The sum of Christian religion, delivered by Zacharias Ursinus first, by way of catechism,…The summe of Christian religion, delivered by Zacharias Ursinus first, by way of catechism,…

The fourth Sophism, of contingency and liberty or freeness.

The fourth Sophisme, of contingency and liberty or freenesse.

¹That which is done by the unchangeable decree of God, is not done contingently and freely. But all things are done by the unchangeable decree, or counsel, or providence of God: Therefore nothing is done contingently and freely. Answ. The Major is either particular, and so concludeth nothing, or being generally understood, is most false. For, An effect which is the same in subject and matter, is changeable and unchangeable, necessary and contingent, in respect not of the same cause, but of divers, of which together it is produced and doth depend, and whereof some are changeable, some unchangeable. In respect therefore of the second and nearest causes, some effects are necessary and certain, which are produced out of causes always working after one sort; some are changeable, which have a changeable cause, that is, such as is not always working after one sort, and producing the same effects. In respect of the first cause, namely, the decree of God, which is unchangeable, all effects are unchangeable and most certain, even those, which in respect of second causes are most uncertain. As, That the bones of Christ should not be broken, it was a thing contingent, in respect of the bones, which in their own nature might as well have been broken, as not broken; as also of the Soldiers, who, as concerning the nature of their will, might have chosen to do either; but in respect of the decree of God, it was necessary: for by his decree were the wills of the Soldiers so ruled, that they could not then, neither would choose the contrary. Wherefore the unchangeableness of the decree of God, which is a necessity by supposition, or conditional, doth not take away either the contingency of events, or the liberty and freeness of a created will, but rather maintaineth, and confirmeth it. For God accomplisheth his decrees by reasonable creatures according to the condition of their nature, when as by objects represented and showed to their understanding, he inclineth and bendeth their will, that it should with free and inward motion choose or refuse that which ⟨p. 214⟩seemed good from everlasting to God, and was decreed of him. For, if when God worketh well by evil creatures, there is not taken away in them, through the decree or providence of God, and his good working, that which is accidental to them, that is, corruption:

¹THat which is done by the unchangeable decree of God, is not done contingently and freely. But all things are done by the unchangeable decree, or counsell, or providence of God: Therefore nothing is done contingently and freely. Answ. The Major is either particular, and so concludeth nothing, or being generally understood, is most false. For, An effect which is the same in subject and matter, is changeable and unchangeable, necessary and contingent, in respect not of the same cause, but of divers, of which together it is produced and doth depend, and whereof some are changeable, some unchangeable. In respect therefore of the second and neerest causes, some effects are necessary and certain, which are produced out of causes alwaies working after one sort; some are changeable, which have a changeable cause, that is, such as is not alwaies working after one sort, and producing the same effects. In respect of the first cause, namely, the decree of God, which is unchangeable, all effects are unchangeable and most certain, even those, which in respect of second causes are most uncertain. As, That the bones of Christ should not be broken, it was a thing contingent, in respect of the bones, which in their own nature might as well have been broken, as not broken; as also of the Souldiers, who, as concerning the nature of their will, might have chosen to doe either; but in respect of the decree of God, it was necessary: for by his decree were the wils of the Souldiers so ruled, that they could not then, neither would chuse the contrary. Wherefore the unchangeablenesse of the decree of God, which is a necessity by supposition, or conditionall, doth not take away either the contingency of events, or the liberty and freenesse of a created will, but rather maintaineth, and confirmeth it. For God accomp•isheth his decrees by reasonable creatures according to the condition of their nature, when as by objects represented and shewed to their understanding, he inclineth and bendeth their will, that it should with free and inward motion chuse or refuse that which ⟨p. 214⟩seemed good from everlasting to God, and was decreed of him. For, if when God worketh well by evill creatures, there is not taken away in them, through the decree or providence of God, and his good working, that which is accidentall to them, that is, corruption:

1. 1Gods government doth not take away, but establish the liberty of the creatures will.

1. 1Acts 5.28.

