A14350:2171
The common places of the most famous and renowned divine Doctor Peter Martyr divided into four principal parts: with a large addition of many theological and necessary discourses, some never extant before. Translated and partly gathered by Anthony Marten, one of the sewers of her Majesties most honourable chamber.The common places of the most famous and renowmed diuine Doctor Peter Martyr diuided into foure principall parts: with a large addition of manie theologicall and necessarie discourses, some neuer extant before. Translated and partlie gathered by Anthonie Marten, one of the sewers of hir Maiesties most honourable chamber.
Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rowe, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henry Denham, Thomas Chard, William Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rovve, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henrie Denham, Thomas Chard, VVilliam Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583
No title page in the transcription: set from the catalogue record.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
128 Now let us treat of another question; namely, whether it be lawful for a good and godly man to lie. But before I speak of a lie, I think best to speak somewhat of truth; which doubtless is an excellent virtue. 2Truth (as saith Tully in his book De inuentione) is that, whereby things which are, have been, and shall be, are spoken without alteration. Wherein we will first note, that it consisteth in words: for he saith, that they are spoken. Not that I am ignorant, but that dumb men, and others, do sometimes speak by signs. 3But because (as saith Augustine in his first book De doctrina christiana) among other signs, words are the principal and most plain. Further, we be taught hereby, that truth is not only to be considered as touching one difference of time; but as touching three differences. For he saith, that both those things which are, which have been, and which shall be. These things be then spoken truly, when they be set forth without alteration; that is, even as they are, and by speaking made neither more ample, nor less than they be. The very self-same thing in a manner hath Augustine said, in his book De vera religione, 4the 36. chapter, where he writeth; that Truth is, whereby that which is, is signified. And it is a virtue; 5because by it men are made prone and ready to speak that, which is true.
128 Now let vs treat of another question; namelie, whether it be lawfull for a good and godlie man to lie. But before I speake of a lie, I thinke best to speake somewhat of truth; which doubtlesse is an excellent vertue. 2Truth (as saith Tullie in his booke De inuentione) is that, whereby things which are, haue béene, and shall be, are spoken without alteration. Wherein we will first note, that it consisteth in words: for he saith, that they are spoken. Not that I am ignorant, but that dumbe men, and others, doo sometimes speake by signes. 3But bicause (as saith Augustine in his first booke De doctrina christiana) among other signes, words are the principall and most plaine. Further, we be taught hereby, that truth is not onelie to be considered as touching one difference of time; but as touching thrée differences. For he saith, that both those things which are, which haue béene, and which shall be. These things be then spoken trulie, when they be set foorth without alteration; that is, euen as they are, and by speaking made neither more ample, nor lesse than they be. The verie selfe-same thing in a maner hath Augustine said, in his booke De vera religione, 4the 36. chapter, where he writeth; that Truth is, whereby that which is, is signified. And it is a vertue; 5bicause by it men are made prone and readie to speake that, which is true.
If thou demand what is the general word of truth; It is equality: whereunto is joined, 1for difference sake; namely, of words, about the things which are signified. And as it is well known to all men, all virtues do aim at the mean, and eschew extremities. Wherefore, 2in the kind of speaking, thou shalt perceive two faults; namely, if thou speak more than the thing will permit, or less than the thing is. Neither is virtue content only with the mean: for we must add circumstances, which use commonly to follow it. So as the truth must not always be spoken to every man, neither at all times, nor yet of every thing: and yet we must not lie. But it is wisdom sometime to keep secret those things, which for just cause we will not have known. He, which should vaunt abroad every-where, and to all men, the gifts of God given unto him; should be counted foolish and fond. As contrariwise, he which should boast of a crime, whereinto by mans infirmity he hath fallen, ought justly and worthily to be reproved. Wherefore, truth requireth, 3that what we have within us, as touching our sense and will, that should prudently be signified by us as it is. Further, the virtue, whereof we speak, hath simplicity most of all joined with it: and it is very contrary unto doubleness.
