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588 passagespart 3 of 15
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
but such suitableness or unsuitableness, as they make things fundamentally good or evil, so they cannot make any thing morally good or evil, unless we suppose some Law; for it would be in this case with man as 'tis in brute creatures, who do many things unnatural (as to eat up and destroy their own young) which yet are not morally sinful, because they are not under any moral law; and *one of the most ancient and best of the Schoolmen, though he thinks that the observance of the Sabbath before Moses time was not secund•m rationem praecepti, or debitè fieri, i. was not actually commanded; yet that it was secundum rationem honesti, hoc est dignè steri. i. It was congruous, and a thing meet and worthy to be observed even from the first creation: But will any of our Adversaries hence say, that because it was meet and worthy to be observed, that therefore it was a moral law from the beginning of the world, while it had no command (as is by them supposed) to be observed? For it must be something meet and congruous, and worthy to be observed of man, which when it is commanded makes it to be a moral law, for then the Law commands a thing that is good, and because 'tis good i• is therefore commanded, which goodness we must a little more narrowly now enquire into.
but such sutablenesse or unsutablenesse, as they make things fundamentally good or evill, so they cannot make any thing morally good or evill, unlesse we suppose some Law; for it would be in this case with man as 'tis in brute creatures, who doe many things unnaturall (as to eate up and destroy their owne young) which yet are not morally sinfull, because they are not under any morall law; and *one of the most ancient and best of the Schoolemen, though he thinks that the observance of the Sabbath before Moses time was not secund•m rationem praecepti, or debitè fieri, i. was not actually commanded; yet that it was secundum rationem honesti, hoc est dignè steri. i. It was congruous, and a thing meet and worthy to bee observed even from the first creation: But will any of our Adversaries hence say, that because it was meet and worthy to bee observed, that therefore it was a morall law from the beginning of the world, while it had no command (as is by them supposed) to be observed? For it must be something meet and congruous, and worthy to be observed of man, which when it is commanded makes it to be a morall law, for then the Law commands a thing that is good, and because 'tis good i is therefore commanded, which goodnesse wee must a little more narrowly now enquire into.