Object. 2. That which is done by the unchangeable decree of God, is not done contingently, but necessarily. All things are done by the unchangeable decree of God: nothing is therefore done contingently, neither by Fortune nor Chance, but all necessarily: which is the Stoics doctrine of fate or destiny. Here, before we answer to this objection, we must know the signification of the words, and the difference between the opinion of the Stoics and Christians. Necessarily is that which cannot be otherwise than it is.¹ Contingent is that, which is indeed, or is done, but might notwithstanding not have been, or have been done otherwise. Necessity therefore and contingency is the order which is between the cause and the effect, unchangeable or changeable. And because the effects follow of their causes unchangeably, either in respect of the nature it self of the causes, or in respect of some external cause, which designeth and appointeth another cause to a certain effect: and because also the effects themselves cannot be more unchangeable, than are their causes: therefore there is said to be a double necessity:² One absolute or simple, which is of them, whose opposites or contraries are simply unpossible, in respect of the nature of the cause or subject whereof it is affirmed: as are the essential and personal properties of God: to wit, God is, God liveth, God is just, wise, &c. God is the eternal Father, Son, and holy Ghost. The other is necessity of consequence or by supposition, which is the immutability and unchangeableness of those effects which follow of causes, which causes being supposed or put, the effect must necessarily follow; but the causes notwithstanding themselves might either not have been, or might have been changed. So are those things necessary which God hath decreed that they should be done, in respect of the unchangeableness of his decree, which decree yet God most freely made; that is, he might from everlasting either not have decreed it at all, or have decreed it otherwise, according to those words: Thinkest thou that I cannot now pray to my Father, and he will give me moe than twelve legions of Angels? ³How then should the Scripture be fulfilled? Likewise, Those things are called necessary, which are done indeed by such second causes as are so made of God, that by their own nature, they cannot do otherwise than they do;

but yet may be by God himself either taken away, or hindered, or altered and changed: As the Sun, and the shadow going forward in consequence (or order of nature) with the Sun; and yet consisting and standing still in that battle of Joshua, and returning backwards in the days of Hezekiah: the fire, burning bodies within the reach thereof, which are capable of burning; and yet not burning the three Children in the furnace of Babylon: or those things which are indeed in their own nature apt to produce a contrary or diverse thing, or to forbear producing of their effect; and yet notwithstanding, cannot do otherwise, because they are so moved by God, or by other causes; which although they be not changed, yet might have been changed; or when they work so, cannot withal not work, or work otherwise, because two contradictories cannot be both at one time true.

but yet may be by God himselfe either taken away, or hindered, or altered and changed: As the Sun, and the shadow going forward in consequence (or order of nature) with the Sun; and yet consisting and standing still in that battell of Joshua, and returning backwards in the daies of Ezechias: the fire, burning bodies within the reach thereof, which are capable of burning; and yet not burning the three Children in the furnace of Babylon: or those things which are indeed in their own nature apt to produce a contrary or diverse thing, or to forbeare producing of their effect; and yet notwithstanding, cannot doe otherwise, because they are so moved by God, or by other causes; which although they be not changed, yet might have been changed; or when they worke so, cannot withall not worke, or worke otherwise, because two contradictories cannot be both at one time true.

¹Fortune and Chance are sometimes taken for the events themselves, or effects, which follow causes that are causes but by an accident, by reason of such causes as are causes by and in themselves, but not known to us: as when we say, good or evil fortune, happy or unhappy chance. Sometimes they signify the causes of such events: either ⟨p. 215⟩the manifest causes, which are causes but by an accident (as when any thing is said to be done by fortune, or by chance) or the hidden and unknown causes, which are causes by and in themselves: As it is said in the Poet: Omnipotent fortune and fate inevitable. And they are wont to call that fortune, which is a cause by an accident in voluntary agents, whose actions have some event, that seldom happeneth, besides their appointment: As he that digging with purpose to build, findeth treasure. Chance they call an accidental cause in natural agents, whose motions have effects, neither proper to them, neither always happening, and that without any manifest cause directing it: as if a tile falling from an house, kill one that passeth by.

¹Fortune and Chance are sometimes taken for the events themselves, or effects, which follow causes that are causes but by an accident, by reason of such causes as are causes by and in themselves, but not knowne to us: as when we say, good or evill fortune, happy or unhappy chance. Sometimes they signifie the causes of such events: either ⟨p. 215⟩the manifest causes, which are causes but by an accident (as when any thing is said to be done by fortune, or by chance) or the hidden and unknown causes, which are causes by and in themselves: As it is said in the Poet: Omnipotent fortune and fate inevitable. And they are wont to call that fortune, which is a cause by an accident in voluntary agents, whose actions have some event, that seldome happeneth, besides their appointment: As he that digging with purpose to build, findeth treasure. Chance they call an accidentall cause in naturall agents, whose motions have effects, neither proper to them, neither alwaies happening, and that without any manifest cause directing it: as if a tyle falling from an house, kill one that passeth by.

