A14350:1482
The Common Places
The common places of the most famous and renowned divine Doctor Peter Martyr divided into four principal parts: with a large addition of many theological and necessary discourses, some never extant before. Translated and partly gathered by Anthony Marten, one of the sewers of her Majesties most honourable chamber.The common places of the most famous and renowmed diuine Doctor Peter Martyr diuided into foure principall parts: with a large addition of manie theologicall and necessarie discourses, some neuer extant before. Translated and partlie gathered by Anthonie Marten, one of the sewers of hir Maiesties most honourable chamber.
Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rowe, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henry Denham, Thomas Chard, William Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rovve, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henrie Denham, Thomas Chard, VVilliam Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583
No title page in the transcription: set from the catalogue record.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Gregory in his Morals, the 26. book, was of another mind; The ears of men judge our words to be such, as they sound outwardly: but the judgements of God do hear such things ⟨p. 373⟩spoken outwardly, as they be uttered from within. And so he would have it to appear, that the words of them which swear, should be understood according to the mind of him that maketh the oath. These two opinions are reconciled even by the School-men, and among others by Thomas Aquinas. Oaths be made, either as concerning the conscience, or else in respect of outward pleadings. If we speak of the conscience, he which sweareth, either dealeth simply and sincerely, or else craftily and by fraud. If sincerely, then is he bound to keep no more but that which he meant to do: but if fraudulently, then let him be sure, that he is bound to the meaning of him, whom he would have beguiled. But if an oath be made in civill pleadings, the words of them which be sworn, must be taken according to the common meaning. If there happen a doubt, the magistrate shall be the judge thereof. But return we to David: if he dealt sincerely, and had the foresaid condition in his mind; he was not bound to Shimei, in respect of his conscience. If he meant to apply himself to the time, and by any means to beguile him, he sware not in truth. Wherefore let us use this invincible argument; Either he meant to keep his promise, or he meant it not; If he meant it not, he should not have sworn; If he meant it, he should have performed it, if it were lawful. If an oath do confirm an unjust thing, it must not be kept. Now to promise impunity to a wicked man, which hath broken the law of the Lord (for the law saith, 1Thou shalt not curse the prince of thy people) is not just: wherefore he was not to perform the oath which he made.
Gregorie in his Moralls, the 26. booke, was of another mind; The eares of men iudge our words to be such, as they sound outwardlie: but the iudgements of God doo heare such things ⟨p. 373⟩spoken outwardlie, as they be vttered from within. And so he would haue it to appéere, that the words of them which sweare, should be vnderstood according to the mind of him that maketh the oth. These two opinions are reconciled euen by the Schoole-men, and among others by Thomas Aquinas. Oths be made, either as concerning the conscience, or else in respect of outward pleadings. If we speake of the conscience, he which sweareth, either dealeth simplie and sincerelie, or else craftilie and by fraud. If sincerelie, then is he bound to kéepe no more but that which he meant to doo: but if fraudulentlie, then let him be sure, that he is bound to the meaning of him, whom he would haue beguiled. But if an oth be made in ciuill pleadings, the words of them which be sworne, must be taken according to the common meaning. If there happen a doubt, the magistrate shall be the iudge thereof. But returne we to Dauid: if he delt sincerelie, and had the foresaid condition in his mind; he was not bound to Semei, in respect of his conscience. If he ment to applie himselfe to the time, and by anie meanes to beguile him, he sware not in truth. Wherefore let vs vse this inuincible argument; Either he ment to kéepe his promise, or he ment it not; If he ment it not, he should not haue sworne; If he ment it, he should haue performed it, if it were lawfull. If an oth doo confirme an vniust thing, it must not be kept. Now to promise impunitie to a wicked man, which hath broken the lawe of the Lord (for the lawe saith,