If thou demand what is the generall word of truth; It is equalitie: wherevnto is ioined, 1for difference sake; namelie, of words, about the things which are signified. And as it is well knowne to all men, all vertues doo aime at the meane, and eschew extremities. Wherefore, 2in the kind of speaking, thou shalt perceiue two faults; namelie, if thou speake more than the thing will permit, or lesse than the thing is. Neither is vertue content onelie with the meane: for we must adde circumstances, which vse commonlie to followe it. So as the truth must not alwaies be spoken to euerie man, neither at all times, nor yet of euerie thing: and yet we must not lie. But it is wisedome sometime to kéepe secret those things, which for iust cause we will not haue known. He, which should vaunt abroad euerie-where, and to all men, the gifts of God giuen vnto him; should be counted foolish and fond. As contrariewise, he which should boast of a crime, whereinto by mans infirmitie he hath fallen, ought iustlie and woorthilie to be reprooued. Wherefore, truth requireth,
Besides this, it is a part of justice: for both unto things it giveth the proper words; and unto a neighbour the truth which is due unto him: without the which, mans fellowship cannot stand. For, if a man should continually suspect himself to be deceived by any man, he would never give any credit unto him: by means whereof, all trades and societies among men would decay. Aristotle, in his Ethics, 1affirmeth; that Truth declineth somewhat toward the defect; especially when any man speaketh of himself. For this wisdom requireth, that a man boast not of himself. Whereupon Paul, in his second epistle to the Corinthians and twelve chapter, wrote; If I will boast of my self, 2I shall not be unwise, but I will forbear, lest any man ⟨p. 543⟩should think of me more than that he seeth in me, or that he heareth of me. By these words he reproveth them as foolish and unwise, which do boast and glory, even of those good things, which they have: and he saith, that he will abstain from it. Neither (saith he) do I require, that any man should think more of me, than either he seeth in me, 3or heareth of me. And he, which speaketh less of himself, than he is, is not straightway to be accused as a liar. For that, which is the more, comprehendeth and containeth in it the less. For whosoever hath fifty, he may truly say that he hath twenty; although he speaketh not of all that he hath. Howbeit, if the same man should affirm, that he hath but twenty only; or else should deny that he hath any at all, 4out of doubt he should lie: the which must not be committed, either for modesty sake, or (as they say) for humility.
Besides this, it is a part of iustice: for both vnto things it giueth the proper words; and vnto a neighbour the truth which is due vnto him: without the which, mans fellowship cannot stand. For, if a man should continuallie suspect himselfe to be deceiued by anie man, he would neuer giue anie credit vnto him: by meanes whereof, all trades and societies among men would decaie. Aristotle, in his Ethiks,
29 Concerning testimonies out of the holy scriptures, which do stir us up to speak the truth; doubtless very many might be alleged: but a few shall suffice. In the ten commandments, 1it is written; Thou shalt not bear false witness. Which commandment must be observed, not only in judgement, but in all things, which in our talk we testify, to be either true or false. Moreover, God is set before our eyes to be followed; 2whom the scriptures in every place pronounce to be true. Wherefore we also ought to be most fervent lovers of the truth. 3And for that cause Jethro, in the 18. chapter of Exodus, counselled Moses to set such men to be rulers over the people, as did fear God, men of courage, lovers of the truth, and those, which hated covetousness. 4Also David saith; Behold, thou hast loved truth, and therefore thou hast made me to understand wisdom in the inward and secret parts of my mind. These things sufficiently declare, that we are taught of God both by inward inspiration, and also by outward doctrine; because he is a lover of the truth: neither doth he suffer, that his children should either err, or be deceived by lies. In Zechariah, the eight chapter, 5it is written; Speak ye the truth every man to his neighbour. Which self-same sentence Paul useth to the Ephesians: 6and he commandeth the same to the Colossians. But in the latter epistle to the Corinthians, 7he saith of himself, and of the other apostles, that they can have nothing against the truth. Yea and the Scribes and Pharisees, being joined with the Herodians, on this wise flattered Christ (whom they went about to entrap in his speech;) Master, 8we know that thou acceptest no persons, yea thou teachest the way of God in truth. Hereby they declared, that it is a singular virtue for a noble and notable man, to prefer the truth before all things. But let these testimonies of the holy scriptures be sufficient at this time.