1. 1

¹By the name of Fate or Destiny, sometimes is understood the decree and providence of God: As that of the Poet, Leave off to hope that the fates of the Gods are moved with entreaty. But the Stoics by this word understood the immutable connection and knitting of all causes and effects, depending of the nature of the causes themselves; so that neither the second causes are able to work otherwise than they work, neither the first causes can work otherwise than doth the second; and therefore all effects of all causes are absolutely necessary. This opinion of the Stoics, because it spoileth God of his liberty and omnipotency, and abolisheth the order and manner of working in second causes, disposed by Gods wisdom, not only sounder Philosophy, but the Church also rejecteth and condemneth, and doth openly profess her dissenting from the Stoics: §11. Because the Stoics tie God to second causes, as if it should be necessary for him to work by them, as their nature doth bear and suffer. But the Church teacheth, that God worketh not according to the rule or lore of second causes; but second causes according to the prescript of God, as being their chief and most free Governor and Lord; and therefore are subject and tied to his will and pleasure. §22. The Stoics were of opinion, that neither God, n•r second causes, can do any thing of their own nature otherwise than they do. The Church affirmeth, that not only second causes are made and ordained by God, some to bring forth certain and definite effects, some variable and contrary; but God himself also could from everlasting either not have decreed, or have decreed and wrought otherwise, either by second causes, or without them, and by them either changeable in their own nature, or unchangeable, all things, whose contrary are not repugnant to his nature: and that he hath so decreed them, and doth so work them, not because he could not do otherwise; but because it so pleased him, as it is said: Our God is in heaven, he doth whatsoever he will. With God shall nothing be impossible: that is, which is not against his nature,² or whereby his nature is not overthrown, as it is said, 2 Tim. 2.

¹

Out of this then which hath been spoken, we answer unto the argument, which was, That which is done by the unchangeable decree of God, is not done contingently, but necessarily: All things are done by the unchangeable decree of God: nothing therefore is done contingently, neither by fortune or chance, but all necessarily. First, we say, there is more in the conclusion than in the premisses, when the opinion of the Stoics is objected to the Church: For albeit the Church confesseth all events in respect of Gods providence, to be necessary: yet this necessity is not a Stoical fate and destiny; because the Church defendeth against the Stoics, both liberty in God governing things at his pleasure, and a changeableness in second causes; and showeth out of Gods word, that God could both now do, and from everlasting have decreed many things, which neither he doth, nor hath decreed. And therefore the Church also hath abstained from the name of fate, lest any should suspect her to maintain with the Stoics an absolute necessity of all things. Secondly,¹ If removing Stoicism, yet notwithstanding the necessity of all things, and the abolishing of contingency, fortune, and chance, be objected: we make answer to the Major by distinguishing the words. For those things, which are done by the providence and decree of God, are done indeed necessarily; but by that necessity, which is by supposition, or of consequence, not by simple necessity or absolute: wherefore it followeth, that all things come to pass, not by simple and absolute necessity, but by that of supposition or consequence. And necessity of consequence doth not at all take ⟨p. 216⟩away contingency. The reason of this is: Because the same effect may have causes, whereof some may produce it by an order changeable, some by an unchangeable order; and therefore in respect of some it is contingent, and in respect of some, necessary. For as the originals or causes of contingency in things, are that liberty which is in the will of God, and Angels, and Men, and the mutable nature of the matter of the elements, together with the readiness or inclination thereof to divers motions and forms: so the cause of absolute necessity in God, is the very unchangeable nature of God;

Out of this then which hath been spoken, we answer unto the argument, which was, That which is done by the unchangeable decree of God, is not done contingently, but necessarily: All things are done by the unchangeable decree of God: nothing therefore is done contingently, neither by fortune or chance, but all necessarily. First, wee say, there is more in the conclusion than in the premisses, when the opinion of the Stoickes is objected to the Church: For albeit the Church confesseth all events in respect of Gods providence, to be necessary: yet this necessity is not a Stoicall fate and destiny; because the Church detendeth against the Stoickes, both liberty in God governing things at his pleasure, and a changeablenes in second causes; and sheweth out of Gods word, that God could both now doe, and from everlasting have decreed many things, which neither he doth, nor hath decreed. And therefore the Church also hath abstained from the name of fate, lest any should suspect her to maintaine with the Stoickes an absolute necessity of all things. Secondly,

