Mr GOODWIN pag. 29, 30. cap. 3. Sect. 3.
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Mr GOODWIN pag. 29, 30. cap. 3. Sect. 3.
IF it be objected, that this argument lieth as strong against the propriety of knowledge, as of foreknowledge in God; in as much as foreknowledge is every whit as Properly and Formally in the Creature, as knowledge; I answer
True it is, there is no knowledge neither in God, according to the precise and formal notion of Knowledge, or in such a sense, wherein it is found in men. And this the first and last of the three reasons mentioned do infallibly demonstrate. Knowledge in the creature is a principle or habit, really and essentially distinct from the subject, or soul, wherein it resideth: yea and is capable of augmentation and diminution therein, and of separation from its Whereas that which is called knowledge in God, neither differs really or essentially from his nature, or from himself, but is really one and the same thing with him (as will farther appear in the following Chapter) nor is it either capable of growth, or of decay, or of separation. Only in this respect, knowledge of the two, is more properly attributable unto God, then foreknowledge, viz. because foreknowledge in the proper notion, or formal conception of it, includes or supposeth a liablenesse to a change or expiration (viz. upon the coming to pass of the thing foreknown; which must of necessity come to pass in time) whereas knowledge imports nothing, but what may be permanent and perpetual, and so is (of the two) more appropriable unto him, who changeth not.
True it is, there is no knowledge neither in God, according to the precise and formall notion of Knowledge, or in such a sense, wherein it is found in men. And this the first and last of the three reasons mentioned doe infallibly demonstrate. Knowledge in the creature is a principle or habit, really and essentially distinct from the subject, or soule, wherein it resideth: yea and is capable of augmentation and diminution therein, and of separation from its Whereas that which is called knowledge in God, neither differs really or essentially from his nature, or from himselfe, but is really one and the same thing with him (as will farther appeare in the following Chapter) nor is it either capable of growth, or of decay, or of separation. Only in this respect, knowledge of the two, is more properly attributable unto God, then foreknowledge, viz. because foreknowledge in the proper notion, or formall conception of it, includes or supposeth a liablenesse to a change or expiration (viz. upon the comming to passe of the thing foreknown; which must of necessity come to passe in time) whereas knowledge imports nothing, but what may be permanent and perpetuall, and so is (of the two) more appropriable unto him, who changeth not.