30 It remaineth, 1that I now come to treat of a lie. Augustine, 2who wrote thereof to Consentius, affirmeth; that A lie is the false signification of the speech. And undoubtedly, of this vice may all those things be spoken by a contrary position, which are before declared of truth. And first, contrary to that, which Tully affirmed of truth; that that is true, whereby things which are, which have been, and which shall be, are said to be unaltered. And a lie is that, whereby is signified that, which is not: for Augustine defined truth by the contrary. This vice is so hurtful, that it maketh a man, which is infected therewith, to rejoice, and be glad in falsehood. The general word of truth, is equality; 3and the general of this vice, inequality. And as truth is very near joined with simplicity, so a lie belongeth to doubleness. Truth is a part of justice, but a lie is a part of injustice. By truth, the society of man is preserved; but by lying, it is hurt and overthrown. But return we to Augustine, who writeth; that He is said to lie, which with a will to deceive speaketh that, which is false: & that, To lie, is nothing else, but to go against the mind; for liars speak another thing than they have in their mind. But the desire to deceive is utterly against justice, love, and amity; which we mutually owe one towards another. So then there be three things in a lie; first, 4to speak that which is false; secondly, his will in speaking; and thirdly, a desire to deceive. The first part belongeth to the matter of a lie; the other two parts pertain unto the form.
30 It remaineth, 1that I now come to treat of a lie. Augustine, 2who wrote thereof to Consentius, affirmeth; that A lie is the false signification of the spéech. And vndoubtedlie, of this vice may all those things be spoken by a contrarie position, which are before declared of truth. And first, contrarie to that, which Tullie affirmed of truth; that that is true, whereby things which are, which haue béene, and which shall be, are said to be vnaltered. And a lie is that, whereby is signified that, which is not: for Augustine defined truth by the contrarie. This vice is so hurtfull, that it maketh a man, which is infected therewith, to reioise, and be glad in falsehood. The generall word of truth, is equalitie;
31 A lie is distinguished into an officious lie, a sporting lie, and a pernicious lie. 1And this division cometh of no other thing, but of the effects, or of the ends. For this is evermore true, that the ends themselves may have the nature both of the cause, and of the effect: seeing lies do either profit, or delight, or else hurt. The end of a pernicious lie, is to hurt; the end of a sporting lie, is to delight; and the end of an officious lie, is to profit. But, forsomuch as in virtue, 2Aristotle hath respect chiefly unto the mean, if then in speaking thou exceed that mean, 3he calleth it boasting: but if thou come short, he nameth it dissimulation or mocking. And in this evil, that most of all hurteth; because an evil or false opinion is engendered in the mind of our neighbour. For which cause it seemeth, that the same Aristotle said well; that Lying is a wicked thing, 4and must be avoided. Which we may prove by testimonies of the holy scriptures. For hereunto belong all those things, which we rehearsed before, for provoking of us to speak the truth. And there be many other places dispersed here and there, which detest lying. David saith; 5Thou shalt ⟨p. 544⟩destroy all those which speak lies. 6There be reasons also, which persuade the same: whereof one is, 7that in a lie there is an abuse of signs. And for so much as it is not lawful to abuse the gifts of GOD: a lie also is understood to be forbidden.
31 A lie is distinguished into an officious lie, a sporting lie, and a pernicious lie. 1
Moreover, as it is before said; a lie is enemy unto the society of man. For in lying, the understanding of the mind is not communicated unto our brethren; but lies. Wherefore, seeing by nature man is made unto society and communication, when he speaketh that which is false, he striveth against his own nature. And (as Augustine saith;1) Faith herein is harmed, because he which heareth, believeth those things which are spoken. Wherefore, that faith, which he giveth unto others words, is made void: and so notable a thing cannot be hurt without blame. And to conclude, every man by lying looseth his own credit; for being taken in a lie, he shall be ever after suspected of it. Wherefore, though he would, he shall not be able, by admonition or correction, to help his neighbour. So the fault that is in a lie, not only respecteth the loss or hurt of our neighbour, but it is in it of his own kind: as manifestly appeareth by that, which we have already said. 2But among lies, that seemeth to be most heinous, which is in matter of religion, doctrine, and godliness: for in no other thing can guile be more hurtful and pernicious. For if we shall err therein, we be cast from everlasting felicity. Wherefore Augustine, in his Enchiridion, the 18. chapter, hath very well written; that They indeed sin grievously, which deceive travelling men, in showing them a contrary way. But they be much more detestable, which in lying about matters of religion, do bring men into error.
