The fourth Sophism, of contingency and liberty or freeness.The fourth Sophisme, of contingency and liberty or freenesse.
pp. 213–21611 passages
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
The fourth Sophism, of contingency and liberty or freeness.
The fourth Sophisme, of contingency and liberty or freenesse.
1That which is done by the unchangeable decree of God, is not done contingently and freely. But all things are done by the unchangeable decree, or counsel, or providence of God: Therefore nothing is done contingently and freely. Answ. The Major is either particular, and so concludeth nothing, or being generally understood, is most false. For, An effect which is the same in subject and matter, is changeable and unchangeable, necessary and contingent, in respect not of the same cause, but of divers, of which together it is produced and doth depend, and whereof some are changeable, some unchangeable. In respect therefore of the second and nearest causes, some effects are necessary and certain, which are produced out of causes always working after one sort; some are changeable, which have a changeable cause, that is, such as is not always working after one sort, and producing the same effects. In respect of the first cause, namely, the decree of God, which is unchangeable, all effects are unchangeable and most certain, even those, which in respect of second causes are most uncertain. As, That the bones of Christ should not be broken, it was a thing contingent, in respect of the bones, which in their own nature might as well have been broken, as not broken; as also of the Soldiers, who, as concerning the nature of their will, might have chosen to do either; but in respect of the decree of God, it was necessary: for by his decree were the wills of the Soldiers so ruled, that they could not then, neither would choose the contrary. Wherefore the unchangeableness of the decree of God, which is a necessity by supposition, or conditional, doth not take away either the contingency of events, or the liberty and freeness of a created will, but rather maintaineth, and confirmeth it. For God accomplisheth his decrees by reasonable creatures according to the condition of their nature, when as by objects represented and showed to their understanding, he inclineth and bendeth their will, that it should with free and inward motion choose or refuse that which