A09386:128
A C[hristian] and [plain]e treatise of the manner and order of predestination and of…
A C[hristian] and [plain]e treatise of the manner and order of predestination and of the largeness of Gods grace. First written in Latin by that reverend and faithful servant of God, Master William Perkins, late preacher of the word in Cambridge. And carefully translated into English by Francis Cacot, and Thomas Tuke.A C[hristian] and [plain]e treatise of the manner and order of predestination and of the largenes of Gods grace. First written in Latine by that reuerend and faithfull seruant of God, Master William Perkins, late preacher of the word in Cambridge. And carefully translated into English by Francis Cacot, and Thomas Tuke.
London: printed by F. Kingston for William Welby and Martin Clarke, 1606
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
But they use to object thus: To will that evil be done is proper and belonging to an evil will which is delighted with evils, or would use them to good, contrary to the rule: That no evil should be done that good might come thereof. To this I answer: That here are two grounds to be laid. The first is, that the object even of mans will is good, and therefore much more of Gods will, and the object of the will cannot be evil by it self but by accident: for if the will willeth evil, it willeth it not as it is evil, but as it is good. The second ground is, that there is a certain summum bonum or sovereign good with which there is no evil conjoined; because there is a certain thing infinitely good, namely God: but there is not any absolute evil, because there is nothing so evil, but it hath some good joined therewith, and therefore it is good that sin should be and come to ⟨p. 51⟩pass. So saith S. Augustine: Although 1therefore those things which are evil, so far forth as they are evil are not good, nevertheless it is good that there should be not only good things, but also evil. For unless this were good, that there should be also evils, they should […] •o means be suffered by the Almigh[…] […]o is goodness it self. Thus therefore I answer: That sin in the causes and circumstances thereof fully and exactly weighed, is two ways to be considered. First we consider sin not as it is sin, but so far forth as it hath some respect unto good with God which decreeth it. And this way taking sin, although God willeth it not simply and by it self, yet he decreeth it and willeth it as touching the event. Moreover sin hath respect unto God two manner of ways, first, because it is in that which is good: secondly, because it tendeth to that which is good. I say it is in that which is good; because every evil is in that which is good as in the subject. Now in respect of the subject, that is, as sin is a motion, an inclination, or an action, God both willeth and effecteth the same. Moreover sin ⟨p. 52⟩tendeth to that which is good, because God ordaineth it to good, and from thence draweth the good either of trial, chastisement, or punishment. And we say that God is so far forth willing that sin should come to pass, as he is able and will by his wonderful wisdom from thence to draw forth that which is good.