but the cause of that necessity, which is only by consequent, is the divine providence or decree coming between those things which are in their own nature mutable; and also the nature of things created, which is framed and ordained of God to certain effects, and yet subject to the most free will and government of God, either according, or besides, or contrary to this order which himself hath made. In respect therefore of second causes, some things are necessary, which are done by causes always working after one sort; as the motion of the Sun, the burning of any matter put into the fire, if it be capable of burning: some things are contingent, which have causes working contingently, that is, apt and fit to produce, or to forbear producing divers and contrary effects: as the blasts of winds, the local motions of living creatures, the actions of mens wills. But in respect of the first cause, that is, of the will of God, all things which are, or are done in Gods external or outward works, are partly necessary, partly contingent. Necessary, as even those things which have second causes most changeable: as that the bones of Christ on the Cross were not broken by the Soldiers, by reason of the unchangeableness or the decree and providence of God: Contingent (by reason of the liberty of his eternal and unchangeable decree, and the execution thereof) even those things, which, as concerning their own nature, have second causes most unchangeable, as the motion of the Sun and shadows. If therefore by contingency they mean the changeableness of effects, ¹which they have by the natures of second causes, or by the power and liberty of God, it doth not follow that things are contingent, because of that necessity which they have by the providence of God. For, this doth not take away, but preserveth rather the nature, order and manner of working in second causes ordained by God. But if by contingency they mean the changeableness of second causes and effects, so floating and wavering, that they are not ruled and governed by Gods providence, any such contingency the Scripture doth not admit or approve.²

but the cause of that necessity, which is only by consequent, is the divine providence or decree coming between those things which are in their owne nature mutable; and also the nature of things created, which is framed and ordained of God to certaine effects, and yet subject to the most free will and government of God, either according, or besides, or contrary to this order which himselfe hath made. In respect therefore of second causes, some things are necessary, which are done by causes alwaies working after one sort; as the motion of the Sun, the burning of any matter put into the fire, if it be capable of burning: some things are contingent, which have causes working contingently, that is, apt and fit to produce, or to forbeare producing divers and contrary effects: as the blasts of windes, the locall motions of living creatures, the actions of mens wils. But in respect of the first cause, that is, of the will of God, all things which are, or are done in Gods externall or outward workes, are partly necessary, partly contingent. Necessary, as even those things which have second causes most changeable: as that the bones of Christ on the Crosse were not broken by the Souldiers, by reason of the unchangeablenesse or the decree and providence of God: Contingent (by reason of the liberty of his eternall and unchangeable decree, and the execution thereof) even those things, which, as concerning their own nature, have second causes most unchangeable, as the motion of the Sun and shadowes. If therefore by contingency they meane the changeablenesse of effects,

Hereby we also understand, When it is demanded concerning the motions and effects of creatures, whether they are to be termed necessary or contingent, that some verily are more rightly and properly called contingent, than necessary, though both contingent and necessary, are wrought by divine providence. For they are rather to be called such as they are of their own nature, and by the nature of their nearest causes, than as they are in respect of Gods providence, which is a cause more removed, and farther off. And nothing is more either certain or manifest, than that, according to the nature of second causes, some things should be changeable, some unchangeable: yet by the power of God, though all things in the creatures may be changed, they are made notwithstanding unchangeable, because of the certainty of his decree and divine providence.

Hereby we also understand, When it is demanded concerning the motions and effects of creatures, whether they are to be termed necessary or contingent, that some verily are more rightly and properly called contingent, than necessary, though both contingent and necessary, are wrought by divine providence. For they are rather to be called such as they are of their own nature, and by the nature of their neerest causes, than as they are in respect of Gods providence, which is a cause more removed, and farther off. And nothing is more either certain or manifest, than that, according to the nature of second causes, some things should be changeable, some unchangeable: yet by the power of God, though all things in the creatures may be changed, they are made notwithstanding unchangeable, because of the certainty of his decree and divine providence.

So likewise we answer concerning fortune and chance. ¹For if by these names be understood such causes or events by accident, as have no cause which is proper and by it self a cause, they ought to be far abandoned from the Church of Christ. But if we understand thereby a cause which is by it self a cause and proper, though unknown to our senses and reason; or such causes by accident, which have notwithstanding some secret proper cause adjoined; nothing hindereth (in respect of second causes, which are causes by accident, and in respect of our judgment, whereby we attain not to the proper, and that which is by it self the cause of these events) that to be, or to be a thing fortuning, or done by chance, which in respect of Gods providence cometh to pass by his most accurate and unchangeable counsel and decree: according to those sayings.² One Sparrow shall not fall on the ground without your Father. And, The lot is cast into the lap, &c.

