faith hath a peculiar property here, and that not as a Grace simply, but in respect of the formality of its acting: which doth confirm all that is said. And thus, Faith is not the principall condition, as being only so in degree (like a chief City amongst many Cities) but in respect of a different manner of acting, and an excellency (to say so) that is in it in that respect, Such acts being peculiar and proper to it, which are the proper characters of a proper condition: and if so, seing all other things mentioned are acknowledged as necessary antecedents or means, or implyed duties, &c. why should there be a contending about words, and a new controversie stated for the nature of a condition when the Church is almost suffocated with controversies already?