A64002:2288
The riches of Gods love unto the vessels of mercy, consistent with his absolute…The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute…
The riches of Gods love unto the vessels of mercy, consistent with his absolute hatred or reprobation of the vessels of wrath, or, An answer unto a book entitled, Gods love unto mankind ... in two books, the first being a refutation of the said book, as it was presented in manuscript by Mr Hord unto Sir Nath. Rich., the second being an examination of certain passages inserted into M. Hord's discourse (formerly answered) by an author that conceals his name, but was supposed to be Mr Mason ... / by ... William Twice ... ; whereunto are annexed two tractates of the same author in answer unto D.H. ... ; together with a vindication of D. Twice from the exceptions of Mr John Goodwin in his Redemption redeemed, by Henry Jeans ...The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute hatred or reprobation of the vessells of wrath, or, An answer unto a book entituled, Gods love unto mankind ... in two bookes, the first being a refutation of the said booke, as it was presented in manuscript by Mr Hord unto Sir Nath. Rich., the second being an examination of certain passages inserted into M. Hords discourse (formerly answered) by an author that conceales his name, but was supposed to be Mr Mason ... / by ... William Twisse ... ; whereunto are annexed two tractates of the same author in answer unto D.H. ... ; together with a vindication of D. Twisse from the exceptions of Mr John Goodwin in his Redemption redeemed, by Henry Jeanes ...
Oxford: printed by L.L. and H.H. for Tho. Robinson, 1653
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Mr GOODWIN pag. 29, 30. cap. 3. Sect. 3.
IF it be objected, that this argument lieth as strong against the propriety of knowledge, as of foreknowledge in God; in as much as foreknowledge is every whit as Properly and Formally in the Creature, as knowledge; I answer
True it is, there is no knowledge neither in God, according to the precise and formal notion of Knowledge, or in such a sense, wherein it is found in men. And this the first and last of the three reasons mentioned do infallibly demonstrate. Knowledge in the creature is a principle or habit, really and essentially distinct from the subject, or soul, wherein it resideth: yea and is capable of augmentation and diminution therein, and of separation from its Whereas that which is called knowledge in God, neither differs really or essentially from his nature, or from himself, but is really one and the same thing with him (as will farther appear in the following Chapter) nor is it either capable of growth, or of decay, or of separation. Only in this respect, knowledge of the two, is more properly attributable unto God, then foreknowledge, viz. because foreknowledge in the proper notion, or formal conception of it, includes or supposeth a liablenesse to a change or expiration (viz. upon the coming to pass of the thing foreknown; which must of necessity come to pass in time) whereas knowledge imports nothing, but what may be permanent and perpetual, and so is (of the two) more appropriable unto him, who changeth not.
True it is, there is no knowledge neither in God, according to the precise and formall notion of Knowledge, or in such a sense, wherein it is found in men. And this the first and last of the three reasons mentioned doe infallibly demonstrate. Knowledge in the creature is a principle or habit, really and essentially distinct from the subject, or soule, wherein it resideth: yea and is capable of augmentation and diminution therein, and of separation from its Whereas that which is called knowledge in God, neither differs really or essentially from his nature, or from himselfe, but is really one and the same thing with him (as will farther appeare in the following Chapter) nor is it either capable of growth, or of decay, or of separation. Only in this respect, knowledge of the two, is more properly attributable unto God, then foreknowledge, viz. because foreknowledge in the proper notion, or formall conception of it, includes or supposeth a liablenesse to a change or expiration (viz. upon the comming to passe of the thing foreknown; which must of necessity come to passe in time) whereas knowledge imports nothing, but what may be permanent and perpetuall, and so is (of the two) more appropriable unto him, who changeth not.