DISCOURSE. The Second sort of Arguments Convincing drawn from Gods Attributes.
pp. 121–186287 passagespart 6 of 8
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
4. In saying sin foreseen is the cause of Gods decree of damnation, they presuppose a prescience of sin, as of a thing future, without all ground. For nothing can be foreknown as future, unless it be future: now these disputers presuppose a futurition of sin, and that from eternity, without all ground. For consider, no sin is future in its own nature, for in its own nature it is merely possible and indifferent, as well not to be future, as to become future; and therefore it cannot pass out of the condition of a thing merely possible, into the condition of a thing future without a cause. Now what cause do these men devise of the futurition of sinne? Extra Deum, nothing can be the cause thereof: For this passage of things out of the condition of things possible, into the condition of things future, was from everlasting, for from everlasting they were future; otherwise, God could not have known them from everlasting, And consequently the cause of this passage, must be acknowledged to have been from everlasting, and consequently nothing without God could be the cause of it, seeing nothing without God was from everlasting. Therefore the cause hereof must be found intra Deum, within God; then either the will of God, which these men do utterly disclaim, or the knowledge of God; but that is confessed to presuppose things future, rather then to make them so; or the essence of God; now that may be considered either as working necessarily, (and if in that manner it were the cause of things future, then all such things should become future by necessity of nature, which to say is Atheistical) or as working freely; and this is to grant, that the will of God is the cause why every thing merely possible in its own nature doth pass from everlasting into the condition of a thing future, if so be it were future at all. And indeed seeing no other cause can be pitched upon, this free will of God must be acknowledged to be the cause of it: And consequently the reason why every thing becomes future is, because God hath determined it shall come to pass; but with this difference, All good things God hath determined shall come to pass by his effection, All evil things God hath determined shall come to pass by his permission.