So likewise we answer concerning fortune and chance. ¹For if by these names be understood such causes or events by accident, as have no cause which is proper and by it selfe a cause, they ought to be far abandoned from the Church of Christ. But if wee understand thereby a cause which is by it selfe a cause and proper, though unknowne to our senses and reason; or such causes by accident, which have notwithstanding some secret proper cause adjoyned; nothing hindereth (in respect of second causes, which are causes by accident, and in respect of our judgment, whereby we attain not to the proper, and that which is by it selfe the cause of these events) that to be, or to be a thing fortuning, or done by chance, which in respect of Gods providence cometh to passe by his most accurate and unchangeable counsell and decree: according to those sayings.² One Sparrow shall not fall on the ground without your Father. And, The lot is cast into the lap, &c.

1. 1What fortune and chance is denied.
2. 2

The fifth Sophism of the inutility or unprofitableness of means.

The fifth Sophisme of the inutility or unprofitablenesse of means.

¹That which shall be unchangeably and necessarily by the will and providence of God, in vain to the furthering or hindering of that are means applied; as the use of the ministry, the magistrates, laws, exhortations, promises, threatenings, punishments, prayer, our study and endeavours: But all things are done by the decree of God unchangeably, neither can they which work by the providence of God work otherwise then they do: Therefore all those means are vain and fruitless. Answ. It is not necessary that the first and principal cause being put, the second and instrumental cause should be removed and taken away. In vain are second causes and means applied, if God had determined to execute his decrees without means, neither had commanded us to use them: But seeing God hath decreed, by those means, in some to work faith and conversion, some to bridle and keep under means, and some to leave excuselesse, and hath for that cause commanded us to use them; they are not in vain used and applied: yea, when there cometh no profit by these, yet they profit to this, that they leave the wicked without excuse. As therefore the Sun doth not in vain daily rise and set, neither are the fields in vain sowed and watered with the rain, neither bodies in vain with food refreshed; though God createth light and darkness, bringeth forth the corn out of the earth, and is the life and length of our days; so neither are men in vain taught, or do study to conform their life unto doctrine, though all available actions and events proceed only from God: for God from everlasting decreed, as the ends, so the means also, and prescribed them unto us, whereby it seemed good to him to bring us unto them. Wherefore, we using those means, do well,² and obtain profitable and fruitful events: but if we neglect them, either by our fault we deprive our selves or others of those blessings offered by God; or if God, even in this contempt of his word have mercy on us or others, yet our conscience accuseth us of open and grievous sin. Wherefore we must use means, 1. That we may obey God therein, who both hath decreed ends, and ordained means to those ends, and prescribed them unto us; neither tempt him, by contemning these, to our own peril and danger. 2. That we may obtain those blessings decreed for us according to his promise, and that to our salvation. 3.

¹THat which shall be unchangeably and necessarily by the will and providence of God, in vain to the furthering or hindering of that are means applyed; as the use of the ministery, the magistrates, lawes, exhortations, promises, threatnings, punishments, prayer, our study and endeavours: But all things are done by the decree of God unchangeably, neither can they which work by the providence of God work otherwise then they doe: Therefore all those means are vain and fruitlesse. Answ. It is not necessary that the first and principall cause being put, the second and instrumentall cause should be removed and taken away. In vain are second causes and means applyed, if God had determined to execute his decrees without means, neither had commanded us to use them: But seeing God hath decreed, by those means, in some to work faith and conversion, some to bridle and keep under means, and some to leave excuselesse, and hath for that cause commanded us to use them; they are not in vain used and applyed: yea, when there cometh no profit by these, yet they profit to this, that they leave the wicked without excuse. As therefore the Sun doth not in vain daily rise and set, neither are the fields in vain sowed and watered with the rain, neither bodies in vain with food refreshed; though God createth light and darknesse, bringeth forth the corn out of the earth, and is the life and length of our dayes; so neither are men in vain taught, or do study to conform their life unto doctrine, though all available actions and events proceed only from God: for God from everlasting decreed, as the ends, so the means also, and prescribed them unto us, whereby it seemed good to him to bring us unto them. Wherefore, we using those means, doe well,

That we may retain a good conscience in using the means, although the expected events do not always follow, either in our selves or others.

That we may retain a good conscience in using the means, although the expected events do not alwaies follow, either in our selves or others.

The sixth Sophism of the merit of good and evil.

The sixth Sophisme of the merit of good and evill.