Moreouer, as it is before said; a lie is enimie vnto the societie of man. For in lieng, the vnderstanding of the mind is not communicated vnto our brethren; but lies. Wherefore, séeing by nature man is made vnto societie and communication, when he speaketh that which is false, he striueth against his owne nature. And (as Augustine saith;1) Faith héerein is harmed, bicause he which heareth, beléeueth those things which are spoken. Wherefore, that faith, which he giueth vnto others words, is made void: and so notable a thing cannot be hurt without blame. And to conclude, euerie man by lieng looseth his owne credit; for being taken in a lie, he shall be euer after suspected of it. Wherefore, though he would, he shall not be able, by admonition or correction, to helpe his neighbour. So the fault that is in a lie, not onelie respecteth the losse or hurt of our neighbour, but it is in it of his owne kind: as manifestlie appéereth by that, which we haue alreadie said.
32 If the three kinds of lies should be compared together, I mean the pernicious lie, the sporting lie, and the officious lie; the pernicious lie should justly be counted the more detestable. Because in it are two evils: one is, the abuse of signs; 1an other is, the hurt of our neighbour, and that both of the mind that is deceived (which is common to all lies,) and also of the thing which is lost. But as for other lies, although they be not without fault; yet is the same fault much diminished by the benefit either of delight, or of supply of the help. 2And indeed, a sporting lie hath in it but a small and slender nature of a lie: for so much as the falsehood is straightway found out, neither can it be long hidden from the hearers. 3Yea Augustine writeth, that such lies are not to be counted for lies. But as touching an officious lie, 4the judgement thereof is more hard and obscure; seeing some deny it to be sin: for they say it hath a respect unto helping of our neighbour, whom we ought in words and deeds to relieve as much as we can. So as they think that therein is no abuse of the signs: forsomuch as all our doings ought to have respect to the commodity of our brethren. Neither do they think, that therein is offence committed against mans society: because through this kind of lie, men are made safe, and kept harmless.
32 If the thrée kinds of lies should be compared togither, I meane the pernicious lie, the sporting lie, and the officious lie; the pernicious lie should iustlie be counted the more detestable. Bicause in it are two euils: one is, the abuse of signes; 1an other is, the hurt of our neighbour, and that both of the mind that is deceiued (which is common to all lies,) and also of the thing which is lost. But as for other lies, although they be not without fault; yet is the same fault much diminished by the benefit either of delight, or of supplie of the helpe. 2
Further, they say, that whereas it is written in the holy scriptures; 1that God will destroy all those that speak lies: the same is not to be understood of every kind of lie; but of a pernicious lie only. Which Augustine also, in his Enchiridion, the 18. chapter, seemeth to grant. They allege also the opinion of Plato, 2in his book De Repub. who, as he did fray the common people from lies; yet he gave magistrates liberty to lie: especially in making of laws. But in my judgement, the thing is far otherwise. Neither can I easily grant, that an officious lie is without the abuse of the signs. For Aristotle, 3in his book [Greek or Hebrew], in defining of words, saith; that They are notes of those affections, which we have in our mind. Whereby it followeth, that all they abuse words, which signify things to be otherwise, than they think in their mind. Further, that reason, which they bring of love, is very weak. For we ought to help our neighbours; but that must be by just and honest means: otherwise we will suffer our selves to steal, to the intent to bestow it in giving of alms. But the sentence of the apostle must stand fast, which is; that Evil must not be done, 4to the intent that good may come thereof. Neither do I think it to be true, that by those kind of lies, the society of man is not hurt: seeing that, if fidelity be taken away, there remaineth no dealing of one man with an other.
Further, they saie, that whereas it is written in the holie scriptures; 1that God will destroie all those that speake lies: the same is not to be vnderstood of euerie kind of lie; but of a pernicious lie onelie. Which Augustine also, in his Enchiridion, the 18. chapter, séemeth to grant. They alledge also the opinion of Plato, 2in his booke De Repub. who, as he did fraie the common people from lies; yet he gaue magistrates libertie to lie: especiallie in making of lawes. But in my iudgement, the thing is farre otherwise. Neither can I easilie grant, that an officious lie is without the abuse of the signes. For Aristotle,
33 But as touching that sentence of the holy scriptures, wherein it is said; Thou shalt destroy all them that speak lies: we grant with Augustine, that that sentence is not universally spoken. For, so long as the strength of our faith, and joining together with Christ endureth; so long those sins are not imputed: which otherwise of their own nature would be our destruction. And this also I may easily grant touching officious and sporting lies: because they are not so much against charity, as pernicious lies be. But this no man can deny, but that in making of a lie, we deal against faith. And we must wholly grant, that he which lieth, doth loose his own credit thereby: so that afterward he cannot profitably admonish, reprove, or fruitfully give counsel, as he ought to do. For they, which hear him, will soon think that he lieth officiously; to call them again into the way, and not that the thing is so in very deed.
