pp. 152–1539 passages
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But because there is something alleged of a good Intent, whereby some go about to excuse Gideon, I think it good briefly to touch those things, which are necessary, as concerning it.
BVt bycause there is something alledged of a good Intent, whereby some go about to excuse Gideon, I thinke it good briefelye to touche those thynges, which are necessary, as concerning it.
As touching the signification of the word, Intent signifieth a motion of the mind, whereby by some mean we tend unto an end, as if a man should study by giving of gifts or by services to attain unto any honour. For the nature of things is in such sort, that many things are so connected together between themselves, that by the one is made a steppe unto the other. For by medicines & drinks we attain unto health: by studies, reading, & teachers, unto wisdom. ⟨image 159⟩Wherefore an intent is an action of the will, for it is his office to move and stir up the mind. And forasmuch as the will doth not perceive the things that he desireth, before that it hath the knowledge thereof, it moveth not, nor forceth the mind before knowledge, which reigneth in the power of intelligence or understanding. It perceiveth both the end, and those things which serve to the end, and ministereth them unto the will. Therefore Intent stirreth up to the end, as to a term,1 by those things which unto it are directed. Let this be his definition. A will tending unto the end by some means. Will, which is his general word, is an act of the power that willeth. The difference is taken of the object, namely of the end, and these things which are ordained unto it: as now as touching Gideon, his intent was a motion of his will, to keep the memory of the victory given him, by the Ephod which he had made. In will therefore he comprehended at once both the end and the mean.
As touching the signification of the woorde, Intent signifieth a motion of the mynde, whereby by some meane we tende vnto an ende, as if a man shoulde study by geuing of gifts or by seruices to attain vnto any honor. For the nature of thinges is in such sort, that many thinges are so connexed together betwene themselues, that by the one is made a steppe vnto the other. For by medecines & drinkes we attaine vnto health: by studies, reading, & teachers, vnto wisdome. ⟨image 159⟩Wherfore an intent is an action of the wil, for it is his office to moue and stirre vp the mynde. And forasmuch as the wyl doth not perceaue the thinges that he desireth, before that it hath the knowledge thereof, it moueth not, nor forceth the minde before knowledge, which raygneth in the power of intelligence or vnderstanding. It perceaueth both the end, and those things which serue to the end, and ministreth them vnto the wyl. Therfore Intent stirreth vp to the end, as to a terme,1 by those thinges which vnto it are directed. Let this be his definition. A wyl tending vnto the ende by some meanes. Wyl, which is his generall woord, is an act of the power that wylleth. The differrence is taken of the obiect, namely of the ende, and these thinges which are ordeined vnto it: as nowe as touching Gideon, his intent was a motion of his wyll, to keepe the memory of the victory geuen him, by the Ephod which he had made. In will therefore he comprehended at once both the end and the meane.
1An Intent in divided into a good intent and an evil. And to a good intent this is chiefly required, that the end be a thing just and good: which yet is not sufficient. For if a man should steal to give alms, he undoubtedly should set before his eyes a good thing, but because the mean is evil, therefore the intent can not be called good. But if the end be both unlawful and evil, then shall the intent also be evil. Wherefore that the intent be good, both the end and the mean must be honest and good things. Howbeit certain things are by their nature so evil, that we can never use them rightly. As theft, perjury, adultery,2 and such like. Wherefore the Apostles rule must always be firm, that we must never do evil things, whereby good things may follow. Therefore an evil intent is two manner of ways: that is, either by the naughtiness of the end,3 or else of the means. But the intent can never be good, except both end and mean be good. Thus far the Philosophers and school Divines agree with us. Now must we see wherein they differ from us.
