7 The Will can move it self, towards an object that is apprehended and judged good for profit or pleasure in some respect, though reason judge that it is not lawful but sinful. The reason is: 1. Because whatsoever good the understanding propoundeth to the will, in this life, it propoundeth it with a kind of indifferency of Judgement, as not having any necessary connection, with the universal good. Upon which the will is naturally set and determined. Hence it is that freedom or liberty in an action, is said to be radically in the judgement and reason. 2 Though the will be determined by the understanding in regard of the specification or kind of thing to be willed, because it willeth nothing but that which the understanding hath first apprehended; yet in regard of exercise or act of willing, it moveth both it self, and the understanding with the rest of the faculties. And hence it is that liberty is in the will formally, which should not be true, if it were necessarily determined by the understanding. 3 If the judgement being right, the will could not but will aright; then before the first sin of Angels and men, (which was ⟨p. 25⟩in the Will) there must necessarily be an error in the Understanding: and if so, then the punishment of sin should be before the first sin; for all Practical error in the Understanding, is either sin, or the punishment of it. 4. If the Will do necessarily follow the judgement of the understanding; then there should (in proper speaking) be no sin of malice, distinct from those sins, which are committed through ignorance, or passion. But it is manifest, that this kind of sin is found in Devils, & likewise in some men. 5. If the Will do necessarily follow the Understanding, then in Regeneration the will it self need not be internally renewed grace: for the enlightening of the Understanding would be sufficient. But this is repugnant to Faith and godliness.
7 The Will can moue it selfe, towards an object that is apprehended and iudged good for profit or pleasure in some respect, though reason iudge that it is not lawfull but sinfull. The reason is: 1. Because whatsoever good the understanding propoundeth to the will, in this life, it propoundeth it with a kind of indifferency of Iudgement, as not having any necessary connexion, with the universall good. Vpon which the will is naturally set and determined. Hence it is that freedome or liberty in an action, is said to bee radically in the iudgement and reason. 2 Though the will bee determined by the understanding in regard of the specification or kinde of thing to be willed, because it willeth nothing but that which the understanding hath first apprehended; yet in regard of excercise or act of willing, it mooveth both it selfe, and the understanding with the rest of the faculties. And hence it is that liberty is in the will formally, which should not be true, if it were necessarily determined by the understanding. 3 If the iudgement being right, the will could not but will aright; then before the first sinne of Angels and men, (which was ⟨p. 25⟩in the Will) there must necessarily bee an error in the Vnderstanding: and if so, then the punishment of sinne should be before the first sinne; for all Practicall error in the Vnderstanding, is either sinne, or the punishment of it. 4. If the Will doe necessarily follow the judgement of the understanding; then there should (in proper speaking) be no sinne of malice, distinct from those sinnes, which are committed through ignorance, or passion. But it is manifest, that this kind of sinne is found in Devils, & likewise in some men. 5. If the Will doe necessarily follow the Vnderstanding, then in Regeneration the will it selfe neede not bee internally renewed grace: for the inlightening of the Vnderstanding would be sufficient. But this is repugnant to Faith and godlinesse.