33 But as touching that sentence of the holie scriptures, wherein it is said; Thou shalt destroie all them that speake lies: we grant with Augustine, that that sentence is not vniuersallie spoken. For, so long as the strength of our faith, and ioining togither with Christ indureth; so long those sinnes are not imputed: which otherwise of their owne nature would be our destruction. And this also I may easilie grant touching officious and sporting lies: bicause they are not so much against charitie, as pernicious lies be. But this no man can denie, but that in making of a lie, we deale against faith. And we must wholie grant, that he which lieth, dooth loose his owne credit thereby: so that afterward he cannot profitablie admonish, reprooue, or fruitfullie giue counsell, as he ought to doo. For they, which heare him, will soone thinke that he lieth officiouslie; to call them againe into the waie, and not that the thing is so in verie déed.
Certainly, this was the cause that Augustine was against Jerome, who in a manner fathered an ⟨p. 545⟩officious lie upon the holy scriptures: If this (saith he) should be so, the authority of the holy scriptures would soon be impaired; for the readers thereof would soon say, that the thing is not so, but that it is so written for the keeping of men in their duty. Neither ought the authority of Plato to move us much; 1seeing in that place he erred greatly, granting, that in things pertaining to GOD, they might feign fables, which should serve to bring forth and keep a good opinion of them. Doubtless we must not jest in divine matters. Further, the law of God is equal, and evermore one: and as it will not have the common people to lie; so doth it also forbid the same to magistrates. Howbeit, they cannot justly be accused of a lie, which in their talk be far from double meaning. For otherwhile it cometh to pass, that some speak that which is false; and yet they thought the same to be true. 2Among which men they also are to be excused, who have given a promise to do a thing; which afterward they be not able to perform: because at the beginning, when they promised it, they were fully minded to do that, which they had promised: and therefore they have not lied. If they afterward do not accomplish those things, which they spake, the same happeneth by some other occasion.
Certeinlie, this was the cause that Augustine was against Ierom, who in a maner fathered an ⟨p. 545⟩officious lie vpon the holie scriptures: If this (saith he) should be so, the authoritie of the holie scriptures would soone be impaired; for the readers thereof would soone saie, that the thing is not so, but that it is so written for the kéeping of men in their dutie. Neither ought the authoritie of Plato to mooue vs much; 1séeing in that place he erred greatlie, granting, that in things perteining to GOD, they might feine fables, which should serue to bring foorth and kéepe a good opinion of them. Doubtles we must not ieast in diuine matters. Further, the lawe of God is equall, and euermore one: and as it will not haue the common people to lie; so dooth it also forbid the same to magistrates. Howbeit, they cannot iustlie be accused of a lie, which in their talke be farre from double meaning. For otherwhile it commeth to passe, that some speake that which is false; and yet they thought the same to be true.
And otherwhile it cometh to pass, that he which delivereth his sword to a man to keep, falleth afterward mad: wherefore he that hath the custody of the sword, ought not to redeliver it unto him; because (as the lawyers say) a new case requireth a new help. 1After the very same sort is Paul excused, who said, that he would go into Spain; when as nevertheless he went not thither. 2Paul also promised to the Corinthians, that he would come unto them; which he performed not, but yet he lied not: because, when he spake those words, he was minded so to do: but God had otherwise appointed it, as Gelasius hath well written, as we find in the 22. cause, question the second, in the chapter Beatus. Undoubtedly, the disposition of God breaketh and dissolveth all bonds: as it is written in the 19. cause, question the second, chapter Duae sunt.