1An Intent in deuided into a good intent and an euyll. And to a good intent this is chiefely required, that the ende be a thing iust and good: which yet is not sufficient. For if a man should steale to geue almes, he vndoubtedlye shoulde set before his eyes a good thing, but bycause the meane is euyll, therefore the intent can not be called good. But if the ende bee both vnlawfull and euyll, then shall the intent also be euyll. Wherefore that the intent be good, both the ende and the meane must be honest and good thinges. Howbeit certayne thinges are by theyr nature so euyll, that we can neuer vse them rightly. As theft, periury, adulterye,2 and suche lyke. Wherefore the Apostles rule must alwayes be firme, that wee must neuer doo euyll thinges, whereby good thynges maye followe. Therefore an euyll intent is two maner of wayes: that is, eyther by the naughtynesse of the ende,3 or els of the meanes. But the intent can neuer bee good, except bothe ende and meane be good. Thus farre the Philosophers and schoole Deuines agree wyth vs. Nowe must we see wherein they differ from vs.
The Philosophers do think that the righteousness of the end and means dependeth of humane reason or natural understanding, as though it were sufficient to put a difference between just things and unjust: but that we deny, and require fully faith and the word of God,1 as sure rules, which thing Augustine testifieth in many places, and especially upon the .xxxi. Psalm, where he saith: Do not count thy works good before faith, which are nothing else, then (as me thinketh) great strengths, and a most swift course out of the way, and he which so maketh haste, runneth headlong to destruction: Wherefore a good intent maketh a good action,2 but faith directeth the intent. Wherefore we must take heed, when we purpose any work, that our hart have a regard unto faith, whereby it may direct his endeavours.
The Philosophers doo thinke that the righteousnes of the ende and meanes dependeth of humane reason or naturall vnderstanding, as though it were sufficient to put a difference betwene iust thinges and vniust: but that we denye, and requyre fully fayth and the woorde of God,1 as sure rules, whych thyng Augustine testifieth in many places, and especiallye vpon the .xxxi. Psalme, where he sayth: Doo not count thy woorkes good before faythe, whyche are nothyng els, then (as me thynketh) great strengthes, and a most swyft course out of the waye, and he which so maketh haste, runneth headlong to destruction: Wherefore a good intent maketh a good action,2 but fayth directeth the intent. Wherefore we must take heede, when we purpose any woorke, that our hart haue a regarde vnto fayth, whereby it may direct his endeuours.
The school Divines will easily grant that faith governeth the intent, and maketh it good. But we differ from them for three causes. First, because we §1affirm that faith dependeth only of the word of God: but they will have it to lean unto Fathers and Counsels,1 and that in no case may be granted unto them, forasmuch as faith must be constant, and utterly without error: which two things are not found in the Fathers and Counsels, because they speak things one contrary to an other. Fathers very often strive with Fathers, and Counsels are against Counsels: and those Fathers are rare, yea in a manner none, which have not sometime erred, and that in things most weighty, and very many Counsels have need of amendment. Doth not the scripture by express words testify that all men are liars?
The schoole Deuines wyll easelye graunt that fayth gouerneth the intent, and maketh it good. But we differ from them for three causes. Fyrst, bicause we §1affirme that faith dependeth onely of the woorde of God: but they wyll haue it to leane vnto Fathers and Counsels,1 and that in no case maye be graunted vnto them, forasmuche as fayth must bee constant, and vtterlye without errour: whych twoo thynges are not founde in the Fathers and Counsels, bicause they speake thinges one contrary to an other. Fathers very often stryue wyth Fathers, and Counsels are against Counsels: and those Fathers are rare, yea in a maner none, whych haue not sometyme erred, and that in thinges most waightye, and very many Counsels haue neede of amendement. Doth not the scripture by expresse woordes testify that all men are lyers?
The other thing, wherein we can not assent unto the Schoolmen, is, because by a good intent they affirm that our works are made meritorious, yea and that of eternal life. Which thing how far of it is from the truth, the nature of merit may teach us: whereof I mind not now to speak.
The other thing, wherein wee can not assent vnto the Schoolemen, is, bycause by a good intent they affirme that our woorkes are made meritorious, yea and that of eternall lyfe. Which thing how farre of it is from the truth, the nature of merite may teache vs: whereof I mynde not nowe to speake.
