A09386:141
A C[hristian] and [plain]e treatise of the manner and order of predestination and of…
A C[hristian] and [plain]e treatise of the manner and order of predestination and of the largeness of Gods grace. First written in Latin by that reverend and faithful servant of God, Master William Perkins, late preacher of the word in Cambridge. And carefully translated into English by Francis Cacot, and Thomas Tuke.A C[hristian] and [plain]e treatise of the manner and order of predestination and of the largenes of Gods grace. First written in Latine by that reuerend and faithfull seruant of God, Master William Perkins, late preacher of the word in Cambridge. And carefully translated into English by Francis Cacot, and Thomas Tuke.
London: printed by F. Kingston for William Welby and Martin Clarke, 1606
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
There is also such a like kind of necessity of the Manichees, condemned by the fathers, who taught that there was no violence or necessity offered unto the will by God, nor that it was forced by necessity to sin. The necessity of infallibility is that whereby a thing according to the event shall certainly and immutably come to pass: yet so, as if we consider the cause of a thing by it self, it may either not come to pass, or else come otherwise to pass. Of this manner of necessity we must understand that principle: Every thing that is, when it is, is of necessity. And thus is necessity distinguished: now will I show how far forth it is agreeable to several things. The events of all things have reference either to the second causes, or to God, who is the first cause. Now some things in respect of the second causes are necessary, othersome contingent. From causes which are necessary, must needs proceed that which is necessary, from those that are free, that which is free, ⟨p. 70⟩from those that are natural that which is natural; and to be brief, such as are the next causes aforegoing, such also is the event of things. But in respect of God, all things whatsoever, are partly changeable, and partly necessary. In respect of Gods liberty, which doth that which it doth freely, all things are contingent and mutable: howsoever according to nature and the order of the next causes, they be necessary and immutable. In respect of Gods decree, the second causes and the effects of them are all necessary, howsoever in themselves they be uncertain and conti[…]nt. And yet they are not absolutely necessary, but by the supposition of Gods decree, neither are they necessary by the necessity of compulsion, but of infallibility only, because God ordained before that those things which should come to pass should be. And this kind of necessity taketh not away the contingency and liberty of second causes, but rather establisheth and confirmeth it. For that which is free worketh freely, and that which is contingent, worketh contingently, by the necessary decree of God. ⟨p. 71⟩Neither doth liberty and necessity mutually overthrow each other, but liberty and compulsion. It is manifest therefore that Gods decree causeth an immutability to all things, of which notwithstanding some, in respect of the next causes, are necessary, and othersome contingent;
There is also such a like kind of necessitie of the Manichees, condemned by the fathers, who taught that there was no violence or necessitie offred vnto the will by God, nor that it was forced by necessitie to sinne. The necessitie of infallibilitie is that whereby a thing according to the euent shall certainly and immutably come to passe: yet so, as if we consider the cause of a thing by it selfe, it may either not come to passe, or else come otherwise to passe. Of this manner of necessitie wee must vnderstand that principle: Euerie thing that is, when it is, is of necessity. And thus is necessitie distinguished: now will I shew how farre forth it is agreeable to seuerall things. The euents of all things haue reference either to the second causes, or to God, who is the first cause. Now some things in respect of the second causes are necessary, othersome contingent. From causes which are necessarie, must needs proceede that which is necessarie, from those that are free, that which is free,