30 It remaineth, 1that I now come to treat of a lie. Augustine, 2who wrote thereof to Consentius, affirmeth; that A lie is the false signification of the speech. And undoubtedly, of this vice may all those things be spoken by a contrary position, which are before declared of truth. And first, contrary to that, which Tully affirmed of truth; that that is true, whereby things which are, which have been, and which shall be, are said to be unaltered. And a lie is that, whereby is signified that, which is not: for Augustine defined truth by the contrary. This vice is so hurtful, that it maketh a man, which is infected therewith, to rejoice, and be glad in falsehood. The general word of truth, is equality; 3and the general of this vice, inequality. And as truth is very near joined with simplicity, so a lie belongeth to doubleness. Truth is a part of justice, but a lie is a part of injustice. By truth, the society of man is preserved; but by lying, it is hurt and overthrown. But return we to Augustine, who writeth; that He is said to lie, which with a will to deceive speaketh that, which is false: & that, To lie, is nothing else, but to go against the mind; for liars speak another thing than they have in their mind. But the desire to deceive is utterly against justice, love, and amity; which we mutually owe one towards another. So then there be three things in a lie; first, 4to speak that which is false; secondly, his will in speaking; and thirdly, a desire to deceive. The first part belongeth to the matter of a lie; the other two parts pertain unto the form.
30 It remaineth, 1that I now come to treat of a lie. Augustine, 2who wrote thereof to Consentius, affirmeth; that A lie is the false signification of the spéech. And vndoubtedlie, of this vice may all those things be spoken by a contrarie position, which are before declared of truth. And first, contrarie to that, which Tullie affirmed of truth; that that is true, whereby things which are, which haue béene, and which shall be, are said to be vnaltered. And a lie is that, whereby is signified that, which is not: for Augustine defined truth by the contrarie. This vice is so hurtfull, that it maketh a man, which is infected therewith, to reioise, and be glad in falsehood. The generall word of truth, is equalitie; 3and the generall of this vice, inequalitie. And as truth is verie néere ioined with simplicitie, so a lie belongeth to doublenesse. Truth is a part of iustice, but a lie is a part of iniustice. By truth, the societie of man is preserued; but by lieng, it is hurt and ouerthrowne. But returne we to Augustine, who writeth; that He is said to lie, which with a will to deceiue speaketh that, which is false: & that, To lie, is nothing else, but to go against the mind; for liers speake another thing than they haue in their mind. But the desire to deceiue is vtterlie against iustice, loue, and amitie; which we mutuallie owe one towards another. So then there be thrée things in a lie; first, 4to speake that which is false; secondlie, his will in speaking; and thirdlie, a desire to deceiue. The first part belongeth to the matter of a lie; the other two parts perteine vnto the forme.
- 1Of a lie.
- 2Augustine.
- 3Inequality the general word of a lie.Inequalitie the generall word of a lie.
- 4Three things incident to a lie.