The third thing wherein we differ from the Schoolmen is, because they ⟨p. 153⟩will have the work to be made good by an habitual good intent as they speak:1 That is to say, done without any good motion of the hart. They fain that our actions do please god, as prayers, reading of Psalms, and giving of Alms, although in act we think nothing of God, & they suppose that this habitual intent which they place in him, is sufficient enough. So that if thou shouldst demand of him, which doth these things, why he doth so? he may be ready to answer, that he doth it to the glory of god, especially when in doing of it he hath not a contrary mind or repugnant will. But this can we not grant unto them, forasmuch as in this negligence, whereby when we work we think not of god nor of his glory, the commandment of god is violated, which commandeth us to love god withal the hart, withal the soul, and withal the strengths. Wherefore we rather counsel that this may be knowleged a sin, then to be counted a good work.
The thyrde thing wherein we differ from the Schoolemen is, bycause they ⟨p. 153⟩wyl haue the worke to be made good by an habitual good entent as they speke:1 That is to saye, done without any good mocion of the hart. They fayn that our actions do please god, as prayers, reading of Psalmes, and geuing of Almes, although in act we thinke nothing of God, & they suppose yt thys habitual entent which they place in him, is sufficient inough. So that if thou shouldst demaūd of him, whych doth these thyngs, why he doth so? he may be redy to aunswer, that he doth it to the glory of god, especially whē in doing of it he hath not a cōtrary mind or repugnant will. But this can we not graunt vnto them, for asmuch as in this negligence, wherby when we work we think not of god nor of his glory, the commaundement of god is violated, which commaundeth vs to loue god withall the hart, withall the soule, and withall the strengthes. Wherfore we rather counsell that this maye bee knowleged a synne, then to be counted a good woorke.
But because they perceived that their sayings have some absurdity, they added, so that in the beginning of that work, we think somewhat of god and his glory, and so that that which is purposed, be directed unto him. But no man doubteth but that the beginning of all those things which we do, ought to be good: but afterward, if faith follow not those things which we have well begun, and if when we are working, we have not a respect unto god and his glory, we shall run headlong into sin, which may not be dissembled. Farther, if we should work as we ought to do, and as the law requireth, yet should we (as Christ saith) be still unprofitable servants: so far is it of, that we can claim unto our selves any merits. Wherefore so long as we desist from thinking upon the honour and glory of God, we fall, neither are such falls to be dissembled, but rather to pray that they may be turned from us, forasmuch as of their own nature they are sins,1 although unto the believers for Christs sake they are not imputed unto death. Wherefore let there be added to our works a good intent: But yet such an entente as is adorned with faith, and let us perform the same not in habit but in act. Wherefore the Lord saith in the Gospel of Matthew the .6. chap: The light of the body is the eye. And if thine eye be simple, the whole body shall be light. But if the light which is in thee be darkness,2 how great shall the darkness then be? These things Augustine (in his questions of the Gospels, the .2. book, & .15. question, and against Julianus in the .4. book, & 20. chap.) judgeth to be understanded of a good intent. And in like manner writeth he in his .10. Tome, the .2. Sermon, where he entreateth upon this place, we must not do righteousness before men, to be seen of them. The intent (saith he) is always to be applied unto the glory of God, but the will to have it known unto men, is to be avoided, but so much as shall seem to pertain to the honour of God. And to that tendeth that which Christ speaketh: A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruits, neither an evil tree, good: for as much as the tree signifieth the intent. Wherefore this act of Gideon done of a good intent (if those things be true which we have said) cannot be excused, when as faith governed it not.
But bicause they perceiued that theyr sayinges haue some absurdity, they added, so that in the beginninge of that woorke, we thinke somewhat of god and his glory, and so that that which is purposed, be directed vnto hym. But no man doubteth but that the begynning of all those thinges whiche we do, oughte to be good: but afterward, if fayth follow not those thinges whyche we haue well begonne, and if when we are working, we haue not a respect vnto god and his glory, we shall runne hedlonge into sinne, which may not be dissembled. Farther, if we should worke as we ought to do, and as the law requireth, yet should we (as Christ sayth) be still vnprofitable seruants: so far is it of, that we can clayme vnto our selues any merites. Wherfore so long as we desist from thinkinge vpon the honor and glory of God, we fall, neyther are such falles to be dissembled, but rather to pray that they may be turned frō vs, forasmuch as of their own nature they are sinnes,