And otherwhile it commeth to passe, that he which deliuereth his sword to a man to kéepe, falleth afterward mad: wherefore he that hath the custodie of the sword, ought not to redeliuer it vnto him; bicause (as the lawiers saie) a new case requireth a new helpe. 1After the verie same sort is Paule excused, who said, that he would go into Spaine; when as neuerthelesse he went not thither. 2Paule also promised to the Corinthians, that he would come vnto them; which he performed not, but yet he lied not: bicause, when he spake those words, he was minded so to doo: but God had otherwise appointed it, as Gelasius hath well written, as we find in the 22. cause, question the second, in the chapter Beatus. Vndoubtedlie, the disposition of God breaketh and dissolueth all bonds: as it is written in the 19. cause, question the second, chapter Duae sunt.
34 But what shall we say touching the hyperbolical speeches, which are in the holy scriptures, which at the first sight seem to be lies? I answer, that although there in signification the sentence keep not a mean in respect of quantity; yet, as touching the manner, it doth. For those excessive speeches amplify a matter, because their nature is not only to set forth a thing, but also to lead men into an admiration, which by that manner of speech they most commodiously attain unto. Neither have lies any place there, forsomuch as they breed not in the the minds of the readers and hearers any false or corrupt sense. A mean therefore must there be kept; undoubtedly, not of the thing, but of the manner. The evangelists also are not to be holden as liars, when as they, setting forth the acts of Christ, do not all use the self same words. For it is sufficient unto the truth, that a thing be set forth as it was: but it is not required to be expressed by the self same words. Yea, it is oftentimes done through the goodness of the holy Ghost, that the manner of the narration should differ. For by such means, those things, which are not sufficiently expressed by one, are more plainly showed by an other.
34 But what shall we saie touching the hyperbolicall spéeches, which are in the holie scriptures, which at the first sight séeme to be lies? I answer, that although there in signification the sentence kéepe not a meane in respect of quantitie; yet, as touching the maner, it dooth. For those excessiue spéeches amplifie a matter, bicause their nature is not onelie to set foorth a thing, but also to lead men into an admiration, which by that maner of spéech they most commodiouslie atteine vnto. Neither haue lies anie place there, forsomuch as they bréed not in the the minds of the readers and hearers anie false or corrupt sense. A meane therefore must there be kept; vndoubtedlie, not of the thing, but of the maner. The euangelists also are not to be holden as liers, when as they, setting foorth the acts of Christ, doo not all vse the selfe same words. For it is sufficient vnto the truth, that a thing be set foorth as it was: but it is not required to be expressed by the selfe same words. Yea, it is oftentimes doone through the goodnesse of the holie Ghost, that the maner of the narration should differ. For by such meanes, those things, which are not sufficientlie expressed by one, are more plainelie shewed by an other.
29 Concerning testimonies out of the holie scriptures, which doo stir vs vp to speake the truth; doubtlesse verie manie might be alledged: but a few shall suffice. In the ten commandements, 1it is written; Thou shalt not beare false witnesse. Which commandement must be obserued, not onelie in iudgement, but in all things, which in our talke we testifie, to be either true or false. Moreouer, God is set before our eies to be followed; 2whom the scriptures in euerie place pronounce to be true. Wherefore we also ought to be most feruent louers of the truth. 3And for that cause Iethro, in the 18. chapter of Exodus, counselled Moses to set such men to be rulers ouer the people, as did feare God, men of courage, louers of the truth, and those, which hated couetousnesse. 4Also Dauid saith; Behold, thou hast loued truth, and therefore thou hast made me to vnderstand wisdome in the inward and secret parts of my mind. These things sufficientlie declare, that we are taught of God both by inward inspiration, and also by outward doctrine; bicause he is a louer of the truth: neither dooth he suffer, that his children should either erre, or be deceiued by lies. In Zacharie, the eight chapter, 5it is written; Speake ye the truth euerie man to his neighbour. Which selfe-same sentence Paule vseth to the Ephesians: 6and he commandeth the same to the Colossians. But in the latter epistle to the Corinthians, 7he saith of himselfe, and of the other apostles, that they can haue nothing against the truth. Yea and the Scribes and Pharisies, being ioined with the Herodians, on this wise flattered Christ (whom they went about to intrap in his spéech;) Maister, 8we knowe that thou acceptest no persons, yea thou teachest the waie of God in truth. Hereby they declared, that it is a singular vertue for a noble and notable man, to prefer the truth before all things. But let these testimonies of the holie scriptures be sufficient at this time.